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## THE INCOMPETENTS

Official Records of the Penitentiary—Escapes, Pardons and Commutations Compared With Fugitive Administration

Last year at about this season the Omaha Bee, the State Journal, and every little republican country weekly in the state were filled to overflowing with "hotter plate" matter regarding Governor Foytner's record in the matter of pardons and paroles of convicts at the penitentiary. These articles were prepared by one Harrison, commonly known as "Thunder-Maker Harrison."

This year, however, these same papers are painfully silent on the matter of pardons and commutations under the administration of Governors Dietrich and Savage. This painful silence suggested that it might be a good plan to investigate the matter. The officials, both in the governor's office and at the penitentiary, were loath to give out any information on the subject, but finally were persuaded that being matter of public record the public is entitled to information in regard thereto.

Comparison is made of the year 1900 under Governor Foytner and for the year 1901 under Governors Dietrich and Savage up to and including October 19, and is as follows:

Number paroled—	
Foytner, 1900.....	9
Dietrich and Savage, 1901.....	47
Number of sentences commuted—	
Foytner, 1900.....	4
Dietrich and Savage, 1901.....	16
Number of convicts escaped—	
Foytner, 1900.....	2
Dietrich and Savage, 1901.....	10
Number escaped convicts returned—	
Foytner, 1900.....	0
Dietrich and Savage, 1901.....	6
Paroled convicts returned—	
Dietrich and Savage, 1901.....	11
Foytner, 1900.....	3
Convicts pardoned—	
Foytner, 1900.....	0
Dietrich and Savage, 1901.....	1
Number of convicts died—	
Foytner, 1900.....	0
Dietrich and Savage, 1901.....	7

It will be observed that the republicans last year were not careful about using the term pardon in its strict and real sense. The records show that Governor Foytner issued no pardons during the year 1900, but that he did commute the sentences of four convicts. In view of the terrific howl which went up last year from many thousand republican throats because of these four commutations by Governor Foytner, what shall be said of the sixteen commutations and one unconditional pardon issued under the administration of Governors Dietrich and Savage? A parole is to some extent a pardon (although not strictly so) inasmuch as the paroled convict gets his liberty, but is placed under certain restrictions as to his actions. Here Governors Dietrich and Savage have released forty-seven convicts as compared to nine paroled by Governor Foytner. The howl this year ought to be five times as loud as it was last year, but not a republican paper or politician in the state is mentioning the matter.

The republican governors are not only indirectly responsible for escapes from the penitentiary, but here again we see ten escapes in nine months of republican rule as against but two in a whole year under Warden Hopkins. The number of deaths is also a subject for comment. Not one convict died at the penitentiary during the entire year of 1900, but seven have died in the short time the republicans have been in control at the penitentiary. Typhoid fever is a preventable disease. All these are straws which show the way the wind is blowing.

When we consider the foregoing facts and when we further take into consideration the disastrous fire which occurred at the penitentiary as the result of carelessness on the part of the republican officials, fair-minded men must concede that the penitentiary has fallen into bad hands. That the present republican warden is incompetent to perform his duties in a satisfactory and business-like manner is further evidenced by the fact that he has wholly failed and neglected to file with the governor a semi-annual report of the expenditures made at the penitentiary for the six months ending May 31, 1901. More than this, he has failed to make the regular monthly abstract of the number of prisoners at the penitentiary at the beginning of the month, number received, number paroled, number discharged, number escaped, number died, and number on hand at the end of the month. These reports should be filed immediately after the end of each month in the office of the secretary of state; but inquiry at that office shows that no such reports have been filed there except for the month of August, 1901.

Such a record of incompetency has seldom been approached even under the old-time regime. There is no necessity for permitting the penitentiary or any other state institution to be in such incompetent hands. There are plenty of able republicans in the state who could perform these duties in a satisfactory manner. But the present republican administration is simply a reinstatement of the old gang who were formerly in power. That is the reason the state institutions are so badly managed.

## Republican Spoils

Editor Independent: The republican legislature refused to drop the spoils system.

The present chief executive of the United States is a pronounced civil service man. The best articles written by Theodore Roosevelt as a maga-

zine writer breathed a severe condemnation of the spoils system.

