up
lT',-fB,"
r-Kfrt
i-.r
'40,000 troops Is about the right number to keep
there for sorao years to come'
It is strange to hear one who poses as a
student of government say that the Filipinos
will "probably never he American citizens in the
broad sense that is understood by all that the
term conveys to men born in the United States
of white parents."
Mr. Hull assures us that "the Filipino will
be a citizen in spirit, patriotism, industry and
education, and will be worthy of participating
to the fullest extent in all the benefits of this
government." How absurd it is for a mem
ber of congress, occupying the conspicuous
position Mr. Hull occupies in the public eye
to say such things as these.
When Mr. Hull says that the Filipino will
probably never be an American- citizen "in the
broad sense" he means to say that if the repub
lican party has its way the people of the Philip
pines will be kept in a state of subjugation by
the United States, and that the colonial form
of government, a form that has no place in our
system, a form against which our forefathers
rebelled, will be the form of government under
which the people of the Philippine Islands
must live.
It is interesting to hear this congressman
assure us that the Filipino will be a citizen
"in spirit, patriotism, industry and education
and will be worthy of participating to the
fullest extent in all the benefits of this govern
ment." One who is an American citizen "in
spirit, patriotism, industry and education" is
an'. American citizen in fact; and theprivilcges.
ho enjoys of participating alike int. the. affairs -of
government and in the beneficial results of
government such as ours, these are the privi
leges that make him a citizen "in spirit and in
patriotism."
What Mr. Hull says of the FilipinoB has
been said by every despotic king of, his sub
jects. Even King George hoped to make the
men of Washington's time "citizens in spirit
patriotism, industry and education,'' although
ho did not intend that they should be British
citizens "in the broad sense.".
Is it not strange that those advocates of
colonialism find it necessary to indulge in
absurd and intricate sentences in which to con
vey their meaning? Why do they not admit at
once that these people are never to bo citizens
in any sense? Why do they not admit that they
are to bo subjects of the' United States, to bo
governed exactly as King George intended to
govern the colonists of America?
No greater truth was ever uttered than when
Mr. Lincoln said that this country could not
exist half slave and half free, and it can bo
said with equal truth today, as declared in the
Kansas City platform, that this country cannot
exist part citizen and part subject. If we lived
under a king, then wo might all bo citizens
"in spirit, patriotism, industry and education,"
although wo would have no. right to participate
m the privileges guaranteed to citizens under a
republican form of government. But if we are
to live in a republic, then every man subject to
the jurisdiction of this country is entitled, un
der reasonablp statutory regulations, even'
though not born in this country, to, become a
The Commoner.
citizen even in the "broad sense', having all
the rights, privileges and immunities vouch
safed to "men born in the United States of
white parents."
We may obtain an idea of the distance wo
have traveled during the past four years whon
we reflect that prior to the campaign of 1890,
or even during that famous campaign, no pub
lic man would have dared to sanction such
notions as were presented by Congressman
Hull in his recent interview. If, as Mr. Hull
says, it is impossible to make an American cit
izen out of the Filipino why should we seek to
make him a subject in our "government of the
people, by the people and for the people"?
How can we justify ourselves in subjugating a
people who can never be made American citi-i
zens, thus taking upon ourselves a new and
larger problem, when at the same time we have
many difficult problems in our land, problems
that at this moment seem to be getting the
better of us?
W
The Popular Verdict.
When "the government" rested in the
Schley court of inquiry it was evident that Ad
miral Schley, in the consideration of the Amer
ican people, was yet the hero of Santiago Bay.
On the whole the testimony offered by the
judge advocate has tended to confirm the high
opinion which the people have seemed to enter
tain of Admiral Schley.
. The Washington correspondent of the !New
York Times summed up a portion of the testi-.
mony introduced by the .judge advocate in the
following manner:
"1. It is charged against Schley that when he
was sent to look for the Spanish fleet he delayed
unnecessarily at Cienfuegos in spite of orders to go
to Santiago.' It has been proved that he spent
about three days there, and that he received dis
patches from Hear Admiral Sampson, some of
which told him to go to Santiago, and others to re
main at Cienfuegos.
