THE NORTHWESTERN.
GSO. K. BBNM'HOTKKi Editor and Pub
LOUP CITY. - - NEBRASKA.
M’KINLEYS MESSAGE.
AS READ BEFORE THE NATION
AL CONGRESS.
■Waits of Our Money System Pointed
Oat—The Caban Question Discussed at
Length — Other Foreign Matters
Bpeody Annexation of Hawaii Crged ■
Alaska la Need of Attention, Etc.
National and International Question*.
WASHINGTON. Dec. 7.—The mes
sage of President McKinley 1b as fol
lows: „ _
To the Senate and House of Repre
sentattves: It gives me pleasure to ex
tend greeting to the Fifty-fifth con
gress .assembled In regular session at
the seat of government, with many of
whose M-nators and representatives
I have been associated In the legisla
tive ecr\ ice. Their meeting occur* un
dsr lellcRous conditions, Justifying
sincere congratulation and calling for
our grateful acknowledgment to a be
neficent Providence which has so sig
nally blessed and prospered us as a
nation. Peace and good will with all
the nations of the garth continue un
broken.
A matter of genuine satisfaction Is
the growing feeling of fraternal re
gard and unification of all section* of
our country, the Incompleteness of
which has too long delayed realization
of the highest blessings of tbe union.
The spirit of patriotism Is universal
and i« ever Increasing In fervor. The
public questions which now most en
gross ns are lifted far above either
partisanship, prejudice or formor sec
tional difference. They affect every
part of our common country alike, and
permit of no division on ancient linos.
Questions of foreign policy, of revenue,
the soundness of the currency, the
inviolability of national obligations,
•the improvement of the public service
appeal to the Individual core douce
of every earnest citizen to whatever
party he belongs, or In whatever sec
tion of the country he may reside.
The extra session of this congress,
which closed during July last enacted
Important legislation, and while its
full effect has not yet been realized,
what it has already acompllshed as
sures us of Its timeliness and wisdom.
To test Its permanent value further
time will be required and the people,
satisfied with its operation and re
sults, thus far, are In no mind to with
hold from It a fair trial.
Tariff legislation having been settled
by the extra session of congress, the
question next pressing for considera
tion Is that of the currency. The work
of putting our finances upon a sound
basis, difficult as it may seem, will
apiier.r easier when we recall the finan
cial operations of the government
since 1866. On the 30th day of June
of that year we had outstanding de
mand liabilities in the sura of $728,
868,477.41. On the 1st of January,
1879, those liabilities had been reduced
to $443,889,406.88. Of our interest-bear
ing obligations the figures are even
more striking. On July 1, 1866, the
principal of the interest-bearing debt
of the government was $2,332,331,208.
On the 1st of July, 1893, this sum had
boT» reduced to $585 037,108 or u:» ag
gregate reduction of $1,747,294,108. The
Interest-bearing debt of the United
States on the 1st day of December,
1897, was $847,366,620. The govern
ment money now outstanding (Decem
ber 1) consists of $346,681,016 of
United States notes, $107,793,280 of
treasury notes issued by authority of
the law of 1890, $384,903,304 of sliver
certificates and $61,280,761 of standard
silver dollars.
WUh tho great resources of th; gov
ttwnmont nn/l titllk t. 1.1« ...
ample of the past before us, we ought
not to hesitate to enter upon a cur
rency revision which will make our
demand obligations less onerous to
the government and relieve our finan
cial laws from ambiguity and doubt.
The brief review of what was ac
complished from the close of the war
to 1893, makes unreasonable and
groundless any distrust either of our
SnanWsil ability or soundness, whin*
the situation from 1893 to 1897 must
admonish congress of the Immediate
necessity of so legislating as to make
the return of the conditions then pre
vailing Impossible.
There are many plans proposed as
a remedy for the evil. Before we can
find the true remedy -we must appre
ciate the real evil, it is not that our
currency of every kind Is not good,
for every dollar of It is good; good be
cause the government’s pledge Is to
keep it so, and that pledgo will not bo
broken. However, the guaranty of our
purpose to keep the pledge will be best
shown by advancing toward Its ful
fillment.