A fusionist in the last session of the Nebraska legislature introduced a bill, House Roll No. 192, which was recommended for passage by the judiciary committee, providing that no state officer shall assess his subordinates, clerks and deputies for campaign purposes, and making it a misdemeanor or subject to a fine of from \$25 to \$500 for the violation thereof. A republican majority of the sitting committee, and on the floor of the house, refused to advance this bill, and put it upon its passage.

It seems that these adherents to the principle of higher civilization and benevolent assimilation were not willing to pass a measure to prevent the state and county officers from assessing their employees. This bill would not prevent clerks, deputies and stenographers from voluntarily contributing to their party, state and local committees, but it does prevent poor stenographers and clerks from being held up by compulsory assessments. The majority party had a chance to in-dorse one phase of the merit system. They refused to do it.

## NEW YORK NATIONAL BANKERS

Nearly Every One of Them Would Now Be Serving Terms in the Penitentiary if the Law Had Been Enforced

Editor Independent: I have received quite a number of letters of inquiry that indicates that I have not been quite explicit enough to be understood by some.

Those who have read carefully previous articles will have observed that all reserve national banks outside of New York (43) and Chicago (12) held on July 15, in the aggregate, \$2,713,335.58 of loanable funds. That is if every one of the seven banks in St. Louis and the 274 banks in 29 reserve cities had each held the full amount of cash reserve required by law then there would have been in all the 281 of these banks outside of New York and Chicago the sum above mentioned that could have been loaned without violation of the national bank laws.

The seven St. Louis banks are shown by the reports to have been short in the aggregate cash reserve required \$3,551,148.77. If the St. Louis banks are dropped out of the calculation then this shortage must have been in the remaining 274 reserve banks. Add this amount therefore to the \$2,713,335.58 and the sum of \$6,264,484.35 is the aggregate excess of cash over "cash reserve required" in the 274 banks in 29 cities. That is the shortage in the seven St. Louis banks is represented in the increased loanable surplus in the 274 reserve banks outside of New York, Chicago and St. Louis.

Out of these 274 reserve city banks, 24 held in the aggregate an excess of "cash reserves required" \$6,736,508.82. That is, 250 banks out of 274 were short in the aggregate in their "cash reserves required" \$472,024.47.

The comptroller's abstract for July 15 shows that 165 of these banks in fourteen cities held an excess and 75 banks in ten cities were short in "cash reserves required." The banks in the fourteen cities held an excess of \$4,223,239.72. Add to this the \$472,024.47 and the sum \$4,695,264.19 represents the aggregate shortage of 75 banks in ten cities.

Thus, by the shortage in "cash reserves required" in 75 banks in ten reserve cities and seven banks in one central reserve city (St. Louis) the aggregate loanable surplus is increased from \$2,713,335.58 to \$11,431,773.01. This amount is in 199 banks in 19 reserve cities.

Now, consider the situation. New York and Chicago have a surplus of \$12,099,133.62 and the 281 banks outside of New York and Chicago hold \$11,431,773.19. But of this amount so held as a surplus by some banks \$8,718,437.45 represents a shortage of reserve. It must be remembered that this is a calculation of reserve cities and that the abstracts do not enable us to determine how the banks stand with relation to each other in each city. It is possible (and probable) that the amount of loanable surplus held would (if we had this information) be largely increased and the number of banks holding this surplus be largely decreased. All such increase of surplus above \$14,812,462.29 must, however, necessarily depend upon a shortage in "cash reserve required," in part of the 236 central reserve and reserve city banks.

Take for example, Baltimore with 19 national banks and an aggregate shortage below the aggregate "cash reserve required" of \$23,310.20, it can hardly be supposed that all the 19 banks were short. A part of the banks may have had a large cash surplus that could have been loaned by the bank holding it without a violation of law, but if so then every dollar of such surplus must be added to the \$23,310.20 aggregate shortage to show the increased shortage of other banks.

In other words, according to the comptroller's abstract every dollar of loanable money in Baltimore national banks must be added to the \$23,310.20 to find how much some of the banks are short in their "cash reserve required." Every dollar of loanable surplus in any part of the Baltimore national banks represents a shortage in other banks.

