

HOOKER'S FIGHT.

The Battle of Chancellorsville in May, 1863.

IMPENETRABLE THICKETS.

Across the Rappahannock and the Rapidan.

"Stonewall" Jackson's Great Movement Around the Union Right—Sickles' Fight. Heroic Death of Maj. Peter Keenan. Sedgwick's Corps Captures Marye's Hill at Fredericksburg.

The battle of Chancellorsville, Va., was fought May 1, 2, 3 and 4, 1863, between the Army of the Potomac, Gen. Joseph Hooker commanding, and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee commanding. Hooker's corps commanders were as follows: First corps, Maj. Gen. J. F. Reynolds; Second, Maj. Gen. D. N. Couch; Third, Maj. Gen. D. E. Sickles; Fifth, Maj. Gen. G. G. Meade; Sixth, Maj. Gen. J. Sedgwick; Eleventh, Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard; Twelfth, Maj. Gen. H. W. Stuemmer. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton was at the head of the cavalry.

Gen. Lee had around him his trusted commanders—"Stonewall" Jackson, J. E. B. Stuart, R. E. Rhodes, A. P. Hill and Jubal A. Early. On both sides they are the names familiar to those who have followed these pages. The battle of Chancellorsville resulted unfavorably to the Union arms. The fighting is properly divided into two parts—that around the village of Chancellorsville and that at Fredericksburg. Here the old ground was fought over again.

All winter the Army of the Potomac had lain quiet in camp at Stafford Hills, on the east bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, Va., where the desperate battle of December 19 had been fought. Hooker's effective fighting force in the spring amounted to 113,000 men, of whom 11,000 were cavalry. Lee had about 63,000 men, among them 8,000 cavalry. Lee's forces consisted of Jackson's corps and part of Longstreet's corps, under Lafayette McLaws, besides the cavalry under J. E. B. Stuart, and the artillery corps.

Lee was a master of the art of fortifying, and thoroughly had he put into a state of defense his side of the Rappahannock. For over forty miles along that river its right bank bristled with fortifications and gunners. By consulting the accompanying map the reader will get a clear idea of the country about Chancellorsville. It was extremely difficult for an army to penetrate this region. So dense were the thickets that the approach of an army could not be seen through them.

Gen. Hooker was a man of fine soldierly presence, very popular with both the army in the field and the civilians at home. He was an enthusiastic, even impatient, man, and desired to strike a blow which should justify the confidence felt in him. He was popularly called "Fighting Joe Hooker." As soon as spring opened in 1863 he prepared for a great battle. He was the most anxious to have it over soon, as the term of service of a large number of his men would soon expire. These were the nine months' and the two years' soldiers. His troops were in magnificent condition. Gen. Hooker himself said he had "the finest army upon the planet." Gen. Sherman, in his paper in *The Century*, says that the fate of the war depended on the Army of the Potomac.

The army headquarters were at Falmouth, a village on the left bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg. All the winter Hooker had been planning his campaign. The plan sounded well. Gen. George Stoneman, with 10,000 cavalry, was to start two weeks in advance of the main movement, cross the river above Lee's fortification, at the upper fords of the Rappahannock.

Hooker expected great things from this cavalry movement, which is known in the war history as Stoneman's Raid. The object of the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac was at last what it should have been from the first, the capture, not of Richmond, but of Lee's army. For this purpose Stoneman, with his cavalry, was to make a descent upon Lee's communications with Richmond, destroy railroads and telegraphs and cut off the Confederate army supplies. To effectually do this the cavalry was separated into two columns, one under Averell, the other under Buford. They were to work at different points, and then, after their task was accomplished, come together again in the rear of Lee's army. Cutting off his supplies would necessarily cause Lee to give up Fredericksburg and fall back toward Richmond. Then Stoneman's cavalry was to intercept him, worry him and detain him, giving Hooker a chance to get in his work with the main Union army. Hooker charged Stoneman as follows:

"Harass the enemy day and night, on the march and in the camp, unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from his columns large slices, do not fail to take small ones. Let your watchword be 'fight' and let all your orders be 'fight'!"

