

### A ROMAN IRISH FIZZLE.

#### The Much Advertised Meeting of the Irish Military Union Not a Success.

#### Large Part of the Population of Bridgeport, Conn., Not Aware That Their City Was the Meeting Place of the English Haters.

Well, it was not the success promised. Bridgeport did not go wild over the military display, nor will Lord Salisbury ask Secretary of State Olney for an explanation. The friendly relations existing between the United States and Great Britain will not be perceptibly strained by the grand encampment at Avon Park of the Irish-American Military Union, supplemented by a Polish artillery company from Newark to give a military aspect to the gathering. The affair had been written up for months in advance in the Barnum to what the appetite of expectation, and to teach the effete American population a proper respect for the inherent military genius of the Irish race. It is now all over, and notwithstanding the assiduous labors of the pencil-pushers in a political campaign, hardly one in ten of the citizens of Bridgeport were aware that Camp Phil Sheridan ever existed, and seem to care less.

Perhaps it would have fared better had some time other than the natal day of American Independence been selected. There is nothing particular which associates the Irishmen with that historic occasion except that Patrick Henry took part therein, and Patrick never, as far as heard from, laid any particular claim to being a Hibernian in any sense of the word. He left that to future generations of Patricks. He was more interested during his time in driving the Patriots in the British army out of the Colonies to their homes, across the water than in flattering their egotism by telling them that in fighting against the patriots that they were doing heroic service in the cause of civil and religious liberty. He seems to have left this to a future generation of orators, who think more of votes than they do of the truth, and where American self-respect is not shocked in kissing the Blarney Stone at the invitation of the modern Patricks. The great mass of the citizens of Bridgeport took more pleasure in reviewing the bicycle parade and celebrating the day on their "own hook" than in having the Hibernian thrust upon their notice on this occasion, and they were right. It is hardly in good taste for the Hibernian to attempt to monopolize a day which his progenitors were not in sympathy with. It is not unnatural that he should do so as it is his nature to claim the earth and that Adam was a Celt, any more than that the United States would never have had any existence had it not been for the Celtic population who had immigrated to the Colonies, that it would have been wiped out of existence in 1812 but for Celtic heroism, and that it would have gone up in a balloon in 1861 but for the military and patriotic instincts of the Hibernian population. Has not every stump-speaker in search of an Irish vote been flattering their vanity on these topics until they now actually believe such to be the fact, and when, if they read history, which does not sustain the orator, they know that it is an A. P. A. lie and an emanation of bigotry and intolerance. It is not improbable that in a generation or two hence there will be less of Hibernianism and more of Americanism in the descendants of the Celts in the United States. They will have more respect for the truths of history than for the fictions of stump orators. They will then know that the Irish population did not rush impetuously into the union army to "fight for the nagur" at the first call, nor [at the second call of "Uncle Abe"] to put down the rebellion. On the contrary, the great bulk of the race were not only lukewarm, but more of them were backward in expressing their sympathy for the rebel cause and in placing every obstacle at their command in the way of the other side. There were exceptions, it is true, but there was not enough patriotism among them in this state to fill a regiment notwithstanding Governor Buckingham's earnest efforts to enlist them in the service of the state, even to appealing to their Hibernianism. The efforts of Colonel Cahill to recruit a Hibernian regiment in the state promised to become a failure. Governor Buckingham and the adjutant-general of the state gave him every aid possible, but recruiting lagged and the