The "cash reserve required" and "reserve required" are headings of different columns in the abstract and must not be confused. "Reserve required" means (allow me to repeat) 15 per cent of the deposits in country banks and 25 per cent of deposits in

reserve banks. "Cash reserve required" means 6 per cent of deposits in country banks and twelve and a half per cent in the reserve banks, while in central reserve banks both headings mean 25 per cent of deposits.

The difference between "reserve required" and "cash reserve required" may become a deposit in the hands of "reserve agent." When it does it ceases to be, in any correct sense, a reserve or any part of a reserve.

On July 15, the "reserve required" in 274 reserve banks in 29 reserve cities was \$25,142,935.75. The "cash reserve required" was \$124,140,533.37, but these banks held cash \$130,405,017.72. It is clear therefore that they had on deposit with "reserve agent banks" not less than \$121,016,968.03. Presumably, this amount was on deposit in central reserve banks in New York, Chicago, or St. Louis; principally of course, in New York.

New York with a cash surplus over and above "cash reserve required" of only \$10,471,887.28 are liable to be called on for the reserves of reserve city banks which they hold to an amount of over \$120,000,000.

Just this occurred in 1893 and these same New York banks arbitrarily and in violation of law refused to honor the drafts for reserves to non-combatant reserve agents. There were few national banks in New York, the officers of which would not have served terms in the penitentiary if the law had been enforced against them. Why, is it that so large a number of these banks are permitted continually to loan their deposits until they do not have the "cash reserve required" by law to be kept in their vaults? Possibly the comptroller may be able to explain. At no time between September, 1899, and August, 1901, has the comptroller issued an abstract that does not show that a large per cent of national banks in the control reserve and reserve cities were short in their "cash reserve."

FLAVIUS J. VAN VORHIS, Indianapolis, Ind.

## Not War but Murder

Great Britain is and long has been making war upon helpless women and children, killing these by slow starvation in concentrated camps. It is no longer war, but the extermination of these innocent persons. In August of the present year there were in these camps 137,919 Boer people, of whom 2,345 died. This is a death rate of one 200 per month, or ten times the normal rate. At this rate 28,140 of these women and children will perish in a year, and all of them will be dead in five years! This statement is made from records made and published by the British government. The death rate is greater than any known to have occurred in Cuba under the infamous reconcentro policy of the British. The Cubans are a frail race with little vitality. The Boers are a strong, vigorous race. The inference is, that British inhumanity is incomparably greater than Spanish savagery!

She is transporting from their native land and promises to continue to transport those who exercise the God-given right to defend their homes. She is confiscating the property of those in arms, contrary to the rules of civilized warfare. In this she repeats her treatment of the hapless Acadians of one hundred and fifty years ago.

She is burning the homes and destroying the substance of non-combatants as she did in the war of 1812. She is placing the same upon the Boers as she did in the war of 1812. She is placing the same upon the Boers as she did in the war of 1812. She is placing the same upon the Boers as she did in the war of 1812.

The Boers (I have mentioned) themselves as did the Greeks against the Persians, and later in their struggle for independence against the Turks, and as their Dutch ancestors against Spain in the time of Charles II. Marjorie Hill and Spion Koy are remembered by the Marathas, the Armenians, our Trenton and Brandywine, Kruger, Botha and De Wet will be remembered along with the greatest names of all time, with our own Washington, with Leonidas, with Winkler, with William of Orange.

The world cannot let such people perish. The civilization which they would construct must not be destroyed by the civilization of Cecil Rhodes and Barney Barnato.

## The Man Behind the Pick

Up the rugged mountain side a thousand feet he takes his way, Or as far into the darkness from the cheering light of day. He is shut out from the sunlight, In the glimmer of the lamps; He is cut off from the sweet air In the sickly fumes and damps; He must toil in cramped positions; He must take his life in hand, For he works in deadly peril that but few can understand; But he does it all in silence and he seldom makes a kick, Which is why I sing the praises of the man behind the pick.

