

to those appeals to the non-partisanship of their audiences which speakers on political subjects are prone to utter. Yet, sir, such an appeal I now make. I do not believe the ancient shrines are all untenanted. Many an American heart still pays its vows to the spirit of citizenship in the republic while the altars of party "pale their ineffable fires."

Millions of voters in this nation, I believe, still bear a fealty to their country stronger and more sacred than any duty they recognize to any political organization. Many of them at the last election, I am convinced, voted for the party in power under a misapprehension. To some the clamor of party drowned the voice of country. To others the flaunting of party banners in the stillitude of the national ensign worked a temporary confusion. These two classes are dangerous to the system they have aided. If they become convinced that they have been deceived, if once they realize that the new course is away from the old landmarks of liberty, that vengeance will be both swift and sure.

I cannot hope that my voice may reach any large number of these men, nor that, even of those who hear, many will be convinced through my imperfect utterance. But happily mine is but one of a multitude of voices that are to be raised for justice and national honor, for the Americanism of the fathers, and for the true and perpetual glory of the country. They shall sing of industry rather than waste, of social equity rather than war, of self-government rather than arbitrary power.

Our advent in the Philippines was an incident in the war against Spain. Cuba was liberated in the Orient. Strange that the subjugation of one people should be the vicarious atonement for the freedom of another; still more inexplicable that the great republic should proclaim the sacrifice and herself execute the bloody decree. The state of affairs which in Cuba had aroused the indignant sympathy of the American people was, nevertheless, according to all the testimony, much more tolerable than that which obtained in the Philippine islands.

There the same despotic monarchy had inflicted an even greater oppression for more than three hundred years. The burdens of taxation borne by the Filipinos, the extortions practiced upon them, the awful punishments they suffered, the wanton and bloody cruelty of which they were the constant victims; these things had scarcely been paralleled in history, and had sufficed to stir to permanent discontent and intermittent revolution a people of kindly disposition and of naturally peaceful habits. Yet these experiences had not been without their discipline. A certain self-reliance was generated, and a common suffering stimulated the latent feeling of nationality that grew into the hope, and finally into the determination, for independence.

One of the numerous insurrections in which this restlessness found expression had broken out in the summer of 1896 under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo. It became quite formidable and was prosecuted with some success against the Spanish troops, whose cost of terrible suffering on the part of the natives. It resulted in the peace of Biaknabato, negotiated in December, 1897. Upon one of the incidents of this treaty has been founded an accusation against Aguinaldo, so persistent in its misrepresentation, so gratuitous in its calumnies, that we consider that the official publications of our own government contradict and destroy it, that I shall refer to it with more particularity than would otherwise be warranted.

It has been said that Aguinaldo accepted a bribe for peace; that he sold his country for a few thousand dollars. During the last political campaign the stump rang with this easy slander. The great administration newspapers still occasionally repeat it. I have heard it on this floor. Astounding as it may seem, even the president of the United States has given the high sanction of his character and station to this charge notwithstanding that its absolute refutation is contained among the documents accompanying one of his own messages, and by him officially transmitted to congress. This publication has become famous as "Document No. 62" (Senate, 55th Cong., 2d sess.) On page 423 of this volume in a memorandum by Maj. Gen. F. V. Greene on the situation in the Philippines, under date of August 30, 1898, is the following language referring to the agreement of Biaknabato:

In brief, it required that Aguinaldo and the other insurgent leaders should leave the country, the government agreeing to pay them \$500,000 in silver and promising to introduce numerous reforms, including representation in the Spanish cortes, freedom of press, general amnesty for all insurgents and the expulsion or the secularization of the monastic orders. Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hong Kong and Singapore. A portion of the money, \$400,000, was deposited in banks at Hong Kong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordinate chiefs named Artacho, which is interesting because of the very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division of the money among the insurgents according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund, and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spanish would carry out their proposed reforms, and if they failed to do so it was to be used to defray the expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by paying Artacho \$5,000. No steps have been taken to introduce the reforms; more than two thousand insurgents, who have been deported to Fernando Po and other places, are still in confinement, and Aguinaldo is now

using the money to carry on the operations of the present insurrection.

