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Commoner.
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WILLIAil J. BRYAN, EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR.
. Vol. 3. No. 47.
Lincoln, Nebraska, December n, 1903.
Whole No. 151.
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THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE .
. Tho president's message is remarkable for
what it does not say. That portion of tho mes
sage devoted to Panama is the only really inter
esting feature.
So far as'the administration's Panama policy
is concerned, Mr. Roosevelt does not hesitate to
accept the responsibility, making it very plain,
indeed, that he is proud of his achievements with
respect to the new republic on the isthmus. Sifted
down, Mr. Roosevelt's defense of his Panama pol
icy is that "the end justifies the means," al
though he makes an effort, and a feeble ono, to
show that there are precedents for his course, and
that he is sustained by the interpretation which
several distinguished secretaries of state, dur
ing the earlier days, placed upon tho treaty of
1846.
Aside from its reference to Panama, thp mes
sage is one of the strangest documents that was
ever sent from the White house. It reads more
like the report -of a department chief, who un
derstands that he is expected to go Into details,
but who is very reluctant to express an opinion
concerning any of the policies with which he
deals.
The president Ignores altogether the tariff
question.
In treating the financial situation, the presi
dent says that the same liberty should be granted
the secretary of the treasury to deposit customs
receipts as is granted himto deposit all receipts
from other sources. He then dismisses the finan
cial question by directing attention to his message
of December 2, 1902. He again asks tile consid
eration of congress for the plans then proposed,
It vill be remembored that in his message of
December 2, 1902, the president safd that "it is
necessary that there should be an element of
elasticity in our monetary system." In that mes
sage he said: "Banks are the natural servants of
commerce and upon them should be placed as far
.as practicable the burden of furnishing and main-
taining a circulation adequate to supply the needs
of our diversified industries and our domestic and
foreign commerce, and tho issuo of this should
be so regulated that a sufficient supply should bo
always available for the business interests of tho
country." He -suggested "tho use of such instru
mentalities as will automatically supply every
legitimate demand of productive industries and
commerce not only in tho amount, but in tho
character of tho circulation; and of making all
kinds of money interchangeable and at tho will of
the holder convertible into tho established gold
standard."
Since the message of December, 1902, was
delivered, wo have been told that Mr. Roosevelt
meant "automatic currency;" and from tho defini
tions we subsequently received, wo have learned
that Mr. Roosevelt's "automatic currency" or Mr.
Shaw's "emergency currency" means nothing, more
nor less than asset currency.
The president refers to tho merchant marine
In a way to justify tho Impression that ho Is in
favor of a ship subsidy, although he does not
seem to be willing to state his position clearly.
It may not be doubted that whqn thojjommission,
tho creation of which is recoramonued by the
president, shall make its report, it will present
a subsidy scheme.
Even upon the question of abolishing tho
tariff between the United States and tho Philip
pines, the president treads very lightly. .Ho points
out that "congress should ever keop in mind
that peculiar obligations rest upon ub to further
in every way tho welfare of these communities;"
and he adds; "The .Philippines should bo knit
closer to us by tariff arrangements," but ho
leaves congress to guess whether ho is in favor
of abolishing tho Philippine tariff or making a
marked reduction in that tariff.
Tho president seems to have a weakness for
commissions and so he announces that he has ap
pointed a commission whose duty it will bo to
investigate tho operation of existing land laws
and recommend whatever 'changes may be desir
able. On this. subject, the president says that his
purpose is "to effect tho largest practicable dis
position of tho public lands to actual settlors who
will build permanent homes upon them," and
it is oafo to say that a very largo majority of tho
American pcoplo are heartily In sympathy with
that purpose.
. It will bo observed that while the president
rolteratos tho recommendations mado in his mes
sago of December, JJ)02, with respect to the cur
rency question, he does not tako tho trouble to
reiterate his statement with respect to the tariff
question. Many peoplo will wonder how tho
president could persuado himself to Ignore alto
gether tho tariff question just at this tlmo when
that question Is being moro generally dlscussod
among tho peoplo than for soveral years.
Tho president touches very lightly upon tho
trust question, speaks, enthusiastically of the new
department of commerco, says that tho work of
tho bureau of corporations will bo productivo of
great good, emphasizes tho plan of "publicity,"
leaving tho impression upon his reader that that
is tho solo thing to bo desired in treating the
great trust evil. In fact, tho president seems to
regard tho trust question, concerning which thero
is largo discussion among tho peoplo, as of com
paratively littlo importance. So anxious uoes ho
seem to be to avoid giving tho slightest offense to
the trust magnates that tho word "trusts" Is not
at all conspicuous and is used In an Incidental
way perhaps In half a dozen places.