He unlocks the bolted portals of the mountains to the stores Hid in nature's vast exchequer in her treasure house of ores. He applies a key dynamic and the gates are backward rolled, And the ancient rocks are riven to their secret heart of gold. Things of comfort and of beauty and of usefulness are mined By this brave and quiet worker—he's a friend of humankind; Who, though trampled down and un-dersold, rises on without a kick, So I lift my hat in honor of the man behind the pick.

—J. A. Edgerton.

## THE UNIVERSITY VETO

It Was a Premeditated Assault Upon Higher Education by a Governor Who Had no Sympathy With It

"A state official" (too cowardly to reveal his identity) recently rushed into print defending Governor Dietrich's veto of the \$90,500 appropriation for permanent repairs. This defense was in the form of a neatly typewritten "interview" which was published in the Omaha Bee a week or so ago. This "state official's" defense would be laughable were it not such a tissue of falsehoods and misrepresentations. The opening paragraph is really charming because of its naivety:

"In the renewed attack on Governor Dietrich for his veto of the \$90,500 appropriation for sundry purposes in connection with the university the popocratic editors have the boldness to state that the veto of this large sum was inspired by hostility to this well-known educational institution. No more silly falsehood was ever uttered.

"In vetoing this appropriation, as shown by public records, Governor Dietrich simply saw that if this amount were allowed to stand the total appropriation would exceed the proceeds from the levy and increase the state's floating indebtedness."

"Actions speak louder than words," is an old saying that fits Governor Dietrich's case exactly. He may profess the greatest love and admiration for the university, but his actions belie his words. Why was the university selected as the victim of his veto acts? The 1,400 or 1,500 students at this institution are asking this question as they walk up to the captain's office and pay the \$6 "Dietrich tax."

This "state official" assures the people that the popocratic editors have the boldness to state that Governor Dietrich's veto of the university appropriation of \$90,500 is a well-known fact to that institution. It requires no particular boldness to make a statement which is corroborated by all the facts concerning the matter. "Governor Dietrich simply saw that if this total amount (\$90,500) were allowed to stand the total appropriation would exceed the proceeds from the levy and increase the state's floating indebtedness." The gentleman is acting in his statement. It is a well-known fact that the total appropriations made against the general funds have for a number of legislative sessions invariably exceeded the amount which could be possibly raised by the five-mill levy for general fund purposes. But this \$90,500 appropriation was payable from the temporary university fund and is not included in the facts well known that this fund is derived from a one-mill tax levy made against the taxable property in the state and the income from two permanent funds. In order that the matter may be thoroughly understood it should be stated that there are four different funds which are used in behalf of the university. The first of these is known as the temporary university fund, the same as a general fund, and is registered. Hence it would be possible to make large appropriations against this temporary university fund and create a large floating debt of outstanding registered temporary university warrants.

In order to ascertain whether Governor Dietrich had a reasonable ground for his fears of creating a floating debt by reason of the \$90,500 appropriation, it might be well to inquire what the receipts in this temporary university fund for previous years. During the biennium which ended November 30, 1898, the total receipts in this fund were \$256,664.90, of which \$134,787.64 was derived from a tax levy, which at that time was three-eighths of a mill on the dollar valuation in each county; and \$121,877.26 was derived from the income on lands and securities held by the permanent university and agricultural college endowment funds. The legislature in 1899 amended the law with respect to the tax levy for the temporary university fund and increased it to one mill on the dollar valuation in each county of the state. Hence the receipts during the biennium which ended November 30, 1900, are somewhat increased by the increased levy of 1899. The total receipts during the biennium last mentioned were \$314,298.45, of which \$219,892.06 was derived from the tax levy before mentioned; and \$94,406.39 was derived from the income on lands and securities before mentioned.

Another fund which is used in maintaining the state university is known as the agricultural and mechanic arts fund (commonly known as the "Morrill fund"). This fund is derived from the United States. Once a year the United States treasurer sends his warrant to the state treasurer for the amount due to the state under the provisions of the Morrill act. The amount in recent years has been \$25,000 each year. This constitutes what is known as a cash fund. No warrant can be drawn against the fund in excess of

the amount of cash in the state treasurer's hands. There is no possibility of creating a floating indebtedness consisting of warrants against this fund. There is no such thing as registered agricultural and mechanic arts fund warrants, because there is always cash in the state treasurer's hands sufficient to pay the warrant when presented and it would be folly for the legislature to make appropriations against this fund in excess of the amount which would probably be received from the United States.

