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About The commoner. (Lincoln, Neb.) 1901-1923 | View Entire Issue (Dec. 11, 1903)
"HWWfft r i Commoner. t.', ; pi WILLIAil J. BRYAN, EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR. . Vol. 3. No. 47. Lincoln, Nebraska, December n, 1903. Whole No. 151. v"7 THa fit. hl m n THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE . . Tho president's message is remarkable for what it does not say. That portion of tho mes sage devoted to Panama is the only really inter esting feature. So far as'the administration's Panama policy is concerned, Mr. Roosevelt does not hesitate to accept the responsibility, making it very plain, indeed, that he is proud of his achievements with respect to the new republic on the isthmus. Sifted down, Mr. Roosevelt's defense of his Panama pol icy is that "the end justifies the means," al though he makes an effort, and a feeble ono, to show that there are precedents for his course, and that he is sustained by the interpretation which several distinguished secretaries of state, dur ing the earlier days, placed upon tho treaty of 1846. Aside from its reference to Panama, thp mes sage is one of the strangest documents that was ever sent from the White house. It reads more like the report -of a department chief, who un derstands that he is expected to go Into details, but who is very reluctant to express an opinion concerning any of the policies with which he deals. The president Ignores altogether the tariff question. In treating the financial situation, the presi dent says that the same liberty should be granted the secretary of the treasury to deposit customs receipts as is granted himto deposit all receipts from other sources. He then dismisses the finan cial question by directing attention to his message of December 2, 1902. He again asks tile consid eration of congress for the plans then proposed, It vill be remembored that in his message of December 2, 1902, the president safd that "it is necessary that there should be an element of elasticity in our monetary system." In that mes sage he said: "Banks are the natural servants of commerce and upon them should be placed as far .as practicable the burden of furnishing and main- taining a circulation adequate to supply the needs of our diversified industries and our domestic and foreign commerce, and tho issuo of this should be so regulated that a sufficient supply should bo always available for the business interests of tho country." He -suggested "tho use of such instru mentalities as will automatically supply every legitimate demand of productive industries and commerce not only in tho amount, but in tho character of tho circulation; and of making all kinds of money interchangeable and at tho will of the holder convertible into tho established gold standard." Since the message of December, 1902, was delivered, wo have been told that Mr. Roosevelt meant "automatic currency;" and from tho defini tions we subsequently received, wo have learned that Mr. Roosevelt's "automatic currency" or Mr. Shaw's "emergency currency" means nothing, more nor less than asset currency. The president refers to tho merchant marine In a way to justify tho Impression that ho Is in favor of a ship subsidy, although he does not seem to be willing to state his position clearly. It may not be doubted that whqn thojjommission, tho creation of which is recoramonued by the president, shall make its report, it will present a subsidy scheme. Even upon the question of abolishing tho tariff between the United States and tho Philip pines, the president treads very lightly. .Ho points out that "congress should ever keop in mind that peculiar obligations rest upon ub to further in every way tho welfare of these communities;" and he adds; "The .Philippines should bo knit closer to us by tariff arrangements," but ho leaves congress to guess whether ho is in favor of abolishing tho Philippine tariff or making a marked reduction in that tariff. Tho president seems to have a weakness for commissions and so he announces that he has ap pointed a commission whose duty it will bo to investigate tho operation of existing land laws and recommend whatever 'changes may be desir able. On this. subject, the president says that his purpose is "to effect tho largest practicable dis position of tho public lands to actual settlors who will build permanent homes upon them," and it is oafo to say that a very largo majority of tho American pcoplo are heartily In sympathy with that purpose. . It will bo observed that while the president rolteratos tho recommendations mado in his mes sago of December, JJ)02, with respect to the cur rency question, he does not tako tho trouble to reiterate his statement with respect to the tariff question. Many peoplo will wonder how tho president could persuado himself to Ignore alto gether tho tariff question just at this tlmo when that question Is being moro generally dlscussod among tho peoplo than for soveral years. Tho president touches very lightly upon tho trust question, speaks, enthusiastically of the new department of commerco, says that tho work of tho bureau of corporations will bo productivo of great good, emphasizes tho plan of "publicity," leaving tho impression upon his reader that that is tho solo thing to bo desired in treating the great trust evil. In fact, tho president seems to regard tho trust question, concerning which thero is largo discussion among tho peoplo, as of com paratively littlo importance. So anxious uoes ho seem to be to avoid giving tho