Irishman held aloof. Captain Fitzgibbon, who had gone to the front with a company on the first call and served three months, and on the discharge of his company at the end of their enrollment immediately recruited another company, which was incorporated in the 6th regiment, was recalled from his command at the front by the governor to aid Colonel Cahill by exerting his influence to assist in recruiting an Irish regiment. He was commissioned lieutenant-colonel of the regiment, but while he had hitherto found no difficulty in raising recruits, the Irish did not rush impetuously to fill what was intended to be a purely Hibernian regiment. They preferred casting votes against the administration to shooting bullets at their late political colleagues, and to get the company off his hands as a last resort Captain Frye's company attached to the 8th regiment was transferred to the 9th, and the captain was consoled by being appointed its major. This was the only attempt to recruit an Irish regiment made in this state. There were exceptions, honorable exceptions. There were Irishmen who enlisted, did faithful duty as soldiers, and fought bravely side by side with their comrades who had also enlisted and did their duty as faithfully and fought as bravely, and who had never seen Ireland. All honor to them, but then there is no record of these exceptions arrogating to themselves the full credit of putting down the rebellion, or that if it had not been for their services the confederacy would have been a success. It is the other class of their countrymen, the men who had conscientious scruples against "fighting for the nagur" and against their late political colleagues who, they claimed, were fighting for their rights, who are now prating about the great services rendered by the Irish to the United States. We would not detract in the least from the credit due the former class, but we do say that they were the exceptions so far as the Irish race in the country was concerned. They had imbibed the spirit of Americanism and cast aside their race proclivities. They enlisted as Americans, fought as Americans, and not as Irishmen, because the Irish were "not in it." They were reserving themselves to free Ireland by way of Chicago.—*Bridgeport Independent Leader.*

#### Rome and the Republican Party.

Nearly two weeks ago we sent out four letters to delegates to the Republican National Convention—to men who were on the resolutions committee—asking them for an explanation of the report that Archbishop Ireland and R. C. Kerens had "fixed" the platform in the interests of the papal church. We have received but one reply, as follows: July 2, 1896.—Editor of *The Citizen*: In reply to yours of the 25th June allow me to say: I was a member of the committee on resolutions in the Republican National Convention. The resolution to which you refer—that opposing the granting of public funds to sectarian institutions—was in the first draft of the Republican platform, but was finally omitted—not, as some of the papers say, through any influence of Thomas H. Carter, for Mr. Carter's influence was absolutely nil; but through the influence of R. C. Kerens, Edward Lauterbach, and several gentlemen who are known to be Protestants, but who were anxious not to antagonize the Roman Catholics. Mr. McKinley was in no way responsible—he saw and approved of the first draft, but was not consulted in regard to omitting the sectarian funds clause. This was done as a matter of political caution; but it could have been prevented, probably, in one of two ways, viz: If the patriotic orders had sent their best men to St. Louis. These orders were represented by men who are known to be cheap adventurers—at least, these were the men (with the exception of Linton) who did the most of the talking, and they did it in such a blustering, bullying manner, as to disgust those who otherwise would have favored them. I speak now of the lobbyists—of the men who were not delegates or alternates.

2nd. It could have been prevented had your case been argued by one or two strong men on the resolutions committee; but nothing was said in its favor—it was allowed to go by default. The opposition put forth their best efforts; your side did nothing.

Any other measure would have suffered the same fate in the committee—whether concerning tariff, coinage, or anything else—if there had been only opposition and no defence. Planks have not only to be born, but to be nursed as well. Your sectarian appropriations plank was born, and then left as a foundling at the door of the committee—without nurse, without care. Is it any wonder it died? However many men there may have been on the com-

mittee who favored it, none of them felt called upon to father it or sponsor it, as each had all he could attend to outside of this.

But here is the fact: There were only four men on the whole committee who favored it. Not one man from the south, not one from New England, and but two from the central states, and two from the Pacific, had any interest in the matter. These men are politicians, simply that and nothing more, and they care little about what they term "sumptuary legislation."

Mr. McKinley is not to blame; the party is not to blame; the managers of the patriotic orders are to blame—or rather, to be pitied—for not having as their managers men competent to cope with such political tricksters as Kerens. You were outwitted—that is all.

Archbishop Ireland may have been concerned in the matter, but if so, we heard nothing about it. Kerens made a large majority believe such a plank would harm the party, and the minority was outvoted.

If you desire to win the next time, begin at the caucus and send the right men to the convention. It is useless to attempt this sort of work at the eleventh hour—or, rather, twelfth hour.

Personally, I wish the proposed plank had been inserted; but you may take this as a fixed truth—that platforms amount to nothing; they are made to be neglected and forgotten. If you elect patriotic men to the senate and house, your work will be successful; if you do not, of what avail would be a favorable platform? Remember that Republican politicians work on the same principle as do the storekeepers: "Protestants will trade with us anyway; but we have to cater to the Roman Catholics."

