The commoner. (Lincoln, Neb.) 1901-1923, September 07, 1906, Page 9, Image 9

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If ten corporations conspiring to-
rrestraint of trade are threatened with
kt, all they have to do now is to dis-
otwt tiMir separate corporations and turn their
provMwfover to a new corporation. The new
corporation can proceed to do the same thing
that the irparate corporations attempted, and yet
not TloUtU the law. We need, therefore, new
togiuftUon pd the republican party not only fails
jvt lucn legislation, out rails even to pronr
iffcTho democratic party must be prepared to
legislation which will be sufficient.
iWSfc' that nearly all the crookedness revealed
Ilk 'law management of our large corpora-
tiopuiEive been due largely to the dupli
CUkmof directorates. A group of men
prapaappQ, or obtained control of, several corpor-
.doing business with each other and then
to swindle the stockholders of the va-
rporations for which they acted. No man
re two masters, and the director who at
to do so will fail, no matter how much
ie makes, before his failure is discovered.
the trusts control prices by the Bame
The same group of men secure control
jral competing corporations and the man-
it is thus consolidated. It is worth while
ilder whether a blow may not be struck at
ists by a law making it illegal for the same
to act as director or officer of two cor-
tioas which deal with each other or are en-
in the same general business.
. I A of 111 mmv f n i.iao Ti In rr romorlif nrn o Trt
sTSL Oblil UAtSA V JLKA A VUVUIUH -A4 - V J IT C(J W J
by the democratic platform of 1900, namely,
miring of corporations to take out a federal
so before engaging in interstate commerce,
remedy is simple, easily applied and com-
lensive. The requiring of a license would not
irass legitimate corporations it would scarce-
feconvenience them while it would confine
)redatory corporations to the state of their
Just as a federal license to sell liquor
ss the possessor of the license to sell only in
rdance with the laws of the state in which
resides, so a corporate license granted by a
fcral commission would not interfere with the
it of each state to regulate foreign corpora-
id doing business within its borders.
I "If corporations were required to take out a
ral licence the, federal jgover.nment could then
the license upon the terms and conditions
Sh, would protect the public. A corporation
rs from a human being in that it has no nat
rlghts and as all of its rights are derived
the statutes it can be limited or restrained
Drding as the public welfare may require. The
rol which congress has over Interstate com-
is complete and if congress can prevent the
iportation of a lottery ticket through the
by the express companies or by freight, It
Pcertainly forbid the use of the mails, the
ravs and the telecranh lines to any cornora-
Ewhich is endeavoring to monopolize an article
mmerce, and no party can long be credited
Bf alnnorltv "f If ffl f ftTTl Tl H fhfk trllRtcj with
only and then permits the trusts to employ
iie instrumentalities of interstate commerce
carrying out of their nefarious plans. It Is
jier to prevent, a monopoly than to watch
ir punish it, and this prevention can be ac-
jished in a practical way by refusing a license
corporation which controls more than a
proportion of the total product this pro
to be arbitrarily fixed at a point which
HflH 'give free operation to competition.
K, jTne tariir question is very cioseiy auieu to
fit trust question and the reduction of the tariff
tames an easy means of limiting the extortion
the trusts can practice. While abso-
m free trade would not necessarily make
utrust impossible, still it is probable
very few manufacturing establishments
Id dare to enter into a trust if the president
empowered to put upon the free list articles
jting with those controlled by a trust.
I shall take occasion at an early day to
Ider the tariff question more at length, I
lot permit this opportunity to pass without
Rgsing the opinion that the principle embod-
the protective tariff has been the. fruitful
of a great deal of political corruption as
as the mother of many of our most iniquit
'trusts. It is difficult to condemn the manu-
jturers for uniting to take advantage of a high
iff schedule when the schedule is framed on
ie theory that the industries need all the protec-
m given and it is not likely that the benenciar-
of these schedules will consent to tneir reduc-
m so long as the public waits for the tariff to
reformed by its friends.
"But one of the worst features of the tariff,
jvied not for revenue, but for the avowed pur-
)se of protection, Is that it fosters the idea that
'men should use their votes to advance their
own financial interests. The manufacturer has
boon assured that it is legitimate for him to vote
for congressmen who, whatever their opinions on
other subjects may bo, will legislate larger divi
dends into his pockets; sheep growers have been
encouraged to bollevo that they should have no
higher aim in voting than to raise the price of
wool; and laboring men have been urged to make
their wages their only concern.
"For a generation the 'fat' has been fried
out of the manufacturers by the republican cam
paign committee, and then tho manufactur
ers have been reimbursed by legislation. With
the public conscience educated to believe that this
open purchase of legislation was entirely proper,
no wonder that Insurance companies have used
the money of their policyholders to carry elec
tionsno wonder that trusts have hastened to
purchase immunity from punishment with liberal
donations! How can we draw a moral distinction
between tho man who sells his vote for five dol
lars on election day and the manufacturer who
sells his political influenco for fifty or a hundred
thousand dollars, payable in dividends'? How
can we draw a moral line between the senator
or congressman elected by the trusts to prevent
hostile legislation and the senator or congress
man kept in congress by the manufacturers to
secure friendly legislation? Tho party that
justifies the one form of bribery can not be relied
upon to condemn the other.
"There never was a time when tariff reform
could be more easily entered upon, for the man
ufacturers by selling abroad cheaper than at
home, as many of them do, have not only shown
their ingratitude toward those who built the tariff
wall for them, but they have demonstrated their
ability to sell in competition with the world. The
high tariff has long been a burden to the con
sumers in the United States and it is growing
more and more a menace to our foreign commerce
because it arouses resentment and provokes re
taliation. "The railroad question Is also interwoven
with the trust question. Nearly .all the private
monopolies have received rebates or secured other
advantages over competitors. Absolute equality
of treatment at the hands of the railroads would
go far toward crippling the trusts, and I rejoice
that the president has had the courage to press
the question upon congress. While the law, as it
was finally distorted by the senate, is not all that
could be wished, It deserves a fair trial.