On page 328 of the same document may be found the following in a dispatch from Cavite, on May 24, 1898, by Mr. Williams, our consul at Manila, to the secretary of state:

Today I executed a power of attorney whereby General Aguinaldo leases to his attorneys in fact \$400,000, now in the bank at Hong Kong, so that money therefrom can pay for 3,000 stand of arms bought there and expected here tomorrow.

And again (see Document 62, p. 337) Consul General Wildman, writing from Hong Kong to Assistant Secretary Moore under date of July 8, 1898, declares that the claim that Aguinaldo and his cabinet had "sold their country" had been "conclusively disproved," citing, with other proofs, the exonerating statement, in the Spanish senate, of ex-Governor General Rivera himself, the negotiator of the treaty of Biaknabato. Thus it is irrefutably established that Aguinaldo betrayed no cause and made no personal gain by Spanish corruption.

The insurgent leaders were deported, but peace did not long continue. The promised reforms failed to materialize and sporadic insurrection reappeared. Demonstrations increased in frequency and force until, at the time our fleet sought the Spanish squadron in Manila bay, rebellion was again formidably afoot. In a communication to the state department dated February 22, 1898 (Document 62, p. 319), Consul Williams says:

Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists. Battles are of daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, and hospitals are full. Prisoners are brought here (Manila) and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law.

On the 19th of the following month he reports (Document 62, p. 329):

Insurgents rampant; many killed, wounded and made prisoners on both sides. Last night, special squads of mounted police were scattered at danger points to save Manila. . . . Rebellion never more threatening to Spain.

This was the situation down, practically, to the time of Dewey's arrival and the memorable naval battle of Manila on the 1st of May.

We now come, in the hasty resume of the principal facts which I think necessary to make, to the appearance on the scene of Aguinaldo and his associates as active factors in the operations carried on by the United States. In the memorandum heretofore cited, General Green (Document 62, p. 471) states that Aguinaldo, our consul general and others at Singapore April 24, 1898, and "offered to begin a new insurrection in conjunction with the operations of the United States navy at Manila." It appears, however, by the statement of Consul General Pratt himself (Document 62, p. 341), that the interview between him and Aguinaldo was arranged at his own instance and that he, not Aguinaldo, made and urged the suggestion of co-operation.

This fact and its result are most important to remember. It shows that the United States was the moving party in this matter and that we fixed and voluntarily fixed, the status of the Philippines in the very beginning of our relations with them. That status, sir, was that of allies of the United States against the power of Spain. I am aware that the fact of an alliance is disputed, and I remember in what high quarter this denial has been made with special emphasis. And I appreciate the more the importance of our relations to those whom, for want of a better term, I shall call imperialists, that the American people shall believe that no alliance existed. For that reason, Mr. President, I propose to present from official sources certain facts that can leave no doubt, as I believe, in the mind of any candid man who shall consider them, that we were in alliance with the Filipinos, an alliance sought by ourselves, availed of by us for our own advantage, and, finally, to our everlasting shame in the estimation of honorable men, repudiated by us when we found it no longer necessary, and when lust of empire sought to blunt our moral sensibilities that we could mount from an act of perfidy to the grand larceny of a nation.

It appears, then, that on April 21, 1898, Consul General Pratt at Singapore, after thus securing the acquiescence of the Filipino general in his plans, sent to Commodore Dewey at Hong Kong the following cablegram (Document 62, p. 343):

Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hong Kong; arrange with commodore for general co-operation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegram.

Let us pause here a moment to consider exactly what was proposed: "General co-operation." Sir, I claim some acquaintance with the resources of the English language, and I dare affirm that our mother tongue does not contain, in all its impulsive of words, material wherewith better to describe an alliance de facto than an expression "general co-operation" describes it when referring to the hostile action of two peoples against a third. To co-operate is to operate together. To co-operate generally is to operate together to the fullest extent in furtherance of the common purpose. In this case, what was the common purpose? Manifestly, the defeat of Spain. We were fighting Spain because she oppressed the people of Cuba. Aguinaldo was fighting Spain because she oppressed the Filipinos. Here was a proposition that we and they combine against our common enemy. If we did so combine we became allies. Who can dispute it?