slightest offense to the trust magnates that tho word "trusts" Is not at all conspicuous and is used In an Incidental way perhaps In half a dozen places. Altogether, tho message must bo unsatisfac tory, oven to republicans, because it leaves the Im pression that It was written not by a man whoso greatest anxiety Is for thocorroet solution of pub lic problems, but rather by a man whose largest concern is for a nomination to tho office ho now holds. Those who will carefully read tho president's message from tho beginning to tho end will, wo think, conclude that it bears tho earmarks of an ambitious politician rather than tho impress of a great president. . MR. ROOSEVELT ON PANAMA . In dealing with the Panama question, In his message to congress, Mr. Roosevelt is not en tirely candid. It is not difficult to learn from his treatment of the subject that he takes great pride in the part his administration hass played in that sorry affair; and yet he lacks candor be cause while he goes into such details as may suit his purpose, directing attention even to ev ery riot that occurred on the isthmus, he deliber ately ignores in his statement of tho treaty of 184G, the guarantee by the United States of Colom bia's (then New Granada) sovereignty over tho isthmus; and while ignoring this Important guar antee, Mr. Roosevelt pushes' to tho front our guarantee of "the perfect neutrality" of the isth mus. For Instance, pretending to describe the treaty of 1846, Mr. Roosevelt says: ''In the year 1846, this government en tered into a treaty with New Granada, tho predecessor upon the isthmus of the republic of Colombia, and Of tho present republic of Panama, by which treaty it was provided that1 the government and citizens of the United States should always have free and open right of way across tho isthmus of Panama, by any modes or communications that might be con structed, "WHILE IN RETURN our govern ment guaranteed the PERFECT NEUTRAL ITY of the above mentioned Isthmus with tho view that tho freo transit from the ono to the other sea might not bo interrupted or em barrassed." Now, look at tho treaty, of 1846. In that treaty, after tho government of Colombia (then New Granada) had guaranteed to tho government of the United States tho right of way across tho Isthmus, and certain other privileges, which our , government had eagerly sought for, it was said: "And In order to .secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages and as an especial compensation for certain advantages and for the favors they have acquired by the fourth, fifth and sixth articles of this treaty, the United States GUARANTEE POSITIVELY AND EFFICACI OUSLY to New Granada by the present slip- ulation the perfect neutrality of tho before mentioned isthmus, with tho view that the pre-translt from tho ono to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed at any future time while this treaty exlstd; and, IN CONSEQUENCE, THE UNITED STATES ALSO GUARANTEE IN THE SAME MAN NER THE RIGHT OF SOVERIGNTY AND PROPERTY WHICH NEW GRANADA (now COLOMBIA) HAS AND POSSESSES OVER THE SAID TERRITORY." Not ono word, in Mr. Roosevelt's description of the treaty of 1846, to show that tho United States "positively and efficaciously" guarantee to New Granada (now Colombia) tho right of sov ereignty and property which New Granada (now Colombia) has and possesses over tho said ter- ritory That in omitting this very Important provi sion from his description of tho treaty of 1846, Mr Roosevelt acted deliberately, is plainly to bo seen when it is observed that he goes to tho trouble of quoting from Secretary of State Sew ard in 1865 and from Attorney General Speed in 1865 and all to tho effect that the guarantee of Now Granada's sovereignty did not mean that the UniTed states would become a party to Colombia's domestic troubles, but that this guarantee was .meant rather to protect tho Colombian govern ment as against other and foreign governments. But how do these quotations from Messrs. Seward and Speed help Mr. Roosevelt? Mr. Seward said: "The United States has taken and will tako no Interest In any question of the internal revolutions in tho state of Panama or any state of the United States of Colombia, but will maintain a perfect neutrality In connection with such domestic altercations;" and when tho president of the United States of Colombia had called upon tho American government for a force to protect tho Isthmus of Panama from a body of insurgents of that country, Mr. Seward said that "neither the text nor the spirit of tho stipulation in that article impose an obligation on this gov ernment to comply with the requisition." But, if tho insurgents at that time in Panama had called upon Mr. Seward for a force to protect them from tho parent government, what would Mr. Seward have said? If the proposition had been made that the United States government In- terfere in that revolution in bejialf of the insur gents and against the parent government, what would Mr. Seward have said? Unquestionably, his answer would have been the same as the answer quoted by Mr. Roosevelt In his message. Mr. Seward would have said to the Insurgents' that "The United States has taken and will take no Interest in any question of In ternal revolution in the Colombian government." Ho would have said that "tho United States will maintain a perfect neutrality in connection with such domestic altercations." Because every in telligent man knows that ho would have said It, because the very language used by Mr. Seward and quoted by Mr. Roosevelt justifies that belief. 1 'i uut$t