is no force in this argument. The state's representation has nothing whatever to do with the manner of election, and the state's equality in the senate is more likely to be made sure by an amendment which would relieve senatorial elections of the suspicion that now attaches to them than by a blind disregard of present defects. Unless a state is something different from the people of the state, there is no reason why the sovereignty of the state could not be represented by senators elected by the people as well as by senators chosen by the legislature.

The Unionan above referred to then attempts to answer the charge of corruption by saying that it is possibly true, but that "purchase of seats in legislative bodies is not a new thing." He quotes the corrupt election of members of parliament and cites a case in 1831 where 489 members out of 659 "were elected by 144 peers and 123 commons." He quotes Macauley as an authority on the corruption that existed, but he neglects to add that it was because of the rotten borough system that the representation in parliament was changed and that Macauley was one of the advocates of the change.

It is true that the election of senators by the people would not absolutely prevent corruption, but it would work a great improvement over the present method. It is easier to purchase an election from a few representatives to whom large sums can be paid than to secure an election by buying a majority of the people.

It is no answer to the almost universal demand for the popular election of senators to say that the voter ought to be more careful about the selection of representatives in the legislature. That is true, but there is no reason why those who do use care in the selection of legislators should be left at the mercy of legislators who, although with a good private record, yield to the temptations that beset a legislator when great corporations are interested in selecting a senatorial agent to carry out their purposes.

Saved by the Elkins Law.

The New York American calls attention to the testimony of Mr. Baer which casts some suspicion upon the good faith of the republican party in the enactment of the Elkins law. The interstate commerce law as it existed prior to February 19 last contained the following provision:

> "Any person who shall neglect or refuse to attend and testify, or to answer any lawful inquiry, or to produce books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents, if in his power to do so, in obedience to the subpoena or lawful requirement of the commission, shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment."

The Elkins law which the president has pointed to as a partial fulfillment of his promise of anti-trust legislation contains the following:

> "In all convictions occurring after the passage of this act for offenses under said acts to regulate commerce, whether committed before or after the passage of this act, or for offenses under this section, no penalty shall be imposed on the guilty party other than the fine prescribed by law, imprisonment wherever now prescribed as part of the penalty being hereby abolished."

A comparison of these extracts will show that the Elkins law repealed so much of the interstate commerce law as prescribed imprisonment as a part of the penalty, and it will be noticed that it is retroactive to the extent of relieving from imprisonment even when the criminal act committed was committed prior to the passage of the Elkins act. This makes it possible for an official to refuse to attend and testify, to answer any lawful inquiry or to produce books, papers, tariff contracts, agreements and documents, even though it is in his power to produce them. The only punishment for such refusal is a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $5,000. Under no circumstances now can the official be imprisoned. What is a fine of $5,000 to a corporation that may make a hundred thousand or even a million by violating the law? It would seem that the real purpose of the Elkins law was not to prevent discrimination so much as to prevent the punishment of officials who are guilty of violation of the law.

More than four months prior to the passage of the Elkins law Mr. Hearst called the attention of the president to the fact that the coal trust was violating the interstate commerce law, and urged the enforcement of the law. Nothing has been done so far, and the Elkins bill makes it more difficult than before to enforce the interstate commerce law. In the hearing before the interstate commerce commission on the 29th of April last. Mr. Clarence J. Shearn, attorney for Mr. Hearst, called Mr. Baer's attention to an official bulletin of the department of labor, in which a statement made by Mr. Baer to Mr. Wright relative to the miners' strike in 1900 was quoted. The following is taken from the American's report of the testimony.

> Mr. Shearn (to Mr. Baer)—Did you say as follows, referring to the preceding strike, that:
>
> "Shortly after this strike was inaugurated, Senator Hanna met a number of gentlemen and insisted that if the strike were not settled it would extend to Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, and the election of Mr. McKinley and Mr. Roosevelt would be endangered. He insisted that he was authorized to settle the strike, through Mr. Mitchell, if the operators would agree to a 10 per cent advance in wages. After a great deal of pressure had been brought to bear upon the presidents of the coal companies and positive assurances were given that the situation was really dangerous, President McKinley sending me personally a gentleman to assure me that Ohio and Indiana were in danger unless some adjustment was made, we agreed to put up a notice which was prepared, we understood, at Indianapolis and furnished by the united mine workers. The private operators absolutely refused to join in this advance, and instead of the strike being ended as promised, it continued on for some time, and it became necessary, in order to relieve the situation, to call a meeting of the private operators with the presidents of the coal companies and to agree with them that if they would put up notices to pay 10 per cent increase we would meet a committee which they should appoint and endeavor to increase, if possible, the price of coal. They agreed to this, a committee was appointed by the private operators, and we sat two or three days a month for three months to reach an agreement with them. That agreement involved a heavy compensation to the private operators from the coal companies. The coal companies had agreed to change the basis of coal purchased from the private operators from a basis of 40 per cent and 60 per cent to a basis of 35 per cent and 65 per cent. In other words, we had to decrease 5 per cent and they increased 5 per cent."
>
> Mr. Shearn: You stated that to Mr. Wright?
>
> Mr. Baer: I did, I assume; it sounds all right—if you have read it correctly.
>
> Mr. Shearn: That is the fact, is it not, anyway?
>
> Mr. Baer: Yes, sir. It is the fact.