The evil of the present system is
found In the greut rost to the govern
ment of maintaining the parity of our
different forms of money, that Is.keep
ing all of them at par with gold. We
surely cannot be longer heedless of the
burden this Imposes upon the people,
even under fairly prosperous condi
tions, while the past four years have
demonstrated that It ts not only an ex
pensive charge to the government but
a dangerous menace to the national
credit.
It Is manifest that we must devise
some plan to protect the government
against bond Issues for repeated re
demptions. We must either curtail the
opportunity for a|M* ulatlon. made easy
by the multiplied redemptions of our
demand obligation or |U Increase the
gold reserve for I heir redemption We
have NMM tsai.imo of currency which the
government by solemn enactment has
undertaken to keep at par with gold
Nobody la obliged to redeem In gold
but the government. The banks are
not required to redeem In gold The
government Is obliged to keep equal
with gwid all Its outstanding currency
and coin obligations, white its re
celpts are not required to be paid In
gold They are paid in every kia-l of
*»••> but gold and the ouly mean*
by which the government caa with
antilsty get gold la by hurtoelag It
awn get It in no other way eh*a it
•wa« needs it The government, with
eel any «t*d gold revenue, la pi«dg
i Is has steadily and faithfully done,
! and which under the authority now
| given It will continue to do.
The law which requires the govern
ment after having redeemed its notes
to pay them out again as current
funds demands a constant replenish
ment of the gold reserve. This is es
pecially so in times of business panic
and when the revenues are insuffi
cient to meet tho expenses of the gov
ernment. At such times the govern
ment has no other way to supply its
deficit and maintain redemption hut
through the Increase of Its bonded in
debtedness, and during the adminis
tration of my predecessor $262,313,400
of 4V4 per cent bonds were issued and
sold and the proceeds used to pay the
expenses of the government in excess
of the revenues and sustain the gold
reserve. While it is true that the
greater part of the proceeds of these
bonds wero used to supply deflceint
revenues, a considerable portion was
required to maintain the gold reserve.
With our revenues equal to our ex
penditures there would be no deficit
requiring the issuance of bonds. Hut
if the gold reserve falls below $100,
000,000 how will It be replenished ex
cept by selling more bonds? Is there
any other way practicable under ex
isting law? The serious question,
then la, shall wo continue the policy
that has been pursued in the past—
that is, when tho gold reserve rcaqhes
the point of danger. Issue more bonds
and supply the needed gold, or shall
wo provido other means to prevent
these recurring drains upon the gold
reserve? If no further legislation is
had and the policy of selling bonds
Is to be continued, then congress
should give the secretary of the treas
ury authority to sell bonds at long or
short periods, bearing a less rate of
interest than Is now authorized by
law.
I earnestly recommend as soon as
tho receipts ef the government are
quite sufficient to pay all the expenses
of the government, that when any of
the United Stales notes are presented
for redemption In gold, and are re
deemed In gold, such notes shall be
kept and set apart, and only paid out
In exchange for gold. This Is an ob
vious duty. If the holder of tho
United States note prefers the gold
and gets It from tho government, he
should not receive back from tho gov
ernment a United States note without
r» O*'1'* • *-v«» u III t H'j
reason for this Is made all the more
apparent when the government issues
an interest bearing debt to provide
gold for the redemption of United
States notes—a non Interest bearing
debt. Surely It should not pay them
out again except on demand, for gold.
If they are put out In any other way
they may return again, to be followed
by another bond Issue to redeem a
non-interest bearing debt.
In my view It is of the utmost Im
portance that the government should
be relieved from the business of pro
viding all the gold required for ex
changes and export. This responsibil
ity is alone borne by the government
without any of the usual and neces
sary banking powers to help Itself.
The banks do not feel the strain of
the gold redemption. The whole
strain rests upon the government and
the size of the gold reserve in the
treasury has come to be, with or with
out reason, the signal of danger or of
security. This ought to be stopped.
If we are to have an era of prosper
ity in the country, with sufficient re
ceipts for the expenses of the govern
ment, we may feel no great embar
rassment from our present currency,
but the danger still exists and will
be ever present, menacing us as long
us the present ysstem continues. And
beside it Is in times of adequate rev
enues and business tranquility that
the government should prepare for
the worst. We cannot avoid without
serious consequences the wise con
sideration and prompt solution of
this question.