Where can you do any better? With the Democrats? With the Populists? I think not.

Do not allow treasonable men in your own ranks to split your organization by trick or trade. Stand by the party which has done so much for Americanism in the recent congress.

The above, as we have said, is the only reply we have received. The question arises: Who is to blame? If Allen of Maine, or Lodge of Massachusetts, or Fessenden of Connecticut, voted to kill the patriotic plank referred to, will it help the matter to defeat McKinley and throw the election into the hands of the Romanist party—the Democrats? Would that help on the patriotic work?

We confess that we are disgusted with politics and political parties, and we are perplexed as to the wise course to pursue. We believe in McKinley, for we are convinced that what our correspondent says is true. He is an intelligent Protestant American. But some of his managers seem disposed to lose the substance in grasping at the shadow. They disgust three million American voters by their mean catering to a few hundred Irish Roman Catholics who may or may not vote their ticket.

We await further developments—important information having been promised us.—*Boston Citizen.*

#### Illustrated the Manner.

Archbishop Ireland, one of Rome's leading prelates in this country, in a recent speech directed against the American Protective Association, illustrated the manner in which Rome is accustomed to ignore both history and the intelligence of the American people by the following utterance: "The liberties, the Democracy, the spirit of progress, which are the glories of America, are the outcome of the deepest principles of the Catholic church. Liberty and progress came into the world with her." The intrinsic value of this may be seen by placing beside it this statement from Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. V., page 296:

"The British gained numerous recruits from immigrants. Cultivated men of the Romish church gave hearty support to the cause of independence; but the great mass of its members, who were then but about one in seventy-five of the population of the United States and were chiefly newcomers in the middle states, followed the influence of the Jesuits, in whose hands the direction of the Catholics of the United States still remained, and who cherished hatred of France for her share in the overthrow of their order. In Philadelphia Howe had been able to form a regiment of Roman Catholics."

This early opposition of the Catholics to American independence reflects, of course, much less upon the character of the Catholic people than upon their condition of mental and moral subservience to the will of their superiors, who were well versed in "the deepest principles of the Catholic church." The evil work of the papacy is not due to the character of the mass and its adherents, but to the nature of its principles.—*American Sentinel.*

### WEBSTER ON SILVER.

#### The Fallacy of Free and Unlimited Coinage Fully Set Forth.

#### The Silver Men the Real Monometallists—A Plan to Enrich the Mine Owner Without Benefit to Others.

As we have given space to free silver articles we shall be consistent and allow the other side to have a fair and impartial hearing. The first article will be an address by Hon. John L. Webster of Omaha, taken from the *Nebraska State Journal* of Oct. 28, 1895. The address was delivered at Nebraska City Oct. 27, and is well worth reading. The *State Journal* prefaced Mr. Webster's speech with this paraphrase:

Undoubtedly the best exposition of the silver question heard here this campaign was made in the address delivered at the Republican meeting last evening by Hon. John L. Webster of Omaha. In its clear, convincing logic it is worthy of place as a text-book on the finance issue. The following embraces some of the points made by Mr. Webster:

The free and unlimited coinage of silver in the ratio of 16 to 1 is a delusion and a snare. It involves a fallacy which has been threshed out in all civilized countries of the world years and years ago. Wherever it has been investigated and put to trial in the commercial world it has been repudiated. Judgment based on practical experience has repudiated and condemned it. There were skilled men in finance and in monetary matters when it was condemned in Europe. There were wise men in finance and in monetary affairs when it was condemned in this country as there are to-day. The men who are advancing the policy of the free and unlimited coinage of silver in the ratio of 16 to 1 in this campaign are not advocating a new doctrine, neither are they prophets of greater wisdom than the prophets of a century ago, whose prophecies failed.

Viewed in the light of experience, there is no more reason why we should place confidence in these advocates of silver than that we should place confidence in the Donnelly theory that the works of Shakespeare were written by Bacon, or that the religion of the Mormon church is the true religion of the world. Both Donnelly and Brigham Young had followers for a time, yet the good and settled sense of the country adheres to the idea that William Shakespeare and not Bacon was the author of that classical literature, and that the Bible and not the book of Mormons contains the doctrine of the true religion.