April 30 Stoneman moved out on his raid. But it appeared as if fate itself set to work to thwart Hooker's plans in the Chancellorsville campaign. The spring rains, which

seemed to have ceased, set in again tremulously and soon the whole country was under water. Stoneman was delayed by the mud and impassable fords until April 28. By that time Hooker's impatience would allow him to wait no longer, and he gave orders to move the whole army—cavalry, infantry and all over together. Thus Stoneman's work was interfered with by the commanding general's haste, for by the time the cavalry commander was fairly at his task the battle of Chancellorsville had been fought and lost, and the Union army was over on the left bank of the Rappahannock at Falmouth again.

HOOKER'S INITIAL MOVEMENT.

Hooker's camp was in plain sight of Lee, who lay on the heights of Fredericksburg, opposite. It would be necessary to move with the utmost caution, therefore, in order to mislead him. One division of the Army of the Potomac (Couch's) was therefore left in camp at Falmouth. Three corps were sent down the river twenty miles below Fredericksburg under Gen. Sedgwick to make a feint of crossing there. This would draw the Confederate army in increased numbers thither and conceal the main crossing, which was made twenty-seven miles above Fredericksburg, at Kelly's Ford. Four corps under Gen. Stuemmer went up the river to Kelly's Ford.

By referring to the map the reader will notice where the Rapidan river empties into the Rappahannock. The first named river is variously called by the Rapid, the Rapid Anna and the Rapid Ann. Kelly's Ford was above the mouth of the Rapid. So that in order to reach Lee's army the Union force was obliged to cross two cold, swollen rivers—first the Rappahannock, then the Rapidan. They crossed the first by pontoon bridges. The latter they forded, the men wading breast deep in the water.

Hooker's army passed the Rapidan by two fords. The Fifth corps crossed at Ely's ford, and the Eleventh and Twelfth corps at Germania ford, ten miles above; once across, the army, except Stoneman's cavalry, set out for Chancellorsville. By the evening of April 30, four corps of Gen. Hooker were at Chancellorsville, and ready for fight.

Hooker's chief engineer was Gen. Gouverneur Kemble Warren, a gallant officer and a man highly distinguished in his branch of the military profession. His skill and courage were of great value during the four days' fighting at Chancellorsville, especially during the disastrous rout of the Eleventh corps, hereafter to be spoken of. Gouverneur Kemble Warren was born in New York in 1830, and was graduated at West Point in 1856. He was employed in government surveying work in the west and south, particularly along the route of the Pacific railway, until 1859. For two years he was assistant professor of mathematics at West Point. In 1861 he entered the army, and from the beginning till the end of the war he was in the hard fighting of the army of the east. His talents as topographical engineer, as well as soldier, early attracted attention, and when Gen. Hooker was raised to the command of the Army of the Potomac, Warren became his chief engineer. During the last year of the war Gen. Warren was in charge at Petersburg. This brave and accomplished officer died in 1882. Few of those who took prominent part in the exciting scenes from 1861 to 1865 have lived to be old.

Confederate cavalry, under W. H. F. and Fitz Hugh Lee, and infantry, under R. E. Anderson, had been instructed to watch the upper fords of the Rappahannock, to prevent the Federals crossing in that direction. On the evening of April 28 word was sent to J. E. B. Stuart, Lee's cavalry commander, that the Union soldiers were crossing. Stuart discovered the crossing of Hooker's army too late to stop its progress. He, however, sent W. H. F. Lee against Stoneman, and ordered Fitz Hugh Lee to keep between the Confederate main army and the advancing Union columns under Stuemmer. With Fitz Lee's brigade, Stuart himself made a rapid march to a point called Todd's Tavern. There he left the exhausted brigade, and rode off to Fredericksburg to tell Gen. R. E. Lee what had happened.

A part of Gen. Hooker's plan had been for certain of Stuemmer's divisions to march down the Rappahannock, after crossing to Banks' ford and take possession of it. This ford was twelve miles nearer Fredericksburg than the ford where Hooker's troops had crossed. Banks' ford was defended by Posey's and Mahone's brigades of Anderson's divisions. These brigades, 8,000 men, fell back toward Chancellorsville on the appearance of Stuemmer's host.