The secretary of the treasury has
ou.lined a plan In great detail for the
purpose of removing the threatened
recurrence of u depleted gold reserve
and save us from future embarrass
ment on that account. To this plan
I Invite your careful consideration.
I concur with tho secretary of the
treasury In his recommendation that
national banks be allowed to Issue
notes to the face value of the bonds
they have deposited for circulation,
and that the tax on circulating notes
secured by deposit of such bonds be
reduced to one-half of 1 per cent per
annum. I also Join him In reccom
mending thnt authority bo given for
the establishment of national banks
with a minimum capital of |2fi,000.
This will enable the smaller villages
and agricultural regions of the coun
try to be supplied with currency to
meet their needs.
I recommend that the Issue of
national bank notes be restricted to
the denomination of |10 and upward.
If the suggestions I have herein made
shall have the approval of congress
then I would reeonmmend that na
tional banks be required to redeem
i the i notes In gold.
REVIEW OF SITUATION IN CUBA.
The most Important problem with
whleh this government is now called
upon to deal pertaining to lu foreign
relations concerns Its dutv towards
Spain and the Unban Insurrection.
Problems and eonditlons more or le-s
; lu common with those now existing
have confronted this government at
various times In the past The s orv
of Cuba for many years has been one
of unrest, growing discontent, an ef
fort toward a larger enjoyini-u' of lib
erty and arlf-control, of orgautsrd re
sistance to the mother r.uintry, or de
preeeUin and dlstrees and warfare, an I
of Ineffectual settlement, to be fol
lowed by renewed revolt. For no en
during period sinee the enfranchise
ment of the continental poaeeael na
of Mpain in the western continent hut
the condition of i'uba or the polity
of ffpaiu toward Uaba not caned con
cern to the United tltalea.
The prospect from lliwt to lima
that the weahaees of Ppatn's hold up
on the IsUhd ami lfir political Vi It
sliudea and enibarasatiiritu of the
home gowrniaieai might lead to he
transfer of Untie to a continental pow
er, nailed forth, between 1(23 and into,
cartons emphatic dcclaratioaa of the
policy of the United Ibatee to |i#r III It
no dtelurbaacee of Unto* a ruaSHilus
with Spain unbrae In the direction of
independence of eeeutell tun be I he
Untied iltaive through porch nee, nor
has there been any condition in ihie
; declared pot by etaee upon the part of
| the government.
The revolution which began in 1888
lasted for ten year*, despite the stren
uous efforts of the successive peninsu
lar governments to suppress it. Then,
as now, the government of the United
States testified its grave concern and
offered its aid to put an end to blood
shed In Cuba. The overtures made by
General Grant were refused and the
war dragged, entailing great loss of
life and treasure and Increased Injury
to American Interests, besides throw
ing enhanced burdens of neutrality
upon this government. In 1878 peace
was brought about by tho truce of
Zanjon. obtained by negotiations tie
tween tho Spanish commander Mar
tinez de Campos and the insurgent
leaders.
The present Insurrection broke out
In February. 1895. It Is not my pur
pose at this time to recall Its remark
able Increase or to characterize Its
tenacious resistance against the enor
mous forces massed against It by
Spain. The revolt and tho efforts to
subdue It carried destruction to every
quarter of the Island, developing wide
proportions and defying tho effort* of
Spain for its suppression. Tho civ
ilized code of war has been disre
garded, no less so by the Spaniards
than by the Cubans.
Tho existing conditions cannot but
fill this government and Ihn American
people with the gravest apprehension.
There Is no dpslre on the part of our
people to profit by tho misfortunes of
Spain. We have only tho desire to
see the Cubans prosperous and con
tented, enjoying that measure of self
control which Is tho Inalienable right
of man, protected in their right to
reap the benefit, of the exhaustions
treasures of their country.
The offer made by my predecessor
in April, 1898, tendering the friendly
offices of this government, failed. Any
mediation on our part was not ac
cepted. In brief the answer read:
"There Is no effectual way to pacify
rCuba unless It begins with the actual
submission of the rebels to the mother
country.” Then only could Hpaln act
In tho promised direction, of her own
motion and ufter her own plans. The
cruel policy of concentration was In
itiated February 16, 1896. The pro
ductive districts controlled by the
Hpanlsh armies were depopulated and
the agricultural inhabitants were
herded In and about the garrison
towns, tbclr land laid waste and their
dwellings destroyed. This policy the
late cabinet of Hpaln Justified a* a
necessary measure of war and as a
means of cutting oft supplies from the
Insurgents. It tas utterly failed as a
war measure. It was not civilized
warfare. It was extermination.
