JAPAN TIGHTENS HER GRIP ON THE COAST OF ASIA Continued Military Activity of the Japanese Shows an Especially Significant Feature Just Now in the Strong Naval Base Which Has Been Established at Makung, Six Hundred Miles from Manila. THOSE observers who have ' made a study of Japan’s policy, long ago became im pressed with her apparent determination to be the dominant nation of the east, to control Asia and to enthrone j Nippon as mistress of the entire Ori- ] ent. That the Pacific will be the theater of the great commercial wars of the future, if it is not the scene of conflict of some other nature, has also been freely predicted. Thanks to the territory which she wrung from the conquered in her two recent wars, Japan has now an almost unbroken cordon strung along the great eastern seaboard of China. A glance at the appended map will show her chain of island possessions reach ing southward as far as Formosa and the Pescadores, a chain of isles which are reckoned as of vast importance in certainly cannot afford to go to war now, and her government knows this. Hut it sees with equal clearness the necessity of looking forward and the necessity of making provision for the things that may happen; or, to put it differently, the wisdom of taking measures to prevent what it is desired should not happen. Makung harbor is in the Pescadores, islands which lie in the 100-mile-wide waterway that separates Formosa from the Chinese mainland. It is nearly 1.000 miles from the nearest naval base in the Japanese islands proper, and is only about 600 miles from Manila. Hitherto the island of Formosa had been something of a bur den upon Japan. Hut her possession of that island, together with her pos session of Pescadores, has made pos sible to Japan a strategic advance which may fairly be compared for im Residence of Governor General, Formosa. Japan’s struggle for dominion, be that struggle for commercial supremacy or for military success. What Japan has been doing with these outlying possessions becomes therefore a subject which at the pres ent moment must have a peculiar in terest. Realizing this the New York Times has made an exhaustive inquiry into the matter and herewith presents the results of its investigations. BESIDES heavily fortifying the island of Formosa, a part of the territory which she had wrested from China after her triumph over that nation, Japan has now estab lished a strong naval base at Makung, a harbor in the Pescadores. Makung lies about 600 miles distant from Ma nila, and Japan's purpose in establish ing a naval base at that place is the most interesting feature of the work in which she has recently been engaged. Against what nation will she make use of Makung as a base? What Could Be Done with Makung as a Base Against the Philippines. The first suggestion—and one that seems to be particularly natural in view of our present relations with Japan—is that Makung would serve as a base of operations against the Philippines The nearest American naval base to the Philippines is Ha waii, 4,800 miles away. With Ma kung only 600 miles from Manila, the Japanese fleet would have obviously a great advantage over an American fleet, supposing that the operations would take place in the neighborhood of Manila. And certainly, unless the United States proceeds much more rapidly in the future than it has in the past with the building of a complete naval station in the Philippines, the Japanese will have superior repair facilities at Makung. In the case also of an attempt by Japan to occupy the Philippines with troops, Makung harbor would make an admirable hiding place and protection for transports, which would be out of reach of an American fleet in case the Japanese warships were defeated in battle, and which could be readily brought to Manila and other Philippine ports in the event of a Japanese naval victory. This is a possibility that naval offi cers in Washington have been quick to see and appreciate. There is no actual belief that Japan intends war—at pres ent. Yet the existence of a powerful naval base at Makung, occupied by a nation of great naval efficiency, and a nation which would also profit greatly bv possession of the Philippines, 13 naturally considered a matter of im portance to this country. Japan is heavily in debt, and she portance to Japan with the advance made by Russia vt hen she reached Port Arthur. Its Marked Strategic Advan tages as a Well-Protected Harbor. From the point of view of protection by land fortifications. Makung bay is exceptionally well situated. It has also an outpost at Amping, on the south west coast of Formosa, with which it is connected by cable. The practical value of this cable connection will bo evident if it is assumed that a Japan ese fleet is lying at Makung harbor in wait for an enemy. In fact, the situa tion as it existed in the spring of 1905, when the Russian fleet under Rojest venskv was making its way toward Japan, is an excellent example by which to test the question. When the Russian fleet was ap proaching the Strait of Malacca, Japa nese scouts went far south through the China sea to keep watch of the enemy's movements, but the main fleet was of necessity kept in strictly home waters, both because of the ex istence of several avenues by which the Russians might approach Vladi vostok and of the extreme undesira bility of attempting to fight a battle many hundreds of miles from a naval base where necessary repairs could be made or where the fleet could go into retreat in case of defeat. It is quite likely that Admiral Togo would not have chosen to fight the Russian fleet in the north of the China sea, even had Makung been a fully developed base at that time. But if Makung had been so developed in 1905, it would have been entirely practicable for Togo to have met the enemy far from Japanese waters. Watching Straits of Formosa an Easy Matter from Makung. Any European fleet, moving against Japan would almost of necessity take the course followed by the Russians front the time they left the Indian ocean; and from Makung as a base, Japan would be in a position to keep close watch over Formosa straits, Pes cadores channel, and the passages to the east between Formosa and the Philippines. In the case of a German fleet there would be an obvious ad vantage in giving battle in this region, because the German fleet would then be still far distant from its only home port in the east—Kiao Chow. German warships which might have to take flight, as some of the Russian cruisers did after the battle of the Sea of Japan, would have to take refuge in neutral ports, where they would be in terned dining the rest of the war. From another point of view Makung as a naval base would give Japan a position of peculiar value in relation