Altogether, tho message must bo unsatisfac
tory, oven to republicans, because it leaves the Im
pression that It was written not by a man whoso
greatest anxiety Is for thocorroet solution of pub
lic problems, but rather by a man whose largest
concern is for a nomination to tho office ho now
holds.
Those who will carefully read tho president's
message from tho beginning to tho end will, wo
think, conclude that it bears tho earmarks of an
ambitious politician rather than tho impress of a
great president.
. MR. ROOSEVELT ON PANAMA .
In dealing with the Panama question, In his
message to congress, Mr. Roosevelt is not en
tirely candid. It is not difficult to learn from his
treatment of the subject that he takes great
pride in the part his administration hass played
in that sorry affair; and yet he lacks candor be
cause while he goes into such details as may
suit his purpose, directing attention even to ev
ery riot that occurred on the isthmus, he deliber
ately ignores in his statement of tho treaty of
184G, the guarantee by the United States of Colom
bia's (then New Granada) sovereignty over tho
isthmus; and while ignoring this Important guar
antee, Mr. Roosevelt pushes' to tho front our
guarantee of "the perfect neutrality" of the isth
mus. For Instance, pretending to describe the treaty
of 1846, Mr. Roosevelt says:
''In the year 1846, this government en
tered into a treaty with New Granada, tho
predecessor upon the isthmus of the republic
of Colombia, and Of tho present republic of
Panama, by which treaty it was provided
that1 the government and citizens of the United
States should always have free and open right
of way across tho isthmus of Panama, by any
modes or communications that might be con
structed, "WHILE IN RETURN our govern
ment guaranteed the PERFECT NEUTRAL
ITY of the above mentioned Isthmus with tho
view that tho freo transit from the ono to
the other sea might not bo interrupted or em
barrassed." Now, look at tho treaty, of 1846. In that treaty,
after tho government of Colombia (then New
Granada) had guaranteed to tho government of
the United States tho right of way across tho
Isthmus, and certain other privileges, which our ,
government had eagerly sought for, it was said:
"And In order to .secure to themselves
the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these
advantages and as an especial compensation
for certain advantages and for the favors they
have acquired by the fourth, fifth and sixth
articles of this treaty, the United States
GUARANTEE POSITIVELY AND EFFICACI
OUSLY to New Granada by the present slip-
ulation the perfect neutrality of tho before
mentioned isthmus, with tho view that the
pre-translt from tho ono to the other sea
may not be interrupted or embarrassed at any
future time while this treaty exlstd; and, IN
CONSEQUENCE, THE UNITED STATES
ALSO GUARANTEE IN THE SAME MAN
NER THE RIGHT OF SOVERIGNTY AND
PROPERTY WHICH NEW GRANADA (now
COLOMBIA) HAS AND POSSESSES OVER
THE SAID TERRITORY."
Not ono word, in Mr. Roosevelt's description
of the treaty of 1846, to show that tho United
States "positively and efficaciously" guarantee to
New Granada (now Colombia) tho right of sov
ereignty and property which New Granada (now
Colombia) has and possesses over tho said ter-
ritory
That in omitting this very Important provi
sion from his description of tho treaty of 1846,
Mr Roosevelt acted deliberately, is plainly to bo
seen when it is observed that he goes to tho
trouble of quoting from Secretary of State Sew
ard in 1865 and from Attorney General Speed in
1865 and all to tho effect that the guarantee of
Now Granada's sovereignty did not mean that the
UniTed states would become a party to Colombia's
domestic troubles, but that this guarantee was
.meant rather to protect tho Colombian govern
ment as against other and foreign governments.
But how do these quotations from Messrs.
Seward and Speed help Mr. Roosevelt?
Mr. Seward said: "The United States has
taken and will tako no Interest In any question of
the internal revolutions in tho state of Panama
or any state of the United States of Colombia, but
will maintain a perfect neutrality In connection
with such domestic altercations;" and when tho
president of the United States of Colombia had
called upon tho American government for a force
to protect tho Isthmus of Panama from a body of
insurgents of that country, Mr. Seward said that
"neither the text nor the spirit of tho stipulation
in that article impose an obligation on this gov
ernment to comply with the requisition."
But, if tho insurgents at that time in Panama
had called upon Mr. Seward for a force to protect
them from tho parent government, what would
Mr. Seward have said? If the proposition had
been made that the United States government In-
terfere in that revolution in bejialf of the insur
gents and against the parent government, what
would Mr. Seward have said?
Unquestionably, his answer would have been
the same as the answer quoted by Mr. Roosevelt
In his message. Mr. Seward would have said to
the Insurgents' that "The United States has taken
and will take no Interest in any question of In
ternal revolution in the Colombian government."
Ho would have said that "tho United States will
maintain a perfect neutrality in connection with
such domestic altercations." Because every in
telligent man knows that ho would have said It,
because the very language used by Mr. Seward
and quoted by Mr. Roosevelt justifies that belief.
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