Against this abuse of tho rights of
_ T l._ f./.nuis'ilno/l An m .
peated occasions to enter the firm and
earnest protest of this government.
There was much of public condemna
tion of the treatment of American cit
izens by alleged Illegal arrests and
long Imprisonment, uwaltlng trial ,or
pending protracted judicial procedure.
I felt it my first duty to make Instant
demand for the release or speedy trial
of all American citizens under arrest.
Before the change of the Spanish cab
inet in October last twenty-two pris
oners, citizens of the United States,
had been given their freedom.
For the relief of our own citizens
suffering because of the conflict, the
aid of congress was sought in a special
message and under the appropriations
of April ♦, 1897. effective aid has been
given to American citizens in Cuba,
and many of them at their own re
quest have been returned to the united
States.
The instructions given to our new
minister to Spain before his departure
for his post directed him to Impress
upon the government the sincere
wish of the United States to lend Its
aid toward the ending of the war In
Cuba by reaching a peaceful and last
ing result. Just and honorable alike to
Spain and the Cuban people. These
instructions recited the character and
duration of the contest, the wldespreal
losses it entails, the burdens and re
straints it Imposes upon us. with con
stant disturbance of national interests
and tho injury resulting from an In
definite continuance of this state of
things. It was stated that at this
Juncture our government was con
strained to seriously inquire if the
time was not ripe when Spain of her
own volition, moved by her own in
terests and every sentiment of human
ity should put a stop to this destruct
ive war and make proposals of settle
ment honorable to herself and just to
her Cuban colony. It was urged that
as a neighboring nation, with large
interests in Cuba, we could be requir
ed to wait only a resonable time for
the mother country to establish
a'unoruy unu rrauuic peace unu
order within the borders of the In
land; that we cuuid not contemplate an
indefinite period for the accomplish
ment of this result.
No solution was proposed to which
the slightest Idea of humiliation to
to Spain could attach, and, indeed,
precise proposals were withheld lo
avoid embarrassment to that govern
ment. All that was asked or exprrted
was that some safe way might be
«p< euuy provided and perm neut pear#
restored. It so chanced that the con
sideration of this offer, addressed to
the same Spanish udminlstiutlon
which had directed the tenders of my
predecessor, and which for more than
two years had poured men anil treas
ure Into Cuba In the fruitless effort to
suppress the revolt, fell to others. Ih»
tween the departure of General Wo>d
ford, the new envoy, and his arrlvul
In Spain, the statesman who had
shafted the policy of his country fell
by the hand of an assassin, and al
though the cabinet of the late pre
mier still held office and received from
our envoy the proposals he bore, that
cabinet gave place within a few day*
thereafter to a new administration un
der the leadership of Hagnsta.
The reply to our note was rec»|yed
on th* !M day of th-iober It le In the
direct bin of a belter understanding
It appreetatea the friendly purposes
of this government It admits that
our country ts deeply affected by the
war In t‘ub# and that Its desire* for
peace are lust It declare# that the
present ttpanlsh government Is hound
by every consideration to a chsng* 'n
polh'y that should satisfy the failed
mate# and pacify t'nha wphln reason
aMe time To *hls rad ripnln has de
rided to put Into effect the political
reforms heretofore sdtorsled hs the
present premier without nailing for
snr essnef-leraitua In Ihe pith wht h
In Ha hsdsteeai leads In pane* Ihe
i military operattuaa. It In said, will
continue, but wll be humane and con
ducted with all regard to private
rights, being accompanied by political
action leading to the autonomy of
Cuba, while guarding Spanish sover
ingty. This, it is claimed, will result
In investing Cuba with a distinct per
sonality; the Island to he governed by
an executive and by a local council, or
chamber, reserving to Spain the con
trol of the foreign relations, the army
and navy and the Judicial administra
tion. To accomplish this the present
government proposes to modify ex
isting legislation by decree, leaving
the Spanish Cortes, with the aid of
Cuban senators and deputies, to solve
the economic problem and properly
distribute the existing debt.
