15
MAT 10 1005
The Cominoner.
A REMEDY FOR THE TRUSTS
(Continued from pago 3.) the democratic national platform adop-
TJnder the constitution congress has ted at Kansas City in 1900, and has
power to regulate interstate commerce since been endorsed by tho present
and in some respects congress can
apply a much more effective remedy
than is within tho power of any state.
Somo have suggested the uso of the
taxing power. While corporations
ought to be taxed for revenue pur
poses, it i& questionable whether tho
taxing power can be successfully used
to exterminate a trust. A corporation
which has an actual monopoly is in
a position to transfer to the consumer
any taxes laid upon it, so that the'tions in their own interest and for
head of tho bureau of corporations,
Mr. Garfield. The plan contemplates
a law requiring corporations engaged
in interstate commerce to take out a
federal license upon terms and con
ditions to be prescribed by tho law.
Under this plan a corporation orga
nized in a state could do business In
that state without interference from
without, Tho people of the state could
be trusted to regulate such corpora
first effect of a tax might be to in
crease the extortion of which the trust
is guilty. Then, too, it would be diffi
cult to levy an internal revenue tax
in such a way as to hurt only the cor
porations at which tho tax was aimed.
Tho removal of tho tariff from articles
which come into competition with
trust-made goods would lessen the
extortion now practiced and discour
age tho organization of trusts among
manufacturers, but it would not en
tirely destroy tho trusts, and most of
the advocates of protection oppose the
remedy, although many of them would
like to see the trusts exterminated.
The most effective weapon within
the reach of the federal government,
without new legislation, is the crimi
nal clause of the Sherman law. White
it is grossly inadequate, and while
the penalty is disproportionate to the
magnitude of the crime, its enforce
ment would accomplish more than
anything that has been tried. Tho
long term of imprisonment prescribed
for a man who steals a few hundred
dollars and the short term of impris
onment prescribed for a trust magnate
who is guilty of stealing hundreds of
thousands or even a million dollars
from the people, show how tenderly
tho large offenders are dealt with
even when criminal prosecution is
proposed. But notwithstanding the in
adequacy of the punishment, the crim
inal -clause would, if enforced, kill
some of the trusts. A few trust mag
nates actually serving time in the
penitentiary would do more to stop
the present trend toward monopoly
than any amount of publicity more
than all the injunction sults which
could be commenced.
But the Sherman law does not cover
the entire field. It only prohibits
combinations between separate and
distinct corporations or independent
concerns. The weakness of the Sher
man law lies in the fact that a half
dozen trust magnates, if prosecuted
under the Sherman law, can evade
future prosecutions by selling all of
the plants of the Various separate cor
porations to a new corporation, and
becoming tho managers of it. The
steel trust has done this very thing,
and so far as the Sherman law is
concerned occupies a more favorable
position than the corporations en
gaged in the meat packing business.
The Sherman law needs to be amend
ed so as to make it a criminal of
fense for one person or a group of
persons to attempt to monopolize any
product, whether the persons are con
nected with several separate corpora
tions or are stockholders or directors
of a single corporation. But it is al
ways difficult to prove conspiracy, and
it would be especially difficult to prove
it where the persons charged with
conspiracy were directors of one cor
poration. The abolition of railroad rebates
and discriminations would go far to
ward crippling the trusts. They have
profited largely by favors coaxed or
forced from the railroads; but somo
trusts might possibly exist under the
strictest regulation, or even under pub
lic ownership.
There is a remedy which, if en
forced, would not only exterminate all
existing monopolies, but would prevent
the creation of any monopolies in the
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their own protection. Tho moment
a corporation organized in any state
attempts to do business outsjdo of the
state it enters the sphere of interstate
commerce, and comes under tho scru
tiny of the federal authorities. A low
requiring a license could be easily
complied with by legitimate corpora
tions. If, for instance, the law re
quired a corporation applying for li
cense to show that there was no water
in its stock, and that it was not try
ing to monopolize any branch of busi
ness or the production of any article
of merchandise, it would impose no
hardship upon the corporation, be
cause the evidence would be at haul
and tho legitimate corporation could
well Afford to take the trouble to se
cure a license in order to obtain pro
tection from corporations bent upon
monopoly.
This plan strikes at the root of the
evil, "and it strikes in such a way as to
disable the monopoly without injuring
any other corporations. To be sure,
the law must be enforced by individ
uals, and the individuals intrusted
with the enforcement of the law might
fail to do their duty, but that is true
of all laws. Where the law requires
compliance with certain specific condi
tions it is, however, easier to hold
the officials to strict accountability.