Gen. William Mahone served his native state of Virginia as a United States senator, independent in politics, from 1881, to March, 1887. He was born at Southampton, Va., in 1827, and was graduated from the Virginia Military Academy in 1849. He became a civil engineer by profession, and at various times in his life has been largely interested in railroads. He rose to the rank of major general in the Confederate army. Gen. Mahone is of small stature and brilliant intellect.

Gen. Lee had been taken by surprise by Hooker's crossing at the upper fords. He sharply reprimanded Anderson for not keeping a stricter lookout, and wrote to him, April 29: "I have just received reliable intelligence that the enemy has crossed the river in force. Why have you not kept me informed? I wish to see you at my headquarters at once."

This dispatch was captured by the Union cavalry. The Union troops pressing on more and more closely, Anderson's brigade fell back once more, from Chancellorsville to Tabernacle Church, and immediately began to fortify that position.

Such was the situation on the afternoon of April 30. It was just at this point that military critics say Hooker made a fatal mistake. He should have pushed on to the attack that very evening, while only a part of Anderson's division was near him, and the reinforcements Lee was hurrying forward had not come up. Hooker had 45,000 men at Chancellorsville, and Sickles, with 15,000 more, was within easy reach. All these troops were fresh and ready for fight.

But Hooker waited till next day to attack, and all that night Anderson was busily fortifying his position at Tabernacle Church and Lee was hurrying forward his reinforcements, knowing it to be life or death.

FIGHT OF MAY 1.

At 11 o'clock, May 1, Hooker started out to attack Lee, and by that time Lee was ready for him. Hooker had expected to move on Lee's left flank, crush him and speedily gain a victory. By 5 o'clock a. m. of May 1, Lee had McLaws and Stonewall Jackson ready for battle. Jackson's corps included the divisions of A. P. Hill, Rhodes and Colston.

to attack were Stuemmer's and Howard's corps, Sykes, Hancock's, Griffin's, Humphreys' and French's divisions. Ahead of each column went a detachment of cavalry.

Military critics again censure Hooker here for his plan of battle. An advancing army for its plan of battle. An advancing army can be separated into converging columns and be beaten by attacking the different lines one at a time. Hooker's army found the greatest difficulty in accomplishing anything, owing to the impenetrable thickets. "It was worse than fighting in a dense fog," says Gen. Doubleday.

If Hooker had pushed forward a single hour longer on the night of April 30 he would have gained an open space in which to fight his great battle. But he stopped just short of that, and his "convergent lines" were cooped up in a hole in the thicket about Chancellorsville.

The roads from Chancellorsville toward Fredericksburg run slightly north of eastward. Along these Hooker's columns moved, facing eastward, toward the Rappahannock and Fredericksburg. On the map the situation will be seen. Banks' ford was one of Hooker's objective points.

Bravely the four columns moved out. Stuemmer's column was on the right, and nearest Fredericksburg. Sykes was next, while a part of Meade's corps occupied the left, and followed what was called the river road, leading to Banks' ford. French's column had been sent further south, so that Sykes' column was to be regarded as the center. The left and right advanced several miles along their forward route without meeting an enemy. But, a mile out from Chancellorsville, Sykes' cavalry encountered the Confederate advance. It was a part of Mahone's brigade, and here the first gun of the battle of Chancellorsville was fired. Sykes' cavalry was driven back to the main line.

Sykes still pressed on till he had advanced two miles and a half east of Chancellorsville. There he met McLaws' and Anderson's Confederate divisions and part of Rhodes' division. The roads toward Fredericksburg spread apart here, and Sykes was in advance of the Federal columns. There was some sharp fighting, which Sykes failed to get the worst. The Confederates flanked him. Sykes then fell back behind Hancock's division, which was immediately in his rear. Hancock advanced to the front. By this time Stuemmer had come up, and immediately formed on the right. Stuemmer's right held a commanding position on high ground. By that time, too, the Federal left had advanced till it was in sight of Banks' ford and the Rappahannock.