It seems from Mr. Baer's testimony that the republican candidate for the presidency personally sent word to Mr. Baer to assure him that Ohio and Indiana were in danger unless the strike could be settled, and Mr. Baer and his associates, desiring to help the republican ticket, agreed to a settlement by which the operators were to have 10 per cent increase in wages, and the coal trust, in order to secure this, had to compensate the private operators. Here we have it—the republican candidate appealing to the trusts to help him at a heavy loss to themselves and now the administration that came into power by the aid of the trusts puts through a bill that relieves Mr. Baer, among others, from the possibility of imprisonment for the violation of the law.

Does this not prove that the democratic charges against the republican party were well sustained? Does it not prove that the republican party is in close affiliation with the trusts and obligated to them? It will be remembered that Mr. Baer is the president of a railroad, besides the president of the trust. How long will the republican farmers, laboring men and business men be blind to their party's subserviency to the trusts? How long will the rank and file of the democratic party be blind to the fact that the reorganizers would, if possible, put the democratic party in exactly the same position that the republican party now occupies in regard to the trusts?

Squeezed by the Trusts.

It seems that those makers of farm implements who are outside of the implement combination have petitioned President Roosevelt for relief from more than thirty institutions which are denounced as trusts. The petitioners make about 10 per cent of the farm machinery, but are subject to extortion in the purchase of raw material and other things that go into the manufacture of implements. Several of the corporations are specifically named, among them the Standard Oil company, the United States Steel company, Tube, Leather, White Lead and Pig Iron trusts. One of the republican papers, in speaking of the petition, says, "if there is any ground for government interference the attorney general will undoubtedly take action," but it insists that the case of every trust must be tried separately, and that a "long time must necessarily elapse before relief can be given, if any is needed." The International Harvester company, it is stated, manufactures 90 per cent of the farm implements used, and it is able to avoid the hardships from which the independent manufacturers suffer. The circumstances in this case, and the arguments made by the republican papers, show that the republican position is not one of opposition to the trusts in general, but to particular features of the trusts. In other words, the republicans do not denounce the private monopoly as a bad thing, but assert it to be the duty of the government to interfere in case a monopoly misuses its power, but as it takes a long time for investigation and a long time for action, it will be seen that this remedy is really no remedy at all.

Roosevelt-Hanna Incident.

The papers are discussing the Roosevelt-Hanna incident and the comments are colored somewhat by the leanings of the paper. The friends of Senator Hanna represent him as graciously offering Ohio's indorsement to the president, the relations between them being the most agreeable. The anti-Hanna element represents the president as giving the distinguished Ohio senator a good drubbing and forcing him to very reluctantly yield up the Ohio indorsement.

It is difficult for any one to really commend the senator's action in the matter. If he was willing to have the president indorsed he ought not to have said anything against it; if he was not willing to have him indorsed he ought not to have surrendered his convictions on the subject merely to gratify the president.

The incident, however, made an issue, and it was quickly settled in favor of the president. The way is now probably clear to a renomination, but it is possible that Mr. Hanna was not ready for a final struggle. If he and the money magnates decide that they prefer some other candidate they can still make it interesting before the convention is held.

Complacent Egotism.

Our more or less esteemed contemporary, the Washington Post, is a great hand to pick up news in the hotel lobbies, and it always happens to be the news that the Post wants to pick up. In its issue of May 23 it quotes a "leading citizen and banker" of Vicksburg as saying that the state of Mississippi was strongly for the platforms of 1896 and 1900, but that the state has undergone a big change of heart. The next sentence, however, destroys the force of this testimony, for the "leading citizen" says: "In truth, the best intelligence of Mississippi was never on the Nebraskan's side. Our substantial and thinking men indorsed the theories of Cleveland and John G. Carlisle." The "best intelligence" is good. There is a complacent egotism about the reorganizers that never fails to manifest itself. The "leading citizen" speaks of "the wool hat crowd from the forks of the creek" and of the "grangers" in such a way as to show that he has not yet recovered from his indignation at the fact that the rank and file have insisted on having something to say in recent campaigns.

An Impossible Choice.

Hon. John H. Regan, the only surviving member of the confederate cabinet, and one of the veteran democrats of Texas, is quoted as saying that he "would rather vote for the blackest kind of a republican than vote for Cleveland," giving as his reason that Cleveland "betrayed his party into the hands of the money power." Mr. Regan will never be called upon to make the choice, for Mr. Cleveland has no possible chance of securing a democratic nomination. He could secure more votes in a republican primary for the republican nomination than he could in a democratic primary for the democratic nomination. The Commoner has called attention to the things said in his favor, not because he had any chance of securing the nomination, but in order that the readers of The Commoner might know the real influence behind the reorganizers, and understand that the candidate favored by the reorganizers will be controlled by the same influence that controlled Mr. Cleveland, even though the fact may not be so well known to the public.