Another fund which is used in the maintenance of the state university is known as the books of the state treasurer's office as the agricultural experiment station fund (commonly known as the "Hatch fund"). This fund is similar to the Morrill fund and no warrant is ever drawn against it beyond the amount of cash in the state treasurer's hands.

The remaining vote which is available for use of the university is known as the state treasurer's books as the state fund for cash. This fund, as said before, is derived from matriculation fees and other fees paid by the students at the state university and it also is a cash fund in this, that no warrant may be drawn against it in excess of the amount of cash in such fund in the state treasurer's hands.

The appropriations asked for by the university and made by the legislature are as follows:

Payable from the temporary university fund for general current expenses, \$74,500; for permanent improvements and repairs, \$90,500; a total of \$165,000; payable from the university cash fund, for services in farm and dairy schools, etc., \$75,000; payable from the Morrill fund for services, etc., \$50,000; payable from the agricultural experiment station fund (Hatch fund), \$30,000, making a total of \$320,000 all told. For expenses other than the salaries and wages of executive and instructional officers. This latter appropriation amounts to \$270,000, with \$5,000 more for additional instruction at the experiment station. Accordingly the total amount appropriated by the legislature for the use of the university and which would be charged against the temporary university fund is \$440,000 in all. Now, it will be seen that during the biennium which ended November 30, 1900, and which contained very little of the one-mill tax levy (being made up largely of the three-eighths mill levy before mentioned) that the total receipts for this fund were \$314,000 in round numbers, of which \$220,000 was derived from taxation. The average income from the permanent university fund taxes is \$40,000 to the two permanent funds heretofore mentioned will run about \$100,000 each biennium, hence \$340,000 must necessarily be raised by taxation if all the appropriations made by the legislature be allowed to stand. The grand assessment roll for 1901 is \$174,439,095.45. Accordingly a one-mill levy each year would produce about \$174,000 of temporary university fund taxes, or \$348,000 for the biennium, and this added to the \$100,000 income would make the total receipts for the biennium about \$448,000. This would be amply sufficient to cover the entire appropriation made by the legislature and would include the \$90,500 which Governor Dietrich vetoed.

With this state of facts before him, Governor Dietrich ruthlessly cut out the \$90,500 to be used for permanent improvements and repairs. In explaining his veto he said: "My objections are that the within appropriations, owing to the condition of the state's finances, are ill-advised and should not have been made. In the case of appropriations for the state university, some of the improvements asked for should not be made, but the items were grouped together under the caption of permanent improvements into one sum of \$90,500. No part of this act could be stricken out without striking out the entire amount available from the one mill levy and result in a large deficit, it became necessary in order to guard against this large deficiency, to veto the section relative to permanent improvements."

Was it hostility to the university or ignorance of the facts which caused Governor Dietrich to veto this? It will be noted that he assumes that the temporary university fund is made up wholly of the one mill levy, and he ignores the income from investments and lands belonging to the two permanent educational funds. It is not hard to see that the university officials did some close figuring on the probable amount which would come into the temporary university fund in the two years and asked for appropriations which could be met and which would take practically all of the money which would come in. Governor Dietrich was certainly informed and knew that the appropriations as made by the legislature for the university need not create any floating debt; hence it is fair to assume that his veto was inspired by hostility to an institution with which he, as a man, has nothing in common and with which he is not in sympathy either by nature or training.

The people of Nebraska are greatly interested in this matter. The above figures show that \$90,500 will be collected from the one-mill tax, come into the hands of the state treasurer, and be reported as "cash on hand" while every man of common sense in the state believes that it is loaned out of the state. They also believe that the interest on that amount, which cannot be less than 5 per cent, will be as much stolen from the school funds as any of the money that Bartley ever embezzled. There is no man silly enough to believe that the enormous sum of cash on hand that appears in the state treasurer's reports lies idle in the vaults of the treasury or any

other vaults. The money from the one-mill tax was assessed for the support of the university and can be used for no other purpose. What comes into the treasurer's hands from that source must remain there or be paid over to the university. Dietrich's veto keeps it in the hands of the state treasurer.

