

"To Take What We Need."

That is the Advice that Was Given by Mr. Roosevelt's Advisers, and Several Months Ago the Washington Correspondent for the Chicago Record-Herald Described the Situation as it Exists in Panama Today.

In the light of Panama's revolt from Colombia, it will be interesting to read an article sent in August last to the Chicago Record-Herald by Walter Wellman, the Washington correspondent for that newspaper. Although Panama's revolt came as something of a surprise to Americans generally, it will be seen that Mr. Wellman predicted the situation practically as it exists today and boldly announced that it would be done practically with the sanction and aid of the Roosevelt administration.

In the dispatch to the Record-Herald, printed during the early days of August, Mr. Wellman said that Mr. Roosevelt had no sympathy whatever with the Nicaraguan idea and no intention of having recourse to that route. He declared then that if the then pending treaty finally and completely failed, Mr. Roosevelt would look about for other means of acquiring the necessary rights of Panama and he said that a number of the president's advisers were urging him bluntly "to take what we need."

Mr. Wellman said that probably there is not another first class nation in the world that would hesitate for a moment to seize the isthmus for the purpose of conferring upon it and the world the boon of a canal connecting the two principal oceans of the world; and then Mr. Wellman explained that "only mawkish sentiment and fine-spun moral considerations stand in the way of the United States, and these obstacles are likely to be swept away if the little band of boodlers at Bogota continue to block the path of progress."

Mr. Wellman then declared that "before the time comes when Mr. Roosevelt will be called upon to demonstrate whether or not he has enough nerve to solve the problem with a man-of-war and a battalion of marines, there were various possibilities in the situation which must be permitted to work out.

1. The Colombian congress may ratify the treaty without amendment in order to avert the danger of the threatened secession of the states of Panama and Cauca. 2. If the Colombian legislators are not sufficiently impressed by that hazard, a million or two of French money, contributed by the stockholders of the new Panama Canal company, may open their eyes. Unofficial information received here indicates that the Panama stockholders are watching the situation very care-

fully, and that they have an agent at Bogoto. Rather than lose the chance to sell their property to the United States they would probably be willing to give up a million or two of the \$40,000,000 purchase money to the Colombian recalcitrants, and unless the statesmen of Bogota are much maligned, a million dollars would buy their entire congress, bag and baggage. 3. If the treaty is amended and then ratified there is a possibility that the United States senate may accept the amendments. It will all depend upon what the amendments are. The state department continues to assert unofficially that any amendment of the treaty would be fatal. It is the duty of state department officials to say this for effect at Bogota, but it may or may not be true. A moderate increase in the price of the concession might be accepted by the United States. A provision depriving the United States of the needful control over the canal zone would not be accepted.

It was further pointed out by Mr. Wellman that if everything else failed, Panama and Cauca were likely to revolt and set up as an independent state and that if this revolt were on, it would not take the United States government very long to recognize their independence and not much time would be lost in concluding a treaty with the new government. Mr. Wellman said that the United States is already the ultimate authority in that region and he added:

"By treaty we are required to maintain the freedom of transit across the isthmus. More than once has this government found it necessary to preserve the peace by stationing warships and landing marines there. If a rebellion comes on, of course fighting will ensue, and the United States is already bound to interpose. If out of this ruction there emerges a new isthmian state, protection by the great North American republic and with that great world enterprise, the canal, well assured, the people of Colombia will have their high-headed legislators to thank for it."

This republican correspondent seemed to realize that there might be some criticism as to the "to take what we need" policy, and so in the same article Mr. Wellman said:

"Of course there will be no lack of sentimental people in the United States who will

set up a cry of 'robbery' and 'rapine' and 'imperialism.' But a number of senators and other public men have already told President Roosevelt that, in their opinion, public sentiment will uphold him. If the United States were to seize the isthmus through just for territory or to escape paying a proper price for the canal concession, or through any other improper motive, the censure of the moralists would be well deserved. But everyone knows that if circumstances push the United States into such an enterprise the step will be taken unselfishly. We are to put \$200,000,000 of money in an isthmian canal for the world's good as well as our own. The \$10,000,000 and the annual bonus which Colombia now has a chance to acquire will, in that case, be paid to the isthmian states. The United States will carry to the isthmus not only vast treasures and great prosperity, but the blessings of assured peace, good government, improved sanitation of the region, development of the resources of the country. Even Colombia will lose nothing except the price of the concession, and that her statesmen propose to throw away by defeating the treaty."