The proposition was accepted. On that very night the commodore's answer came (Document 62, p. 342):

"Tel Aguinaldo come soon as possi-

ble. Dewey." The arrangement was now complete, and it immediately issued in corresponding action. Aguinaldo went April 26 by a British steamer to Hong Kong (Document 62, p. 342). Thence, according to General Greene (ib., p. 421), he, with seven other Filipino leaders, was conveyed to Cavite by the United States gunboat McCulloch. These men went on shore and Aguinaldo began at once the reorganization of an army. In this he was assisted by Commodore Dewey in the way of arms, supplies and counsel. His success was remarkable. He speedily had a considerable army fairly well appointed and under excellent drill and discipline. General Whittier (Document 62, pp. 499-500), in his testimony before the peace commission at Paris, said that Aguinaldo's army consisted of more than 8,000 men. Aguinaldo himself claimed in Luzon a total of 30,000 troops in August, 1898, and General Greene's opinion (Document 62, p. 420) was that the insurgent forces around Manila numbered 10,000 or 15,000 men. He states that in June and July they took between 2,000 and 3,000 prisoners, harassed the Spaniards in the trenches and "invested Manila early in July so completely that all supplies were cut off and the inhabitants, as well as the Spanish troops, were forced to live on horse and buffalo meat, and the Chinese population on cats and dogs."

General Whittier (ib., p. 499) declares that they drove the Spaniards from Cavite more than 20 miles to the defenses of Manila, "all the success being on the native side," and he told the peace commissioners (p. 501) that these soldiers were of "very great assistance in our operations." General Jandeneo, who commanded the Spanish forces in Manila at the time of the surrender, states in a letter to the Madrid government that it had been the plan of the Spaniards to retreat into the interior and keep up the warfare against the Americans; and that they would have done this but for the fact that the insurgent forces hemmed them in.

General Anderson, the first commander of the land forces of the United States in the Philippines, treated Aguinaldo in a manner not explicable, except upon the theory that he was an ally. On the 4th of July, 1898, he writes to the Filipino general, addressing him as "Don Emilio Aguinaldo, commanding Philippine forces," as follows (Document 62, p. 390):

General: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entered into a treaty of friendly sentiment for the native people of the Philippine islands. For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people co-operate with us in military operations against the Spanish.

The relations of these two commanders were like nothing if not those of allies. July 6, in another communication to General Aguinaldo, the American commander uses this language:

I am solicitous to avoid any conflict of authority which may result from having two sets of military officers exercising command in the same place. I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary precautions. Your own medical officers have been making voluntary inspections with mine and fear epidemic disease if the vicinity is not made clean. Would it not be well to have prisoners work to this end under the advice of the physicians?

Admiral Dewey's conduct toward Aguinaldo was of the same character. In his dispatch of June 28, 1898, to the secretary of the navy, he says:

I have given Aguinaldo to understand that I consider the insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to the aid of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed (him) to pass by water recruits, arms and ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have frequently advised (him) to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invariably.

It is also not denied that the flagship Olympia repeatedly dipped her colors in salute to the two or three small vessels constituting Aguinaldo's little navy and flying the flag of the Philippine republic. But perhaps the most conclusive of all on this question of de facto alliance was the delivery on July 9, 1898, of the Spanish prisoners and property captured at Subig Bay by the gunboats Raleigh and Concord to the custody of Aguinaldo and the Filipino navy by the express command of Admiral Dewey. I quote from the official report of this expedition, made by Capt. Joseph B. Coghlan, of the Raleigh, for a copy of which I am indebted to the secretary of the navy:

We skirted the west shore of Subig Bay . . . and were abreast of Grand Island at 8:40 a. m. (July 7). No flags of any kind in sight, but many men, soldiers and others, without arms. We rounded the northwest end of the island, and still seeing no flags, fired some 6-pounder shot at spots supposed to be batteries, but got no reply unless a few Mauser shots which some of our men said they saw fall near the ship. As no one appeared to answer us, we fired one 6-inch at one house and one 5-inch at another. These promptly brought out several white flags. Firing from the ships was immediately stopped, and boats sent to demand unconditional surrender. The commodore asked if they were United States or insular prisoners. Lieut. Hugh Rodman told them they were United States forces. They immediately surrendered, and began delivering arms, ammunition, etc., into the boats. Lieutenant Rodman came off and reported that they had unconditionally surrendered; that the force on the island consisted of about 900 people—50 women and children, 100 sick, and about 450 men with arms.