In the absence of a declaration of
the measures that the government
proposes to take In earrylng nut Its
proffer of good offices, it suggests that
Spain be left free to conduct opera
tions nnd grant political reforms,
while the United States for its part
shall enforce Its neutral obligations
nnd cut off the assistance which It Is
asserted the Insurgents receive from
this country. The supposition of an
Indefinite prolongation of the war Is
denied. It Is asserted that the western
provinces are already well night, re
claimed; that the planting of cane nnd
tobacco therein has been resumed
and that by force of arms nnd new
and amply reform very early nnd
completed pacification Is hoped for.
The Immediate amelioration of ex
isting conditions under the new ad
ministration of Cuban affairs Is pre
dicted, nnd therewith all the disturb
ance and all occasion for any change
•Of attitude on the part of the United
States. Discussion of question* of In
ternational duties and responsibilities
of the United States, as Spain under
stands them, Is presented, with un ap
parent disposition to charge us with
failure In this regard. This charge Is
without any basis In fact. It could not
have been made If Spain hail l»een cog
nizant of the constant efforts this gov
ernment has made at the cost of mil
lions, and by the employment of the
administrative machinery at the com
mand of the nation to perform Its full
duty according to the laws of nations.
That It has successfully presented the
departure of a single military exp dl
tlon or armed vessel from our shores
In violation of our laws would seem
to be a sufflelenty answer. Hut of this
aspeet of the Spanish note It Is not
necessary to speak further now. Firm
In the conviction of a wholly perform
ed obligation, due response to this
charge has been made In diplomatic is
sues. Throughout all these horrors and
dangers to our own peace this gov
ernment has never In any way abro
gated Its sovereign prerogative of re
serving to itself the determination of
Its policy and course according to Its
own high sense of right and in con
sonance with the dearest Interests and
convictions of our own people should
the prolongation of the strife so de
mand.
of the untried measures there re
main only: ‘‘Recognition of the In
surgents as belligerents; recognition
of the Independence of Cuba; neutral
Intervention to end the war by im
posing a rational compromise between
the contestants, and Intervention! In
favor of one or the other parties. I
speak not of forcible annexation, for
that cannot be thought of. That by our
code of morality would be criminal
aggregsslon."
Recognition of the belligerency of
the Cuban insurgents has often been
canvassed as a possible, If not in
evitable step, both In regard to the
previous ten years’ struggle and dur
ing the present war, 1 am not un
mindful that the two houses of con
gress in the spring of 1890 expressed
the opinion by concurrent resolution
that a condition of public war existed
requiring or Justifying the recognition
of a state of belligerency in Cuba, and
during the extra session the senate
voted a Joint resolution of like Im
port, which, however, was not brought
to a vote In the house. In the pres
ence of these significant expressions
of sentiment of the legislative branch,
it behooves the executive to soberly
consider the conditions under which
so important a measure must needs
rest for Justification. It Is to he seri
ously considered whether the Cuban
Insurrection possesses beyond dispute
the attributes of sisterhood which
alone can demand the recognition of
In Its favor. Possession,
In short, of the essential qualifications
of sovereignity by the insurgents and
the conduct of the war by them ac
cording to the recognized code of war
arc no less important factors toward the
determination of the problem of
belligerency than are the Influences
und consequences of the struggle upon
the Internal p6ltcy of the recognls
ins state.
The wise utterances of President
Or»m In his memorable message of
December 7. 1875, are signally rele
vant to tha present situation lu Cuba,
ami It may be wholesome now to re
call them. At that time a nil no is con
flict hail for seven years wasted the
neighboring island. During ull those
ycurs an utter dlsregsril of the laws of
civilized warfare and the Just de
mands of humanity, which railed forth
expressions of condemnation from the
nations of Christendom, continued un
abated. Desolation and ruin pervaded
tl.ut productive region, enormously af
fecting the commerce of all commer
cial nations, but that of the United
Hate* more than any other hy reason
of proximity and larger trade and In
tercourse. At that Junction Uenernl
< -tint uttered these words, which now,
'hen, sum up the elements of lbs
I'ltiUiciu:
• A recognition of Ihe Independence
of Cult* being, In my opinion. Irnprae
tlrnbls. the question which next pre
sents Itself Is that of ths recognition
of the belligerent rights of th* parties
to lbs rout mi In a former message
to congress* I had occasion to con
sider this question and rent bed ihs
conclusion that the roaMct la Cghs
dreadful and devastating as were Its
Incidents, did nut rlsa to ihs fsarlul
dignity of war.