Then Mr. Wellman revealed a little secret. He declared:

"In this connection it is interesting to know that for several years Mr. Roosevelt has believed the United States must ultimately take possession of the isthmus as a sort of trustee for civilization. According to his philosophy the owners of great corporations have not the right to do as they like with their property regardless of the interests of the people, nor have the rulers of states the right to do whatever they please with their territory irrespective of the world's needs, or, as our forefathers put it, 'without a decent regard for the opinions of mankind.' These rulers of the state are directly trustees for the people of that country, but indirectly they are trustees for the world's interests that may be affected. They must stand or fall according as they meet their responsibility. Spain's regime in Cuba, China and the South African republics are recent examples of the working of the higher law of accountability beyond the frontiers. The Colombians stand in grave danger of adding their country to the list."

Keep It Dark.

A New York dispatch to the St. Louis Globe-Democrat announces that Charles M. Schwab has secured an order from a New York court granting Schwab leave to intervene as complainant in the suit recently begun by the New York Security and Trust company for the foreclosure of the mortgage of \$10,000,000 which the shipyard trust contracted at the time of its inception. In the same dispatch it is said:

"It is thought by prominent financiers in Wall street who have been following the hearing closely that Schwab will seek another order restraining all further proceedings before the examiner, and compelling the complaining first mortgage bondholders to settle their litigation in the federal courts. This would put a stop to the revelation now being made before the examiner."

Unquestionably, Schwab and other "captains of industry" would like to put a stop to the revelations now being made in the shipbuilding trust case. But the public has already obtained an interesting hint concerning the methods of these "captains of industry," and with the trusts bearing down more and more heavily upon the people, it is very likely that there will be a strong public demand that more of the secrets of the "captains of industry" be laid bare.

It is reasonable to believe that Mr. Schwab does intend to take steps to "put a stop" to these revelations. "Keep it dark" has been the policy of these trust magnates. They have adopted every conceivable device for the purpose of deceiving the people and, strange to say, they have deceived thousands and thousands of men who have no right to be fooled, but who have deliberately shut their eyes to the situation and calmly awaited the

burden which the system to which the "captains of industry" are so devoted placed upon them. There are, however, indications of a determination on the part of the people to demand the truth and to refuse to be put off by absurd slogans of the "let well enough alone" order.

The Campaign of 1904.

The reorganizers will make a desperate effort to control the democratic convention. They would succeed if the rank and file of the party were to become indifferent. They cannot succeed if democrats generally are aroused to the duty they owe their party and exert themselves to protect the democratic temple from the ruthless hands of those who would destroy it.

General interest will, therefore, attach to the 1904 campaign; and democrats who hope to see their party preserved, who desire that it shall remain true to democratic principles, have a particular interest in the coming contest.

In order to extend The Commoner's influence in this contest it is desirable to enlarge The Commoner's circulation. Commoner readers who are in sympathy with the principles it advocates are invited to co-operate in the movement to increase The Commoner's circulation in order that its efforts may be more effective.

A special subscription offer has been made and, as has been already pointed out, this is similar to the "Lots of Five" plan adopted by The Commoner last year.

Cards, each good for one year's subscription to The Commoner, will be furnished in lots of five at the rate of \$3 per lot.

This places the yearly subscription rate at 60 cents.

Any one ordering the cards may sell them for \$1 each, thus earning a commission of \$2 on each lot sold, or he may sell them at the cost price and find compensation in the fact that he has contributed to the effort to widen The Commoner's sphere of influence.

These cards may be paid for when ordered or they may be ordered and remittance made after they have been sold.

A coupon is printed below for the convenience of those who are willing to assist in the coming contest.

THE COMMONER'S SPECIAL OFFER		
Application for Subscription Cards		
5	Publisher Commoner: I am interested in increasing The Commoner's circulation, and desire you to send me a supply of subscription cards. I agree to use my utmost endeavor to sell the cards, and will remit for them at the rate of 60 cents each, when sold.	
10		
15		
20		
25		
50		
75		
100		
Indicate the number of cards wanted by marking X opposite one of the numbers printed on end of this blank.		
If you believe the paper is doing a work that merits encouragement, fill out the above coupon and mail it to The Commoner, Lincoln, Neb.		