In the meantime, as Lieutenant Rodman had signaled "surrendered" to avoid delay, other boats had been sent in to get arms. After getting the arms and ammunition, our vessels proceeded to Subig. Learning there that the insurgent chief was at Olongapo, we proceeded to that place, communicated

with him, and becoming convinced from the talk of himself and his advisers that the lives of the prisoners would be unsafe if entrusted to him, upon consultation with Commander Walker I determined to lay the matter before you again before carrying out that part of your instructions. The Concord was sent up for that purpose.

On July 9, the Concord having returned to Olongapo, we gave the insurgent chief all the captured arms and ammunition—331 Mauser rifles, 251 Remingtons and about 100,000 or 125,000 rounds of ammunition. We then proceeded to Grand Island and placed on board his steamer, the Filipinos, all the prisoners—20 officers, 563 men, 17 women (Manila), 18 children, and 5 priests, and turned them over to him. An insurgent guard was placed on the island to look out for the provisions and any stray articles not taken by the steamer on the first trip. Aguinaldo's agent told me the women, the children, and the sick were kept at Olongapo arsenal and the men at Subig.

When embarking the prisoners, the general (brigade) informed Lieutenant Rodman that they would never have surrendered to the insurgents, but would have died first, as they were well able to resist for an indefinite time, etc. He persisted in making the point, and he surrendered to the United States.

I retained possession of Grand Island in the name of the United States it having been surrendered to us by the Spaniards; and left it in charge of a guard of insurgents sent there by my own request.

To be sure, since all these events the island has remained in the hands of the Spaniards, who have denied explicitly that they ever treated the insurgents as allies; but I fear the honest sailor's terminology has suffered from recent contact with the nice discriminations of administration diplomacy, which seem to proceed on the theory that the word "insurgent" is a synonym, and that no degree of co-operation can create an "alliance" unless it originates in some formal bond wherein it is so nominated. This suspicion receives probability from the naive qualification which the admiral affixes to his statement. He says he never treated them as allies "except to make use of them" in conquering the Spanish!

Mr. President, the common sense and the natural sentiment of justice which distinguish the American people will approve the answer of Commodore Bradford to an inquiry on this precise point before the peace commission at Paris. This very competent officer, for over sixty years in the navy, was summoned to an expert before our commission, and, in the course of his examination, was asked the following question by one of our commissioners, the able and distinguished senator (Mr. Frye) who presides over this body (Document 62, p. 488):

Suppose the United States in the progress of that war found the leader of the present Philippine rebellion an exile from his country in Hong Kong, and sent for him and brought him to the island in an American ship, and then furnished him 4,000 or 5,000 stands of arms and allowed him to purchase as many more stands of arms as he could get, and accepted his aid in conquering Luzon, what kind of a nation in the eyes of the world would we appear to be to surrender Aguinaldo and his insurgents to Spain to be dealt with as they please?

To which Commander Bradford answered:

We should be responsible for everything he has done; he is our ally, and we are bound to protect him.

Sir, history will demand to know, if the Filipinos were so much our allies that we were bound to protect them against the reprisals of Spain, why they were not also, in the same sacred character, equally bound against the reprisals of the deliverers.

It is not easy, Mr. President, to fix with accuracy the time when the design was formed to take forcible possession of the Philippine islands, nor to ascertain the mind in whose "gloomy recesses" this enterprise of sacrilege and violence first gathered form and pressure. There has indeed been a disposition by its most illustrious sponsors, as if their prophetic souls already trembled at the acquisition of after ages, to impute the dubious responsibility to Providence itself. I know not which to admire the more, sir, whether the modesty which disclaims credit for the policy, or the colossal presumption which, in arrogating to itself the vaunted confidence of the Almighty. But this alleged partisanship of heaven in schemes not susceptible of mundane justification is as old as human artifice and selfishness. No despotism but has urged it; no outworn tyranny that has not hidden its shriveled ugliness behind it, and called it "the scourge of God." George III. posed as the special providence of the American colonies. For centuries the divine right of kings barred the highway of human progress.