But, exactly at this point, with Hancock and Stuemmer ready for fight, and the left in sight of the river, Gen. Hooker, in opposition to the wish of every one of his generals, gave the order that the columns should retreat back to the positions they had occupied before setting out. He determined to wait Lee's attack instead of attacking him, assuming the defensive instead of the offensive, which he had set out, thus reversing his tactics in the face of the enemy. He gave as the chief reason for this that his army had to come in narrow columns through the forest road, while Lee, with full line of battle, was advancing in the clearing to meet him. "I was advancing in the clearing to meet him," said Hooker afterward. "So right found the Union army backward at Chancellorsville."

But his chief engineer, Gen. G. K. Warren, testified: "The advantages of the initiative in a wooded country like this, obscuring all movements, are incalculable, and so far we had improved them." Warren also thought the ridge occupied by Hancock when the order to retreat was given, was a commanding position for the offensive. But the order was given; there was nothing to do but obey it.

A brigade of Gen. Robert E. Rhodes' Confederate division was among those that met and fought the advancing Union columns on that night of May 1. Gen. Rhodes distinguished himself personally at Chancellorsville. Robert E. Rhodes was a citizen of Alabama when the war began, though a native of Virginia. He was a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute of the class of 1846. In 1861 he was professor of applied mechanics in that school. He observed that at the commencement of the war both Rhodes and Stoneman, Jackson were professors in the Virginia Military Institute. Both took the field for the Confederacy, both rose to be distinguished generals in the important part in the light of Chancellorsville, and both were killed in battle, Jackson at Chancellorsville and Rhodes at Winchester in the autumn of 1864. At the battle of Chancellorsville Rhodes, still a brigadier general, commanded the Union division. It was Rhodes' division that finally broke the Union line at Chancellorsville. "It was his gallant charge with his clarion shout: 'Forward men! over friend or foe, that broke the enemy's line,'" Jackson says in this gallant charge and said: "Gen. Rhodes, your commission as major general shall date from the 2d of May." A little while after that Jackson himself was mortally wounded.

On the morning of May 2 the Union army occupied around Chancellorsville what Gen. Doubleday describes as "a plain covered by some thickets," and clearings in front of the forest. South of these were the hills of Fairview and Hazel Grove. The latter was an important strategic position. These hills terminated in a deep ravine. Various small streams running through broken ravines lay between the two armies. As Hooker and Lee now faced each other, Hooker was on the west, Lee on the east. The ground held by the Confederates was broken in its surface.

Hooker's line was now nearly five miles long. Meade on the extreme left, toward Fredericksburg, near the sharp bend in the Rappahannock, which will be seen on the map, and Howard on the right, near Chancellorsville. Howard's position with his Eleventh corps was the weak spot in the Union line. Its right extremity rested "in the air," in military parlance; that is, it was protected by no defense or obstacle against the approach of the enemy from the open plain. Hooker sent a brigade, under Gen. Graham, with a battery, to strengthen Howard's right, but Gen. Howard sent it back again, saying he did not need it.

Gen. J. E. B. Stuart made a reconnaissance at 11 o'clock, May 1, and by that time Lee was ready for him. Hooker had expected to move on Lee's left flank, crush him and speedily gain a victory. By 5 o'clock a. m. of May 1, Lee had McLaws and Stonewall Jackson ready for battle. Jackson's corps included the divisions of A. P. Hill, Rhodes and Colston.

The front and flanks of the Eleventh corps were not protected sufficiently by clouds and earth breastworks or fallen timber; Stuart

had discovered this, so he thought it would be possible to attack and rout it. Lee gave his permission, though to do so robbed him of the advantage of surprise. As soon as Jackson had left, Lee began a pretense of attacking the Union left and center in order to draw attention away from the movement on his right. As he had been on the evening of May 1, Hancock was still somewhat in advance of the main Union line, and his division of Gen. Couch's corps received the heaviest fire.