Tlt la puss!bis that Ihe arts of for
•Iga powers, and svea the acta of
dpsla Itself of this very nature, might
lie pointed to la defease of such r»e
ogaltloa Hut now. as ta Its part bis
lory, ths United Huiss should rare
full y avoid the falsa lights whisk
might land It into ths »»*•'« of downs
fwl law and uf question*id* pr> p..
sly, and s these rigidly and sternly to
Ihs ruls which has hssa Ha (aids of
doing only that which la right ant
ho seat sad uf good report Ths psu
tlon of according or withholding
rights of belligerency must be Judged
In every case in view of thp partlculai
attending facts. Unless Justified by
necessity it Is always, and Jusily. re
garded as an unfriendly act ana a gra
tuitous demonstration of moral sup
port to the rebellion. It Is necessary,
ami It Is required, when the Interests
and rights of another government, or
of its people are so far affected by a
pending civil conflict as to require it
definition of Us relations to the par
ties thereto. Hut this conflict must
be one which will be recognized in
the sense of international law ns war.
"Belligerence, too, is a fact. The
mere existence of contending armed
bodies and their occasional conflicts
do not constitute war In the sense re
ferred to. Applying to the existing
condition of affairs In Cuba, the tests
recognized by publicists and writers
on International law, and which have
been observed by nations of dignity,
honesty and power, when free from
sensitive, selfish and unworthy mo
tives, I fall to find In the insurrection
the existence of such a substantial po
litical organization, real, palpable
und manifest to the world, having the
forms und capable of the ordinary
functions of government toward its
own people end to other slates, with
courts for the administration of jus
tice, with u local habitation, possess
ing such organization of force, such
material, sueli occupation of territory
us to take the contest out of tho cat
egory of a mere rebellious Insurrec
tion, or occasional skirmishes und
place It on the terible footing of war,
to which recognition of belligerency
would aim to elevate It,
"The contest, moreover, is solely
on land; the Insurrection bus not pos
sessed Itself of a single seaport
whence It muy send forth Us flag, nor
has it any means of communication
with foreign powers, except, through
the military lines of Its adversaries.
No apprehension of any of those sud
den und difficult complications which
a war upon the ocean is apt to pre
cipitate upon the vessels both com
mercial und national, and upon the
consular officers of other powers,
culls for the definition of their rela
tions to the parties to tho contest.
Considered as a question of expedient y
I regard the accordance of belliger
ent rights still to be as unwise as
I regard It to be, at present, indefen
sible, as a measure of right.
"Hitch recognition entails upon the
country, according the rights of war
which flow from It. difficult and com
plicated duties, untl reattires the ex
action from the contending parties of
the strict observance of their right.',
und obligations. It confers the right
*/•. nnoii.ii mj/wii mi*; n» i»n iij »* n
sols of both parties; It would subject
the carrying of arms and munitions of
war, which now may be transported
freely and without Interruption In
vessels of the United States, to de
tention and to possible seizure; It
would give rise to countless vexatious
questions, would release the parent
government from responsibility for
ucts done by Llie Insurgents, and
would Invest Spain with the right to
exercise the supervision recognized by
our treaty of 1705 over our commerce
on the high seas, u very large part of
which, In Its traffic between the At
lantic and Gulf states and between all
of them and the slates on the Pacific,
pasi.es through the waters which
wash the shores of Cuba, Tho ex
ercise of this supervision could scarce
fall to lead, if not to abuses, certainly
to collisions perilous to the peaceful
relations of the two states. There
can be little doubt as to what result
supervision would before long draw
this notion. It world bo unworthy cf
the United States to Inaugurate the
possibilities of such result, by meas
ures of questionable right or expedi
ency, or by any Indirection.”