Free silver men talk of gold and silver coinage of the constitution, but perhaps the majority of these men never read the provisions of the constitution upon the subject of money. The constitution says nothing about either gold or silver. It says nothing about what shall be the ratio between gold and silver as money. It says nothing about the unlimited coinage of either metal.

The constitution simply confers upon congress the power "to coin money" and to "regulate the value thereof." The question as to whether gold or silver shall be the money of the country and the regulation of the value of one to the other, and the quantity thereof to be coined, are matters left to regulation by congress. This is, therefore, not a constitutional question. It is a question of expediency.

The Nebraska champion of free silver says: "We believe in the unlimited coinage of silver because we have an unlimited coinage of gold."

He might as well say that, whereas, we have a limited coinage of silver we should have a limited coinage of gold. There would be as much argument in one statement as in the other. Neither statement argues anything or proves anything.

This silver champion further says: "We believe in the treatment of gold and silver exactly alike." Why so? If his statement is logical, then whereas we have demonetized silver, as he claims, we should therefore demonetize gold. That would be treating gold and silver both alike. So we propound the query, does he believe in the demonetization of gold? We do not believe there is a free silver advocate who would have courage sufficient to advance such a doctrine. A mere statement of the case shows the fallacy of such arguments.

It is true that if a man brings gold

to a mint to be coined, he is not asked, where did you get this gold? The gold may have come from Australia, or from Mexico, or from Colorado, and yet be freely coined. Why? Because that gold, whether brought from any of the countries named has the same intrinsic value as a commodity whether coined or not coined. How is it with silver? Just the reverse.

Silver does not have the intrinsic value as a commodity, that it is declared to have by the stamp put upon it at the mint. Silver men ask sixty cents for silver as a commodity that coined at the mint and stamped becomes a dollar, and then ask that it shall pass current as a dollar when its bullion value is but sixty cents. A mere statement of the case shows that silver money would be depreciated money.

It is an attempt to force upon the country two kinds of money of unequal value, and then it asks that the parity between the two metals shall be maintained. To maintain the parity of two metals as money which are of unequal value, is a problem which the history of finance has demonstrated cannot be solved, except to a limited degree.

The most sanguine free silver men admit the truth of the last statement, but undertake to avoid the effect of the statement by saying that the United States would not be flooded by an unlimited amount of silver. They say that silver would not come from France for the reason that the French silver coin is worth three cents more than the American silver coin, and therefore that France could not afford to bring its silver to America. There is a fallacy in this statement. France does not have the free and unlimited coinage of silver, and has not had for many years, for the same reasons that induced this country to put a limit upon the amount of silver coined. Silver in France as a commodity has the same market value as silver as a commodity has in the United States. Let us state the converse of the proposition. If silver in France has the intrinsic value of gold at the ratio of 16 to 1, why do not the silver mine owners take their silver to France and have it coined into French pieces, and thus make it exchangeable for gold at its value? It is simply because the French government knows as well as this government knows, it would be unwise to again permit the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1.

The result is self-evident that the surplus silver of France as an element of merchandise would come to the United States to be coined as money, with the hope of having its exchangeable value increased nearly 100 per cent. If the coining of silver metal into dollars would so enhance its real value as to put it on a parity with gold, why is not the Mexican dollar exchangeable for gold. Why do not all the silver mine owners take their silver to Mexico and have it coined. Mexico has the free and unlimited coinage of silver, and yet the truth is that in that country the silver dollar is not exchangeable at par with the gold dollar. When the Mexican silver dollar is brought into the United States, its exchangeable value is about fifty cents. The Mexican gold dollar, however, is exchangeable at par with the gold dollar of the United States or the gold money of Europe. All this is because gold has an intrinsic value, equal to its coined value while silver has not.

In further answer to the question, where would silver come from, to create a surplus amount, we answer that it would come from every country where silver is mined. All Australian silver would come to our mints. All Mexican silver would come to American mints. All the silver from all the countries of the world would come to the American mints. If the theory of silver men be true, that the free and unlimited coinage of silver would so enhance its minted value above its commodity value, so as to put it on a parity with gold, we are thus brought to this startling proposition: There is 160,000,000 ounces of silver mined every year. That silver has a commodity value of \$125,000,000, and its coined value according to the ratio now existing in the United States would be \$225,000,000. There would be a clear profit to the owners of commodity silver of \$100,000,000 per year.