Hooker had endeavored to conceal his movement, and west around the Union army. He was seen, however, as his troops crossed a hill toward the south. What did it mean? Either the Confederates were retreating southward or else they were going to attack the Eleventh corps. Accordingly Hooker sent an order addressed to "Major Gen. Stuemmer and Maj. Gen. Howard," directing them to prepare for the possibility of an attack on the right flank. In the order occurs these words:

"The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defenses having been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at this position, you will be held in readiness. Sickles went out and shelled Jackson's corps and drove it to another road. Then Sickles asked and got leave to attack the apparently retreating corps and cut it off from the main body. Two divisions were given to him, that of Hiram G. Berry and I. It was now past noon of Saturday, May 2. Sickles followed on through the swamps to the road which Jackson was pursuing, building bridges as he went. Berdan's sharpshooters captured a Georgia regiment that had been left to guard the Confederate rear. From the Georgians it was learned that whatever else Stonewall Jackson was doing he was not retreating.

Sickles wished, after separating Jackson from the main Confederate army, to fall upon the left flank of the latter, where Anderson's and McLaws' divisions were, and make a sharp attack. Among Union soldiers who distinguished themselves gallantly at Chancellorsville was Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, commanding the Third corps. He was one of the few officers high in rank during the late war who had not received a military education. Gen. Sickles was born in New York city in 1821, and early in life learned the printer's trade. He afterward studied law, and engaged in political life. He entered the Union army at the beginning of the war. When the war closed Gen. Sickles left a big, well-to-do man. He was long minister to Spain after the war, and married a Spanish lady.

On the field of May 2, at Chancellorsville, Gen. Pleasonton sent forward with his cavalry to overtake Jackson, with his Confederate corps, while Sickles tarried to attack McLaws and Anderson on Lee's left flank. But Hooker declined to allow him to attack, and so Sickles' corps waited, doing nothing.

Pleasonton attempted to pursue Jackson, but found he could make no progress through the thickets. He came back accordingly, and took position on the elevation known as the Round Hill. When the sun had set, he had, meantime, sent part of his cavalry to Sickles.

ELEVENTH CORPS ROUTED.

As he returned to Hazel Grove, he says he heard "spattering shots going more and more to the northwest." By the time he climbed the hill at Hazel Grove he saw the "Eleventh corps in full flight, panic stricken beyond description." They were rushing maddly into a swamp to the rear of Hazel Grove, horses, cattle, men, mules and wagons all together. "When the fight was over the pile of debris was many feet high," writes Gen. Pleasonton in *The Century*.

Maj. Peter Keenan was at Hazel Grove with the Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry. A moment Gen. Pleasonton paused for thought; then he ordered Maj. Keenan to charge into the woods with his single regiment and hold Jackson's whole victorious corps in check till he himself should be able to place some artillery. Pleasonton had with him at Hazel Grove two cavalry regiments, already in saddle, and a battery of horse artillery. The heroic Keenan gave a glance at the prospect before him. He, with a single regiment, was to hold in check a victorious pursuing army of 30,000. He smiled sadly, realizing that the task was almost certain death. Then he said: "General, I will do it," and moved off without a word more.

He never came back again. A large portion of that heroic regiment, their commander among them, lay dead in the bloody thickets of Chancellorsville a few minutes later.

But his brief work had been of inestimable worth. During the few moments that occupied the Confederates in moving down the Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry, Pleasonton had been able to get twenty-two guns, double loaded with canister, into position.

On came the Confederates like a tidal wave of destruction. They were flying a United States flag, and Pleasonton was at first uncertain whether they were friends or enemies. He said to Maj. Thomson, of his staff: "Ride out there and see who those people are."

Thomson did so, hesitatingly. "Come on, my friends!" they cried. It was too dark to distinguish the uniforms, when all at once there burst from the advancing line the well known "rebel yell" that distinguished Jackson's corps, and they charged up hill toward the Union guns. Pleasonton found out who "those people" were.

Meantime, while delaying Sickles' attack on Lee's left, the main body of the Union army was being driven back by the Confederates. Sickles' corps was being driven back by the Confederates. Sickles' corps was being driven back by the Confederates.

well, better shelter, leaving all behind them. A line of their works faced toward Jackson's men. It did not stop the victors. Taking possession of this, the Confederates hurried on, after the flying Union men. Chancellorsville, the Union headquarters, was only half a mile away. Jackson declared if he had only half an hour more of daylight he would have taken that too.