Turning to the practical aspects of
a recognition of belligerancy and re
viewing Its Inconveniences and posi
tive dangers, still further pertinent
considerations uppear. In tho code
of nations there Is no such thing as
a naked recognition of belligerency
unaccompanied by the resumption of
international neutrality. Such rec
ognition without more will confer
upon neither party to a domestic con
flict a status not heretofore actually
possessed nor affect the relation of
either party to other states. l he act
of recognition usually takes the form
of a solemn proclamation of neutral
ity which recites the do facto condi
tion of belligerency as its motives.
It announces a domestic law of neu
trality in the declaring state. It as
sumes the lnteruhtlonal obligations
of a neutral In the presence of a pub
lic state of war. It warns all citizens
and others within the Jurisdiction of
thn proclamation that they violate
those rigorous obligations at thejlr
peril, and cannot expect to be shielded
from the consequences. The right of
visit and search on the seas, and seiz
ure of vessels and cargoes and contra
brand of war and good prize under ad
miralty law must, under international
law, be admitted us a legitimate con
sequence of a proclamation of bellig
erency. While according the equal
belligerent right" defined by public
law to each party in our ports, dls
fuvors would 1st Imposed on both,
which, while nominally equal, would
weigh heavily on bchulf of Hpiun her
self. Possessing a navy and controll
ing the ports of Cuba, ter maratlme
rights iambi be asserted not only for
the military Investment of the Island,
but up to the mnrgtn of our own ter
ritorial waters, and a condition of
things would exist for which the Cu
ban* within their own domain could
not hope to create a parallel, while
lie creation of aid or sympathy from
within our domains would Is* even
more Impossible than now, with the
additional obligations of neutrality
we would perforce ass i me
The enforcement of this enlarged
and onerous code of neutrality would
only be Influential within our own
Jurisdiction by land and m and ap
?livable by our own Instrumentalities
t could Impart to ths Palled fltat a
no Jurtsdlc*ton between flpalu and ih»
Insurgents It wonkl give to th<
l nlleti .-itat>*e no right of Intervention
to enforce the conduct uf the Strife
within the paramount authority of
opals, according lu the tstsrnstloaal
code of war.
I uf Ihsae reasons I regard the r **»•
PgSUtua uf the belligerency of the
t 14 la as aa non unwise, ami therefore
ts-4-tertssabie. t*h‘«utd thv step
hereafter ha deemed wtsa aa a m*aa
uf* uf rl*ht and duty the eaeeatpra
will (aha M.
Intervention upon humanitarian
grounds has been frequently suggest
ed and has not failed to receive nty
most anxious and earnest considera
tion. Hut should such a step be now
taken, when It is apparent that a
hopeful change has supervened In the
policy of Spain toward Cuba? A new
government has taken office In the
mother country. It Is pledged In ad
vance to the declaration that all the
effort In the world cannot suffice to
maintainpcacelnCubaby the bayonet;
that vague promises of reform after
subjugation afford no solution of the
Insular problem; that with a substl
t ut ion of commanders must come a
change of the paat system of warfare
for one In harmony with a new policy,
which shall no longer aim to drive
the Cubans to the "horrible alterna
tive of taking to the thicket or suc
cumbing In misery;” that, reforms
must be Instituted In accordance with
tho needs and circumstance* of time,
and that theso reforms, while design
ed to give full autonomy to the colony
and to create a virtual entity and self
controlled administration, shall yet
conserve and affirm the sovereignty of
Spain by a Just distribution of jtnwt r
and burdens upon a basis of mutual
Interest untainted by methods of set
fish expediency.
The first acts of the new govern
ment. Ilo In theso honorablo paths. The
policy of cruel rapine and extermina
tion that so long shocked the univer
sal sentiment of Immunity hits been
reversed. Under the new military
commander a broad clemency Is prof
fered. Measures have already Inert
set afoot Ut relievo the horrors of
starvation. Tho power of the Spanish
armies, It Is asserted, Is to be ueeil
not to spread ruin and desolation bm
to protect the resumption of peaceful
agricultural pursuits and productive
Industries. That past methods «ri
futile to force a peace by subjugation
Is freely admitted, and that ruin
without conciliation must inevitably
full In iirin fni* flnoln ttlfk flitfitil v nf >•
contented dependency.