Silver men are in the habit of saying that they are bimetallists. Is it not a self-evident proposition that with the annual coinage of so much silver, at so great a depreciated valuation, the same could not be exchanged for gold? The owners of silver could not go to the United States treasury and exchange it for gold, for there is not sufficient gold to make the exchange. The moment that the exchange of gold for silver cannot be

made on account of the great difference in the values of the two kinds of money, the silver being worth but sixty cents, while the gold is worth 100 cents, the owner of the gold dollar will refuse to exchange for the silver dollar. Gold would be at a premium, just as in the days after the war, when we had a larger quantity of greenbacks than could be exchanged for gold, gold was at a premium; it was hoarded or drawn out of circulation and paper currency became the money of the day. Thus it would be with the free and unlimited coinage of silver. Gold would disappear, and silver would be the only money of the country. We would have but one kind of metal money in use and that would be silver. The result of this is that free silver men would be mono-metallists.

A financial panic would come the moment the free and unlimited coinage of silver produced an undue proportion in the quantities of the two kinds of money. Gold would go out of circulation and to that extent the amount of the circulating medium would be turned from commercial trade. Yet that is not all of this proposition. There are hundreds of millions of American securities held abroad. There are county bonds, school bonds, city bonds, railway bonds, and others that we might mention, that have been purchased by the capitalists of Europe, and by such sale we have had the benefit of all the money that has been sent to this country to purchase these bonds. These purchases were made upon the faith that they would be paid in money worth one hundred cents on the dollar. Capital is timid. It cannot be regulated by law. Every owner of capital has the right to do with it as he pleases. His money is his own. When the threat comes, that those securities are liable to be paid in depreciated money, the holders of those securities would demand that they be paid at the earliest day. Gold will travel out of the country to pay these securities. America will be called upon to pay its debt to Europe. There is scarcely a city but would be found with an empty treasury, nor a railroad company that would not be forced into the hands of a receiver under foreclosure proceedings. It needs no argument or lengthy discussion to show that panic would spread itself over the United States, such as this country has never experienced before. The evils that my friend, Mr. Bryan, so often undertakes to predict, using a sentence of Secretary Carlisle as a text, has not come from what he calls the demonetization of silver, but it will surely come from the free and unlimited coinage of silver.

Mr. Bryan ridicules the suggestion frequently made that the Rothschilds might buy up the silver of Europe and bring it to American mints to be coined into money, and thus make a hundred per cent profit on the investment, by saying: "If he wants to give his silver dollar for a gold dollar, he must find somebody who is willing to give his gold dollar for a silver dollar. He cannot compel the giving or exchange of a gold dollar for some other." That admits the whole proposition. If I had a hundred silver dollars of depreciated value could I compel my neighbor to give me one hundred gold dollars in exchange therefor? It also follows that the man who had the gold would refuse to make the exchange. All this means that silver would become the circulating medium and gold would be retired.

Mr. Bryan further argues that the Rothschilds could not use the American coined silver dollar in buying American merchandise, because "he could only buy with his silver dollar from those who were unwilling to accept his silver dollar for goods." \* \* \* "You can trust to the intelligence of the American not to allow the cheap dollar to be palmed off on him."

Well, if the silver dollar is a cheap dollar, so that it cannot be palmed off for American goods or for American labor, then what are they going to do with the American dollar? If the silver dollar is to be so cheap that it will not buy goods, and will not pay for labor, what is it good for?

If the Rothschilds cannot buy goods or cannot buy labor with the silver dollar, how is the American laborer or the American merchant to buy goods with his silver dollar? If the silver dollar is to be so cheap that it cannot be used what do we want with it? If the Rothschilds cannot buy goods with the American silver dollar, then the New York merchant cannot buy goods in Europe with his silver dollar. The Omaha merchant cannot buy New York goods with his silver dollar. The silver dollar must have some value—some exchangeable value—if it is in the pocket of the Rothschilds, or in the pocket of the Kountzes,