It was at this time that tidings of the mad flight of the Eleventh corps reached Pleasonton at Hazel Grove; also Sickles, waiting idly on Lee's left.

Pleasonton checked the advance of Jackson temporarily by a deadly blizz from the twenty-two double-shotted guns.

And now Gen. Hooker at Chancellorsville became aware of the rout. He had with him only Gen. Hiram G. Berry's division of Sickles' corps. He rushed this one division forward with fixed bayonets to stop the Confederates, drive them back and retake the ground the Eleventh corps had lost. Gen. Berry could not do this. His division, however, and the darkness together at length stopped the pursuit, but Howard's position was in the hands of Jackson's men.

Hooker's staff and the few cavalry with him tried in vain to stop the Eleventh. It is said some of the flying men were even shot down by Hooker's staff in this attempt, but in vain.

Gen. Berry kept up a fierce fire of shot and shell in the woods, Next day, May 3, while executing another heroic task, he was shot and killed.

Gen. George Berry, too, had an adventurous life. Born in Maine in 1834, he became first a carpenter, then a sailor, next entering into politics in his native state. He was a colonel of a Maine regiment at the battle of Bull Run. He was made a brigadier general in May, 1862. From the time the war began until his lamented death at Chancellorsville, May 3, 1863, Gen. Berry was in active service with the army of the Potomac, distinguishing himself often.

DEATH OF STONEWALL JACKSON.

The fierce shot from Berry's division rattled through the thickets. Occasionally a sparkle overhead above the trees showed when a shell was exploded. But the Confederates advanced no further. It became too dark to fight. There was a pause in the combat.

Hooker was a hot fighter always. The divisions of Rodes and Colston, who had made the first attack and pursuit, had become confused and entangled in the woods. Jackson ordered A. D. Hill's divisions to come forward from the rear and pursue without a moment's delay.

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
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GEN. G. K. WARREN.



GEN. MAHONE.




GEN. JOHN W. GEARY.



GEN. HIRAM G. BERRY.



"STONEWALL" JACKSON.



SICKLES' CORPS.



AROUND CHANCELLORSVILLE.

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who, with his corps, had gone down the river below Fredericksburg, and crossed it, to come up and attack Lee in the rear, while Hooker himself attacked in front.

All night Gen. Pleasonton had been fortifying the hill Hazel Grove, knowing it to be an important position, but Hooker directed him to abandon it and fall back into the new line of battle he had ordered Sickles to form. So this important point was lost. The Eleventh corps was sent to the extreme left, where Meade was to be reformed.

Both Jackson and A. P. Hill had been wounded on the evening of May 2. The command of Jackson's corps was given to J. E. B. Stuart, an cavalry general.

At daybreak, May 3, Stuart began the attack on Sickles' new line. The Confederates speedily took possession of Hazel Grove, and sent a steady fire into the Union lines. Sickles sent an urgent request to Hooker for support. But Hooker had been torn in his head by the concussion of a ball striking a column against which he leaned, and was dazed and senseless. There was no head to Chancellorsville might have been all have been a Union victory.

Gen. Sickles fought till his ammunition gave out. At that moment French's division fell upon Stuart's corps and caused it to retreat.

Meantime the Confederate Gens. Anderson and McLaws were making a fierce fight on the Union center, under Stuemmer. Lee endeavored all the while to verge to the left and join Stuart, Stuemmer, French and Sickles lay between. They fought the battle that day. Sickles' men fought desperately. They repulsed five Confederate charges, holding their line only with the bayonet at the last. Then Sickles fell back to the main line.

Such was the situation at Chancellorsville, when word reached Lee of

SEDGWICK'S MOVEMENT.

Hooker had ordered Sedgwick to cross the Rappahannock three miles below Fredericksburg. He was already on the march, when, on the night of May 2, he received Hooker's order to "cross the Rappahannock" and follow the Chancellorsville road till he connected with Hooker. He was to destroy any force that came in his way. Hooker had forgotten that Sedgwick was already across and on the south side of the Rappahannock. Hooker had forgotten his first order to Sedgwick.