Decrees In Application of the fore
shadowed reforms have already been
promulgated. Tho full text of these i
decrees has not been received, hut a* ^
furnished In a telegraphic summary
from our minster are: All civil arid
elect roal rights of peninsular Span
iards are, In virtue of existing cens’,1
lotions authority, forthwith extended
to colonial Spaniards upon ratlfba
lion by the Cortes. It creates a Cuban
parliament, which, with tho Insular
executive, can consider and vote upon
all subjects ulTeetlng local order mid
Interests, possessing unlimited power-t
save as to matters of state, war and
navy, as to which the governor general
acts by his own authority as the del
egate of the central government. This
parliament receives the oath of the
governorgeneral to preserve faithfully
the liberties and privileges of tho col
ony, and to It the colonial secretaries
are responsible. It has the r<~ht. to
propose to the central government,
through the governor general, modi
fications of national charter and
to Invite new projects of law or cx
ecutlve measures In the Interest of th«
colony.
Besides its local powers It Is com
petent, flht, to regulate electoral reg
istration and procedure and prescribe
the qualifications of electors and tlrf>
manner of exercising suffrage; second,
to organize courts of Justice will) na
tive Judges from members of the lo
cal bar; third, to frame the Insular
budget both us to expenditures and
revenues to meet the Cuban share of
the national budget, which later will
be voted by the national Cortes, with
the assistance of Cuban senators and
deputies; fourth, to Institute or take
part In the negotiations of the ns
treaties which may affect Cuban In
terests; fifth, to accept or reject com
mercial treaties which the national
government may have concluded
without the participation of the Cuban*
government; sixth, to frame the col
onial tariff, acting in accordance with
the penlsular government In schednl
| Ing articles of mutual commerce be
tween the mother country and the col
! onies. Before introducing or voting
| upon a bill, the Cuban government, or
| the Chambers, will lay the projee' be
fore the central government and hear
1 its opinion thereon, all the corres
pondence In such regard being made
public. Finally, all conflicts of juris
diction arising between the different
municipal, provincial and Insular as
semblies, or between the latter and the
insular executive power, and which
from their nature may not be referable
to the cen ral government fo" d euiou,
shall be submitted to the courts,
i That the government of Sagasta has
entered upon a course from which re
cession with honor is Impossible c.%ji
| hardly be questioned; that In the few
weeks it has existed It has made earn
est of the sincerity of Its professions
Is undeniable. I shall not itipugn Its
sincerity, nor should Impatience be
suffered to embarras it In the task It
has undertaken. It Is honestly dm* to
Spain and to our friendly relation* with
i Spain that It should be given a ren- .
sonable chance to realise Its expeola
I tlona and to prove the asserted « Olcacy
of the new order of things to which
[ It stands Irrevocably committed. It.
has recalled the command r who*-,
i brutal orders Inflamed the Amo-leal*
mind ami shocked the civilised world
1 It has modified the horrible order to
concentration and haa undertaken to
care for the htdpless and permit thoai
who desire to resume the cal'|vT,l!on
of their fields to do an and amtltt*
them uf the protection of the Kpauiah
government la the lawful occupation*
It has Jual released the Competitor
prisoner*, heretofore arut need ip
death, and who have been the whjai'i
of rrpc«od diplomatic cor re imodenc
during this and preceding mfcuhihitra
lion*.
Not a alagle Americas eltlsen U
now under arreat or la eotiflnentetit
la Cuba of whom this goveram**a< h t#
say knowledge The near futur* wilt
•< loonatrate whether the tndlatwnn
able (oaditlou uf a righteous p ace,
Jual alike to Ike Cuban* a ad t Up* It
ijd well as equitable to all ew la efwste
*i intimate!* ia«td«*d la I be welfan
uf Cuba, Is likely to be atlataed If
not. the e«lg*mr of further * ad **ther ^
arttoa by the Catted Main* will Pa
mela to be takea II hru ' he' Hate
come* that action will ha tbunalml
la the line of the i*4i*t>n**ht* -*«hl
and duty It will be faced *1 hunt
attest*las an' *>*ei»an« * l» 1111 t»ht
nf ihs obitg* ton 'hi* « «*r*m*nt ***»
in ttanlf to the gangla who hn*a <mn