No, the excuse is inadmissible in the white light of modern common sense. We believe men to be free moral agents. While Providence desires the right, it is at our own peril that we must find what is the right and do it. Duty is, of course, a universal obligation. But what is duty? This is a matter of decision by human faculties; and any decision is subject to review, to investigation, perhaps to reversal. No man, no party, no nation, can escape accountability for actions by attributing their origin to any other source than human motives and human judgment. The policy of the administration toward the Filipinos must be justified, if ever justified at all, in the forum of the reason and the conscience of mankind.

So far as I know, the first suggestion of even the possibility that this country might acquire possession of the Philippines occurs in the following cablegram of Commodore Dewey to the secretary of the navy, sent from Hong Kong March 31, 1898, practically just an month before the naval battle of Manila:

There is every reason to believe that, with Manila taken, or even blockaded, the rest of the islands would fall either to the insurgents or to ourselves.

This, of course, lacked a good deal of outlining a policy of conquest, but it may very well have been the innocent germ of that conception. In any event the progress of the idea was rapid,



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for by May 17 following we find it very fully developed in the mind of General Merritt, as is shown by the following extract from his letter of that date to the secretary of war:

I consider the composition of the force outlined by the major general of the army as unsuited to the ends to be accomplished and insufficient in efficiency for the expedition to the Philippines. Two regiments of regular infantry, two-thirds of a regiment of regular cavalry, and two light batteries are a very small proportion of the forty-two regular regiments in the army, when the work to be done consists of conquering a territory 7,000 miles from our base, defended by a regularly trained and acclimated army of from 10,000 to 25,000 men, and inhabited by 14,000,000 of people, the majority of whom will regard us with the intense hatred born of race and religion.

In his indorsement on this communication, General Miles criticizes General Merritt's estimate of the number of the Spanish troops and of the population of the islands; and he adds: "The force ordered at this time is not expected to carry on a war to conquer an extensive territory." General Merritt, however, seems to have been nearer than his superior officer was to inspirational sources, and, to judge by his subsequent conduct in the Philippines, when he came there to relieve General Anderson, never had occasion to change his mind as to character of our occupation.

A president cannot be at one and the same time a constitutional chief magistrate and an autocrat—a president in America, with imperial powers in the Orient. Bryce, in his Holy Roman Empire, in describing the evolution of imperialism at Rome, states a phenomenon universal under similar circumstances:

Republican forms had never been known in the provinces at all, and the aspect which the imperial administration had originally assumed there soon reacted on its position at the capital. This imperialism, if I may use the word, of the Roman state began, as Mr. Bryce points out, by making use of the senate which, while in fact only registering the will of the emperor, seemed, because of the continued observance of customary forms, to be preserving its ancient constitution. Gradually, however, the senate, through the use of patronage and the corrupting influence of wealth, whose pursuit had become the passion of the higher classes in the nation, relinquished its old authority, next lost even its prestige, and became confessedly a mere dependent and servile agent of whatever puppet the Pretorian guard permitted, for its own power and enrichment, temporarily to wear the purple.

Mr. President, I hope I am no mere alarmist, and I do not wish to convey the impression that in my opinion the present policy will at one fell swoop convert this republic into an empire in fact. But I do say that the seeds of empire lurk in this policy and that time and favoring environment will and must bring them to their flower and fruit unless we make a seasonable prevention. The methods now practiced in the Philippines are the methods of the empire. A commission there, whose fountain of power is the president alone, is exercising legislative, executive and judicial functions, issuing edicts and making statutes, so that within the physical limits of its authority it may be said today, as truly as it was said by the old jurists in the days of Roman imperial absolutism, "Quidquid placuit principi, id est lex"—the law is the will of the prince.

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