At daybreak, May 3, Sedgwick reached Fredericksburg. Early had been left with his division to protect Fredericksburg. He occupied the heights on the right. Marye's Hill, where such fearful scenes had been enacted in December, was in the center.

Sedgwick stormed Marye's Hill and took it. It was defended by a brigade under Barndale. Cois, Spenser and Johns led the Union assaulting columns. Spenser was killed and Johns was twice wounded, but the hill was taken. Fredericksburg was captured, and Early retreated along the plank road toward Lee and Chancellorsville.

The attack on the fortified heights of Fredericksburg was planned by Gen. John Newton, a division commander of the Sixth corps. Gen. Newton was born in Virginia, and was graduated second in his class at West Point in 1842. He entered the engineer corps of the military service. He distinguished himself during the civil war. After its close he was employed on harbor and fortification work. He is known to fame as the engineer who blew up the obstruction known as Hell Gate, in Long Island sound.

Gen. Gibbon was left behind, at Fredericksburg, and Sedgwick pushed on after Early down the plank road. Early's force was wiped out. Lee's destruction of Barndale, of the coming of Early and sent out part of McLaws' and Anderson's men to meet him and make a stand. The two forces joined at Salem church, half way between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Then darkness fell and there was no more fighting Sunday, May 3.

MAY 4.

Dawn of the fourth and last day of the fighting at Chancellorsville broke. Hooker's head troubled him all the afternoon of May 3 and all May 4 so greatly that it is not fair to hold him responsible for all that happened. At times he scarcely knew what he was about. All day of the 4th, although he had resumed command, his orders were contradictory as vacillating, now telling Sedgwick to hold his ground, now to retreat back across the river. Early in the morning he directed him not to attack the Confederates at Salem church, but to assume the defensive. All day there was skirmishing between Sedgwick and Early and the brigades that had reformed at Salem church. At 6 o'clock in the evening the Confederates generally, Anderson and Early, made a furious attack on Sedgwick's left, under Gen. Howe. Howe retreated to a strong position in the direction of Banks' ford, and there resisted and beat back the Confederates.

During the night of May 4 Hooker reformed the Rappahannock with his whole force. Hooker had ordered him to cross, then countermanded the order, but the latter command was not received till after the crossing was effected. Lee immediately reoccupied Fredericksburg.

During the night of May 4 Hooker held a council of war with his corps commanders, who were sleepy and exhausted. He resolved to cross back to his old headquarters on the left bank of the Rappahannock.

On May 4 Lee's army, all told, numbered no more than 50,000 men. Hooker, including Sedgwick's corps, had 80,000. Any time during that day a determined attack against Stuart, who, with Jackson's old corps, fronted Hooker at Chancellorsville, or against McLaws, who, with Early, fronted Sedgwick on the east, could have resulted in a Union victory, and Lee could have been killed in detail. But no such attack was made.

Tuesday, May 5, a great rain storm arose in the afternoon. Under its cover the great Union army passed back over the swollen Rappahannock to its old quarters. Wednesday morning, May 6, Gen. Lee looked about him for his enemy, and found none there.

In the battles of Chancellorsville the Union army lost 17,000, the Confederates 13,000. It only remains to note the events of Stoneman's Raid. After crossing the Rappahannock, he divided his cavalry into two columns. One, under Averell, 4,000 strong, went to Rapid Station on the Orange railroad, had a brief encounter with W. H. F. Lee, and returned to the main army. Hooker himself sent Averell the order to return.

Stoneman himself, with his main column, moved south and westward to destroy the Virginia central railroad. He reached Louisa Court House, May 2. He sent out raiding parties in various directions. There was a fight with one of W. H. F. Lee's regiments near Gordonsville. This regiment was driven back by the arrival of Union reinforcements.

A party, under Col. Wm. Smith, attacked the canal at Columbia. A third, under Kilpatrick, dashed across country and captured within two miles of Richmond. He destroyed bridges and a portion of the Fredericksburg railroad. Then he turned and went to Gloucester Point. Other detachments, under Col. Bay and Gen. Gregg, did considerable damage to railroads at various points.