"Rate regulation was absolutely necessary
and it furnishes some relief from the unbearable
condition which previously existed, ht we must
not forget that the vesting of this enormous pow
er in the hands of a commission appointed by
the president introduces a new danger. If an
appointive board has the power to fix rates and
can, by the exercise of that power, increase or
decrease by hundreds of millions of dollars the
annual revenues of the railroads, will not the
railroads feel that they have a large pecuniary
interest in the election of a president friendly
to the railroads? Experience has demdnstrated
that municipal corruption is largely traceable to
the fact that franchised corporations desire to con
trol of the city council and thus Increase divi
dends of the franchised corporations. If the
railroad managers adopt the same policy,
the sentiment in favor of the ownership of the
railroads by the government is likely to Increase
as rapidly throughout the country as the senti
ment in favor of municipal ownership has in
creased In the cities.
"I have already reached the conclusion that
railroads partake eo much of the nature of a
monopoly that they must ultimately become pub
lic property and be managed by public officials
in the interest of the whole community in ac
cordance with the well defined theory that public
ownership is necessary where competition Is im
possible. I do not know that the country is ready
for this change; I do not know that a majority
of my own party favor it, but I believe that an
increasing number of the members of all parties
see in public ownership the only sure remedy for
discrimination between persons and places and
for extortionate rates for the carrying of freight
and passengers.
"Believing, however, that the operation of all
the railroads by the federal government would
so centralize the government as to almost oblit
erate state lines, I prefer to see only the trunk
lines operated by the federal government and the
local lines by the several state governments. Some
have opposed this dual ownership as impractic
able, but investigation In Europe has convinced
me that It is entirely practicable. Nearly all the
railroads of Germany are owned by the several
states, the empire not even owning trunk lines.
and yet tho interstate traffic Is irf no wise ofc
Btructed. In travollng from Constantinople to
Vienna one passes through Turkey, Bulgaria,
Sorvia, Hungary and a part of Austria without a
change of cars. And yot, each country owns and
operates its own roads and different languages
are spoken on tho different divisions of tho lines.
Sweden and Norway each owns Its railroads,
but they have no trouble about interstate trnfllc,
although their political relations are somowhat
stra nod. The ownership and operation of tho
local lines by tho several Btato governments Is
not only feasible but it suits itself to the condi
tions existing in tho various states. In those
states where the people are ripe for a change the
local lines can be purchased or now lines bo built
at once, while privato ownership can continue
in those states in which tho ncopto still prefer
private ownership. Some states have boon more
careful than others to prevent the watering of
stock and in the acquiring of roads each state
can act according to the situation which it has
to meet.
"As to the right of the governments, fede'ral
and state, to own and operate railroads there
can be no doubt. If we can deepen tho water In
tho lakes and build connecting canals In ordor
to cheapen railroad transportation during half of
the year, we can build a railroad nnd cheapen
rates tho whole year; if we can spend several
hundred millions on the Panama canal to lower
transcontinental rates, we can build a railroad
from Now York to San Francisco to lower both
transcontinental and local rates. The United
States mall is increasing so rapidly that we shall
soon be able to pay the interest on tho cost of
trunk lines out of tho money which we now pay
to railroads for carrying through malls. If any of
you question the propriety of my mentioning this
subject I beg to remind you that the president
could not have secured the passage of the rate
bill had he not appealed to tho fear of tho more
radical remedy of government ownership and
nothing will so restrain the railroad magnates
from attempting to capture tho interstate com
merce commission as the same fear. The high
handed manner in which they have violated law
and ignored authority, together with the corrup
tion discovered in high places has done more to
create sentiment in favor of publio ownership
than all tho speeches and arguments of tho oppo
nents of private ownership.
"I have referred to the railroad question
as a part of the trust question because they are
so Interwoven that it is difficult to consider one
without tho other.
"Just a word more in regard to the trusts.
Some defend them on the ground that they are
an economic development and that they can not
be prevented without great injury to our indus
trial system. This may be answered in two
ways: First, trusts are a political development
rather than an economic one; and, second, the
trust system can not be permitted to continue
even though It did result in a net economic gain.
It is political because it rests upon tho corpora
tion and the corporation rests upon a statutory
foundation. The trust, instead of being a natural
development, is a form of legalized larceny, and
can exist only so long as tho law permits it to
exist. That there is an economic advantage in
production on a large scale, may be admitted but
because a million yards of cloth can be produced
in one factory at a lower price per yard than one
hundred thousand yards can be produced In the
same factory, it does not follow that cloth would
be produced at a still lower price per yard if all
the cloth consumed In the United States were pro
duced in one factory or under one management.
There is a point beyond which the economic ad
vantage of large production ceases. The,
moment an industry approaches the posi
tion of a monopoly it begins to lose in
economic efficiency, for a monopoly discourages
Invention, invites deterioration In quality and destroys-
a most potent factor in production, viz.:
individual tambitlon. But the political objections
to a trust overcome any economic advantage
which it can possibly have. No economic advan
tage can justify an industrial despotism or com
pensate the nation for the loss of Independence
among Its producers. Political liberty could not
long endure under an industrial system which per
mitted a few powerful magnates to control tho
means of livelihood of tho rest of the people.'
"Landlordism, the curse of Europe, is an in
nocent institution in comparison with the
trust carried to its logical conclusion.
The man who argues that there Is an
economic advantage In private monopoly is aid
ing socialism. The socialist, asserting the eco
nomic superiority of the monopoly, Insists that
(Continued on Page 14)
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