"It is also proved that a secret code of com
munication with the Cubans, arranged by Captain
McCalla, which was known to Rear Admiral Samp
son, was not communicated to Schley, jmd that
if ho had known this code he could have ascer
tained in a few hours that I he Spanish were not
there and have gone on to Santiago.
"2. It is charged that when he di 1 go to San
tiago his progress was slow. It has been proved
that his larger ships did not make the speed they
might have made. It has also been proved .lhat
the smaller vessels could not go any "faster Lhan
they did, and that Schley accommodated the speed
of the squadron to these rather than abandon
them. It is now a question of the court whether
Schley was right In this, or whether he should
have left hid small ships to the mercies of the
Spaniards-
"3. It is charged that off Santiago he turned
back on the pretense that he could not coal at sea,
.when it was quite possible to do so. On this point
there has been a conflict of testimony among the
judge advocate's witnesses. Some of them have
testified that he could have coaled with ease, some
that it would have been difficult and dangerous,
and some that ho could have coaled on some days
and could not have coaled on others. It has been
shown that a few hours after he had turned back
the' weather moderated, and he then roturned to
Santiago and coaled.
"4. ' It is charged that the three scout sliips
wliich' were detailed to stay at Santiago and find
out if the Spaniards were there met Schley as ho
was coming to Santiago and told him that the
Spaniards were undoubtedly there, but that not
withstanding this ho made the 'retrograde move
ment' mentioned. This charge has not been proved
by the judgo advocate's witnesses. The captains
of the scouts have admitted that they d not givo
Schley any information whatever, although one
of them had a dispatch for Schley. They have also
shown that they did not know whether the Span
iards were there or not until Schley discovered
the Colon lying at the mouth of the harbor.
"5. It is charged that Schley's bombardment
of the Colon was ineffective, and that he was out
of range wlien he fired at her. The witnesses
have testified that Schley was out of range of the
Colon, but within range of the shore batteries.
Schley claims that his real object was to ascertain
the strength of the shore batteries by firing at the
Colon, at the same time complying as far as pos
sible with the orders given him not to risk his
ships under the fire of the shore batteries until
the Spanish fleet had been destroyed. It has been
proved that the shots of the shore batteries passed
over and near Schley's ship;, and come of the wit
nesses have testified that they gained informa
tion of value by the reconnoissance, while others
say that not much was learned.
"6. It is charged that when Schley blockaded
Santiago he was i.i the habit of withdrawing his
ships a distance of twenty-five miles at night.
This charge has been completely disproved. The
testimony against it is unanimous. Some of the
witnesses have testified that the blockade was a
litre further out at night, but the preponderance of
testimony was that it was further in at night
Testimony about the actual distance of the block
ade from shore differs widely, and hardly any two
of the witnesses agree. It has beeen proved that
hu Kept picket vessels, nearer in shore than .the
rest of the fleet by two miles.
"7. It is charged that during, the battle of
Santiago Schley made a 'loop which endangered
the Texas. It has beeen proved that Captain Philip
thought the Texas was in danger and stopped his
engines. It has not been established that she was
really in danger, and the witnesses differ about
the distance between the Brooklyn r.-d the Texas
when the latter stopped her engines. One witness
says that it was 150 yards, another 250 or 300 yards,
another 'less than a quarter of a mile,' and the
navy department's chart makes it half a mfle,
but this chart has been branded on the witness
stand by one of the officers who got it up as in
accurate and worthless. The judgo advocate has
not yet offered any testimony "to show that the
'loop' was unnecessary or a bad maneuvre, but
only that it endangered the Texas.
"8. It is charged that Schley gave no orders
except to his own ship during the battle. It has
been proved that he gave orders to the Oregon at
least, and that the Oregon obeyed' him:"
The judge advocate appeared to take par
ticular pains to show that no pian of battle had
been communicated to the captains by Admiral
Schley. It has been contended by Admiral
Sampson friends that although he was not
present at the battle that he, as commander-in-chief,
laid the plans and made the preparations
for that splendid engagement. Having shown,
however, to their own satisfaction that no plan
of battle was outlined by Admiral Schley,
Schley's critics have also shown to the satisfac
tion of the public tjiat no plan'of battle was
outlined by Admiral Sampson.
In this light, then, it is diffcult.for a lay
man to understand why Admiral Sampson was
entitled to the prize money and the credit for
a victory in the battle in which he did not par-
i