When the Taft commission, which is the government in the Philippines, want their salaries raised, they don't have to wait for appropriations to be made by any recalcitrant legislative body, they don't have to get an order from any potentate, czar or king, they just go into a little room and do the voting to raise them, themselves. They have got the governor's salary, including palaces, perquisites and incidental expenses up to about \$25,000 a year and the rest of them in proportion. When they want them paid they just issue an order to go out and collect it from the people who work for from ten to twenty cents a day. All that is despotism pure and simple, but you must not say so or you are an anarchist and the blood of the president is on your hands. So please keep quiet.

## LOBBIES AND LOBBIES

Only One Kind are Ever Successful and They Represent Great Private Corporations

At the last session of the legislature there were many effective lobbies. The normal school men lobbied in vain. The progressive alumni of the university exhorted in vain. The agricultural and stock raisers lobbied in vain for a cheaper freight bill.

But one lobby was uniformly successful. It was a success in a negative way, however. It was not trying to promote any new bills; it was trying to prevent any change of the laws which would increase their expenses or reduce the profits of the corporations that they represented. The members of this lobby were more numerous and more persistent than the railroad lobbyists. They had a well watered grill room in the Lindell hotel. They quenched the thirst of every parched-mouthed member of the telephone committees in both houses. This great lobby represented the "Bell Telephone company."

Their special lobby manager was the essence of sociability and good will. He was so extremely popular that he succeeded in getting the promoters of every telephone bill, which had for its purpose the reduction of rates, to forget their mission. The gentleman from Gage had cheaper rate bill, and it died "a bornin'." The gentleman from Thurston had one, and it was never heard from after business really began. The gentleman from Colfax had one, but it was silenced. Many others were introduced, but none passed. In fact, but one member (and he a fusionist) ever presented and argued a bill before the telephone committee in the house, and his bill was recommended for indefinite postponement, by the republican pro-corporation committee. But the author of this bill got enough votes by personal solicitation to carry a motion to non-concur in the committee's report and to place the bill on general file.

This bill—House Roll No. 108—was introduced January 14, early in the session; yet the chairman of the great telephone committee wouldn't call a meeting of the committee for over a month, and not then until the persistent populist, who wanted the telephone company to be either the weeds around their poles or move their poles back on the line, threatened to make that bill a special order.

Then the venerable, but sleek attorney from Omaha, who represented the Bell Telephone company, hooted at the idea of asking such a great public benefactor as the Bell Telephone company to mow any weeds.

Yet this bill provided that while the company shall have the right of way along the public roads, that the company as well as the land owners should mow the weeds from around their property. The farmers encourage these companies by free right of way, and they justly asked the legislature to compel the great corporation to mow weeds around their artificial obstructions.

The statutes provide that farmers shall, during the months of July and August, mow the weeds on the road-side adjacent to their land, or the road overseer can hire the weeds out, and have the cost charged up against the land owners' property with his taxes.

But the republican legislature refused to compel these great corporations to mow a space 12 feet in circumference, around their poles which the farmers cannot get up to with their mowing machines.

The farmers have enough work swinging the scythe inside their fences, on the head lands of their corn fields, without mowing around these poles or artificial obstructions in the high-ways.

If one of those farmers want to talk to some one in the state capitol, it will cost him from 45 cents to \$3 for a few minutes' conversation over the line of these great public benefactors. Why a man in one of our county seats less than 100 miles from Lincoln, was recently talking with a state officer, and they talked more than three minutes, and the charges were \$235. Of course, these companies can fit up a grill room with choice liquors and cigars to keep down any measures which tend to reduce telephone rates.