If it is objected that it might be
difficult to determine what constitutes
a monopoly, it is sufficient to say that
tho law can, if necessary, fix the pro
portion of the total product which any
corporation can produce or control.
For instance, the law might fix tho
proportion at 75 per cent, or 50 per
cent, or 25 per cent, or any other per
cent, and say that the control of more
than tho stated per cent would pre
vent the granting of, a license or for
feit a license already granted. Would
such a law be unconstitutional? When
this plan was first proposed at the
Chicago anti-trust .conference in 1890
the question of its constitutionality
was raised. There is no reason to
doubt the constitutionality of such .a
law. Corporations are creatures of
law and congress has power to con
trol corporations engaged in interstato
commerce. If congress can prohibit
the carrying of a lottery ticket either
by mail or express, when both the
vendor and the vendee want the ticket
transported, it can certainly prevent
the use of the mails, the telegraph
lines, and the railroads for the trans
portation of the merchandise of a
corporation when the purpose of that
corporation is to destroy competition
and harm the publig. A private mo
nopoly has always been an outlaw,
and it requires a stretch of the Imagi
nation to suppose that the supremo
court would so construe the constitu
tion as to protect a corporation in
the doing of a thing regarded through
all history as unlawful.
In dealing with the question of mo
nopoly two distinctions ought to be
drawn. First, a fictitious person cre
ated by law ought to be distinguished
from tho natural person of flesh and
blood. The natural man living in
any state in the union Is, and should
be, allowed to trade freely with nat
ural men in other states, and no state
would be justified in discriminating in
favor of its own citizens as against
the Citizens of any other state. But
New Steel Roofing and Sitting
1'alntcd red on both aides
92.00 Per 100 Square Feci.
Motit durable and economical corcring for Hoofing, Biding or Celling, for Barns Shtdn, Home. Stares,
diuretic, Poultry Ileuses, Crib, etc. Cheaper and will last longer than any other material. Bhoeta
Biz and eight loot long. -- -- -
We Pay the Freight
to all points East of Colorado, except Indian Territory. Oklahoma and Texas. Write for price for shipment
to such points. This roofing at IZOO per smiaro la our fo. 10 grade, flat.aomMiardencU. ri 10 for corrugated
"V" crimped or pressed standing scam, sits for hrlclr siding and beaded celling or siding. No experience
noccesanr. Bend us your order for Jmmodlato shipment. Wo haro otho grades.
WHITE FOK FltKK OATALOHUB No. ' on Building Malarial Wlro, Pipe, numbing Material,
Furniture, Household Uoods, eta We lluy at SkcrltV asd Itccclrers' Hale. -
CHICAGO HOUSE WRECKING CO., 35th & Iron 8ts.v Chloago.
future. This remedy was suggested in this right of citizens to trade freely
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It's All in the Bellows
THE pianist produces his effects upon the piano by means of
muscular force, exerted by his fingers, trained by long years
of persistent practice. In the piano-player, air takes the place
of muscle; that is, the mechanical fingers of the piano-player are actu
ated by air. The bellows, which furnishes the motive-power, must be
exceedingly sensitive, so that the force of each stroke of the mechani
cal fingers upon the piano keys can be perfectly regulated by the pres
sure of the feet upon the pedals.
The bellows must provide the performer at all times with a reserve
power which will enable him to accent a note, to swing Instantly from
the softest pianissimo to the heaviest fortissimo, or vice versa, and
which will permit these things to be accomplished with the least pos
sible effort. It is because the patented bellows construction in the
Cecilian Piak.no-Pla.yer
makes it possible for the performer to do these things surely and
easily at all times that the Cecilian is today far superior to any other
piano-player on the market.
Inside of the big operating bellows of the Cecilian is a small bel
lows with a narrow, contracted outlet. When the pedals are worked,
both parts of this compound bellows are Immediately put Into action.
As the air with which the smaller bellows is filled nust escape into
the larger bellows, you will readily see that the large bellows must
first be exhausted before the small bellows comes Into play.
The small bellows thus provides a reserve force which continues
to operate, the mechanical fingers of the player without any loss of
power after the force of the big bellows has been exhausted. This pe
culiar and patented bellows construction in the Cecilian, gives the
performer the utmost freedom for individual expression, and enables
him to pro'duce the most delicate effects in tone coloring, with an abso
lutely non-mechanical touch, and also makes it possible for a woman
a to operate xne oecuian wunuut Tcuiguc.
I The Cecilian can be attached to any piano, and with It any one
I can play any music without previous experience or musical knowledge.
I The price is $250.00. Easy payments if desired. Write for booklet.
I Farraind Organ Company, Dept. W.
I Pa
Paris, France.
DETROIT, MICH.
London, Eng.
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