to the great commercial routes. Of the lines from North America to east ern Chinese ports along the Hong Kong lie either between the Japanese islands at the north, or through the Ballingtan channel, between Formosa and Luzon. The trade routes from Eu rope to all Chinese ports along the Hong-Kong lie in the space between Formosa and China. A fleet at Ma kung would, therefore, have at its mercy practically all the trade with China north of liong-Kong. Com merce destruction is charitably sup posed to bo a thing of the past. Yot if commerce destruction ever showed that it would turn the scale in a great naval warfare it is not to be doubted that belligerents would adopt it. But even short of commerce destruction, the Japanese position at. Makung would give Japanese warships a pe culiarly good chance to embarrass commerce by search for contraband. Formosa Treated Differently in Japan’s Plans for Supremacy. While it appears that Japan lias directed her chief energit toward the establishment of a strong naval base at Makung, her efforts in Formosa have been on an equal, though some what different, scale. This was her^ first effort at colonization, and shows what the little brown men are capable of. When China, after the stress of her war with Japan, ceded Formosa to her conquerors the island was one of the wildest of all in that region, savage head-hunters occupying most of its territory, and the few seacoast towns the embodiment of the worst features of Chinese occupancy— squalid, filthy, out of touch with civili zation, unprogressive. A recent vis itor to the island, who had been made familiar with it prior to Japanese oc cupancy, testifies that there was little or no machinery to carry out the work of civil government. The treasury was ‘depleted, the records were in a state of hopeless confusion, there had been no attempt at sanitation, and the filth and squalor of the towns were appal ling. The natives had grown accus tomed to this state of affairs and were ill-suited for the system and order which their new rulers seemed deter mined to bring about. Effects of Japanese Rule as Seen in Better Regulations. Baron Shimpel Goto, a physician by profession and formerly president or the bureau of hygiene in Tokyo, is now the civil governor of Formosa. He re cently made an extended report of his administration of the island's affairs. In this he said that when Formosa was placed under the sovereignty of Japan a feeling of anxiety w.as enter tained as to the effects of the new regime. The recurring outbreaks of I — statement that in the first year of tlie Japanese administration China con tinued to enjoy the lion's share of the Formosan trade. Ten years later Japan's trade with Formosa exceeded tiie total trade of Formosa with all foreign countries. The foreign ex ports in 1904 were 12,391,124 yen, the imports for the same year being 12, 838,443 yen. With Formosa and the Pescadores already in her possession, Japan now only needs the Philippines to complete the chain of islands guarding the entire eastern seaboard of Japan. In the en tirely unlikely event of the? United Slates giving up the Philippines and trusting them to the tender mercies of native government it is certain that Philippine Independence would he of exceedingly brief duration. Few seri ously believe that the Filipinos are capable of managing their own affairs without failing Into a state of anarchy that would early In the game demand the forcible Intervention of foreign powers for the protection of their citi zens in tin* islands. Awaiting a Filipino Republic Before Completing Program. Ah the history of the Samoan islands illustrates very vividly, protection of Interests Is exceedingly prompt when there Is anything to be gained by it; and in the event of the coming of a wholly Independent Filipino republic, It is safe to assume tiiat Japanese in terest in the islands would suddenly reach a degree of Importance of which there is no present sign. Germany, and in a leaser degree France, have shown an active disposition to accept such Southern Pacific trifles in the way of Islands as were open to occupation, and American abandonment of the Philip pines would seem to promise the prob ability of a struggle between Germany and Japan for the possession of the Philippines. One obvious motive for Japan's wanting the Philippines is the outlet they would give for her emigration, and the resources they would give her. Manchuria and Korea, it is true, are now- absorbing a great portion of Japanese energy, but no one is so rich or so busy that he would refuse to pick up money that he finds in the street. And the Japanese development of Makung may well be taken as proof that Japan is not unwilling to assume such further enrichment as the prog gress of events may thrust upon her. Controlling Chinese Com merce a Possibility for Japan, The relation of Japan and China as regards strategic questions is curious ly like that of western Europe to the British islands. The position of the British islands makes the British fleet Map Showing Japanese Islands Which Have Been Intrenched and How These Outlying Possessions Dominate the Trade Routes to China and the East. W\AA/\^/WNAAA^sA/NA/SrfWV\/'/V^C^VWW\A/NAA/VNA/VWV insurgents was one of the greatest difficulties encountered. Attempts to suppress them by superior force were resorted to, and then conciliatory measures were adopted. Prior to the Japanese occupancy there were no public schools in For mosa. Now primary schools for Japa nese children have been established in all of the important towns. There are also auxiliary schools, these being for the benefit of the native young. One year after the cession of the island a "central language School" was established for the double purpose of teaching Japanese to the natives and the native dialects to the Japanese. For the savages a large number of schools have been opened in the out lying districts, in order that ail the schools be equipped in accordance with modern ideas, educators were re cently sent to Europe and to this country to make a study of educa tional matters. The island has an area approx imately as large as that of Eong Is land. The population is estimated at about 3,000,000. Seiji Hishida of Col umbia university is authority for the able to threaten the commerce of a large part of western Europe, just as it now practically holds the club over the whole foreign trade of Germany and Russia and the I gressman Janies \Y. Wadsworth, son-in-law of the late Secretary Hav . ^ defender in congress of the Chicago packers, got Mr. Slovens’ rllstrict ' ant* mandered in such a way as to mftit 1dm. Stevens la u mild-mannered SmJn' but when the treachery was disclosed to him he vowed to have Wn.Wv Ji • scalp, and ho got it. ’ a *