F. G. H.

## SELLING CORN TO MEXICO

Why the Price Went Down From 95 Cents in 1873, to 37 Cents in 1897 and 51 Cents in 1901

Editor Independent: I have written considerable in your columns during the last few weeks on subjects connected with the farm, and as the farm interests of our country are much greater than all other interests combined, I might write for years and take a subject connected with the farm every time and still in no way exhaust the subject. The design of this article is to show in as near a tangible way as possible just what caused the decline in the export price of the bushel of corn to Mexico from 95 cents per bushel in 1873 to 37 cents in 1897 and 51 cents in 1901. Every farmer in this country knows that the export price controls in a general way the domestic price. Nearly all the discussions for the last thirty years as to what caused the decline in the price of the American farmer's products have been so saturated with political prejudice and ignorance that it is an utter waste of time and in fact life to too soon to attempt to write anything in a specific way on the subject. So in this article I shall confine myself to giving a history of an actual transaction and I am sure that deductions can be made from facts that will come to the surface which will prove to the satisfaction of every intelligent person just what caused the decline in the export price of the bushel of corn from 95 cents per bushel in 1873 to 37 cents in 1897 and 51 cents in 1901.

In order to have a live object lesson to consider right before us, I have placed a table below giving the years, the number of bushels, the price per bushel received by our farmers at tide water and the amount paid by the Mexican in his money at tide water in our country.

No. 1.	No. 2.	No. 3.	No. 4.
1873.....	10,146	\$0.95	\$0.83
1874.....	55,881	72	65
1875.....	93,487	81	80
1876.....	288,109	93	102
1885.....	2,059,937	66	80
1889.....	434,997	45	61
1890.....	961,958	50	60
1892.....	754,548	65	97
1893.....	6,960,356	62	104
1894.....	431,516	51	104
1896.....	1,674,758	40	77
1897.....	8,825,880	37	77
1899.....	194,644	41	82
1900.....	579,517	42	92
1901.....	1,566,171	51	102

(No. 1, year; No. 2, bushels of corn exported to Mexico; No. 3, price per bushel received by American farmers at tide water; No. 4, price per bushel paid by the Mexican in his money at our ports.) The export price of this table shows that our farmers were not aware of the decline in the export price from 95 cents in 1873 to 37 cents in 1897 and 51 cents in 1901. Second, how to prevent a further decline, and, third, how to restore prices.

There are six forces that control prices when conditions are normal. First, overproduction; second, volume of money; third, ocean freight; fourth, wars and famine abroad; fifth, competition in foreign markets; sixth, cost of production. I will line up each one of the above forces and see if I can explain what caused the fall in the price of corn from 95 cents in 1873 to 37 cents in 1897 and 51 cents in 1901.

The farmers of this country want to know just what caused that decline of 44 cents in the export price of the bushel of corn to Mexico. Well, let us see if overproduction furnished the force to press down the price from 95 cents to 51 cents. If there was overproduction of corn in the world during 1901 as compared with 1873 the Mexican would certainly have been buying his corn for less money per bushel during 1901 than he did in 1873. The table shows that the price of the Mexican man said 83 cents per bushel for corn in 1873 and \$1.09 in 1901. That is he paid 26 cents per bushel more for corn in 1901 than in 1873. With these facts plainly in view, it would be preposterous to claim that overproduction furnished the force to cause this decline of 26 cents in the selling price of corn. Further on in this article I will show beyond all question that it was as having above makes it so plain that no one would attempt to prove that the quantity of money either great or small in this country furnished the force to press down the price of corn as shown in the table.

In 1873 the official records at Washington show that the amount of money per capita was about \$17. The same records show 1901 that the amount per capita was about \$26. This makes a large increase in the quantity of money per capita and if conditions had been normal, the price of the bushel of corn would have advanced to the American farmers above the 95 cents per bushel that it was in 1873, instead of declining to 51 cents per bushel as shown by the table for 1901. The showing above makes it so plain that no one would attempt to prove that the quantity of money either great or small in this country furnished the force to press down the price of corn as shown in the table.

As to the next force ocean freights were less in 1901 than in 1873, so as far as this force is concerned, the price of corn should have advanced above the price it was in 1873 instead of falling below that price.

Next, wars and famine abroad would have increased the price instead of causing it to decline. The fifth force, competition in foreign markets. The corn belt of America is the only corn belt in the world to amount to anything. Therefore the American farmers had absolute control of the price