THIS WEAK, NERVOUS MOTHER Tells How Lydia E. Pinkham’s Vegetable Compound Restored Her Health. Philadelphia, Pa.—‘ ‘I was very weak, always tired, my back ached, and 1 felt sickly most of the time. I went to a doctor and he said I had nervous indi gestion, which ad ded to my weak condition kept me worrying most of the time—and he said if I could not 6top that, I could not get well. I heardsomuchabout Lydia E. Pinkham’e - Vegetable Com rrand my husband wanted me to try it. took it fora week and felt a little bet ter. I kept it up for three months, and < I feel fine and can eat anything now without distress or nervousness. ’’—Mrs. J. Worthline, 2842 North Taylor St, Philadelphia Pa. The majority of mothers nowadays overdo, there are so many demands upon their time and strength; the result Is invariably a weakened, run-down, nervous condition with headaches, back ache, irritability and depression — and soon more serious ailments develop. V It. is at such periods in life that Lydia E. ” Pinkham’s Vegetable Compound will restore a normal healthy condition, as It did to Mrs. Worthline. Your Best Asset -A Clear Skin — — Cared for By — ’’"HCuticura Soap DAISY FLY KILLER all flies. Neat, clean ornamental, convenient cheap. Lasts all season Made of metal, can't spil or tip ever; will not sol or injure anything. Guar anteed affective. Sold bj dealers, or 6 sent by tx press, prepaid, for Si.00 HAROLD SOMERS, 150 DE KALB AVE., BROOKLYN. N. Y. SIOUX CITY PTG. CO., NO. 23~191ft Ch'iteee peanuts are usually hand sorted by women after being sifted. Always use Red Cross Ball Blue. Delights the laundress. At all good grocers. Adv. Jealousy feels like kicking itself af ter it is too late to repair the mischief. /, SHAKE INTO YOUR SHOES Ellen’s Foot-Easc, the antiseptic powder to be lhalien into the shoes and sprinkled in the foot bath. It relieves painf1 swollen, smarting: feet and takes the sting out of corns and bunions. Dsed by the American, British and French «roops. Allen’s Foot=Ease is a certain relief lor tired, aching feet. Sold everywhere.—Adv. Bolivia has built a road for auto -mobiles that crosses tlie Andes moun tains, 17,000 feot above sea level. $> — Important to Mothora * Examine carefully every bottle of CASTOUIA, that famous old remedy tor infants and children, and see that it In Use for Over 30 Years. Children Cry for Fletcher’s Castoria Reasonable Supposition. “There is a feller here who owns a queer animal,” said the landlord of the -Petunia tavern. “It has a head like a turtle and a body'like a calf. There is A fin along its spitm. It lias feathers o^ts body, fur on its legs, and a spike or slicker on the end of its tail. It whistles up. to ten o’clock in the morn ing, and then brays till noon. After wards—” “Nonsense!” said the guest, whose countenance was shaped considerably like that of a rare old fiddle. “You don't expect me to believe a fantastic tale like that, do you?” “Well, I heard you saying a little while ago that you feared we could never whip the Huns and might even tually be compelled to conclude a Ger man peace. Of course, .if you believe that you will believe anything.”—Kan sas City Star. Remove Varnish. When doing over an old piece ot furniture all old varnish may be quick ly removed by washing with a solu tion of one part water glass (silicate of soda) and seven parts water. Use itc^^ro generously, as It is cheap, and you will soon find the wood looking fresh and dean as new. When dry, i stain and wax. Paradoxical Punishment. “Mayme says she likes to feed her - min'd.” "I don't think she’s going to do it by devouring serials.” DoYouKnow Hie FFlavor "''POST /TOASTIES ANOTHER YEAR OF WAR IS PREDICTED Campaign of 1919 Seems Sure, Declares Simonds—French and British Are Putting In Their Last Reserves, But American Determination Will Eventually Down the Huns. — BY FRANK H. SI MON OS. (Copyright, 1918, the New York Tribuno.) At the moment when a new and critical phase of the campaign of 1918 is about to open it may seem out of place to open the discussion of a cam paign of 1919. Yet the progress of the present campaign has already pretty clearly forecast the certainty of another. In a word, it begins to be reasonably patent that neither the Ger mans nor our allies can hope for a decisive victory this year. And it is wortli noting that the German press, which "goosesteps” at imperial com mand, is already warning the German public that a fifth winter of war is inevitable. There must be a campaign of 1919 because there is not the smallest evi dence that either side can this year ac complish results which will make a peace inevitable, a peace by the sword. Waterloo, Sedan, Jena, these triumphs from which immediately flowed a na tional defeat, are reckoned outside the calculations of war in its present form, when nations, not small professional armies, fight, and restricted fronts manned by huge forces make the old fashioned style of battle out of the question. Peace this yqar can only be had un der one of three conditions: First, that the allies are beaten completely and beyond rallying In the present cam paign and as a result of the German offensive. Second, that the allies are able, having parried the German attack, to take the offensive themselves and do what the French and British were unable to do at the Marne; namely, transform a battlefield success, won in a counter offensive, into a decisive vic tory. Third, if the people behind the line, the civil populations, either of the allied or of the enemy nations, collapse and compel the military forces to aban don a struggle which in the field has so far been indecisive. Waterloo or Sedan Improbable. Now, looking at the question of the possible German victory, is there any reason to believe that it can reach the magnitude of a Sedan or a Waterloo; that is, the magnitude of the conse quences of these famous battles? Cer tainly there is nothing to suggest it in the progress of the campaign in its first two months. It is possible that the Germans may get to the channel, that Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne will have to be evacuated as a result of further and far more considerable Ger man advances in Flanders. The awk ward and difficult configuration of the British line north of the Scarpe, the few lines of lateral communication available for the transfer of troops from south to north, the unmistakable advantage gained by the German in his opening attack both in and around Flanders, may result in the slow with drawal of the British toward the south and tlie straightening out of the line. This possibility is not a probability, but short of an unforeseeen disaster unlikely under existing conditions the most that we have to fear is the slow but sure advance of the German and the equally deliberate shortening and retiring of the British lines. The loss of the channel ports will- not constitute the sort of defeat which compels the loser to abandon the fight. On- the con trary, Britain, with tho kaiser at Calais, will be forced to fight with re newed energy, for it will be an even more deadly peril than the presence of German troops at Ostend and Zee brugger The German may choose to renew his attempt to get Amiens and to sepa rate the French and British. Here we have a more deadly threat, but we have a more obvious retort. To break the connection between the British and the French the German has not merely to deal with one or two British armies, reinforced by a certain number of French reserves and even a certain number of American regiments; he has to deal with the main British force and all of the French reserves, for it is behind this critical point that the French reserves must now be concen trated. May Get to Amiens. It is conceivable that the impact of the new German tiirust may enable him to re^ph Amiens—but that it will per mit him to get far beyond, with the same promptness that he got across the Somme two months ago, given the fact that the main mass of allied re serves is at hand, seems unbelievable. Thus he may compel the British to evacuate the north by his attack upon the south, as he .may be able by at tack in the north to force a similar retirement, but he can hardly hope or expect to interpose between the armies now, aS he hoped to do when he set cut. In sum, on the military side it seems to me that the largest conceivable gain for the German this year will be the occupation of the channel ports and the dislocation of the British front in sucli fashion as to force the British armies south of the Somme. But once this occurs then the allies, despite the loss of territory of p*tent value, will be in a stronger military position, for their lines will be shortened and they will no longer be threatened with dan gers which grow- out of the geograph ical circumstances of their present posture in the north of France. Now there remains, on the military side, the question of the ability of the allies, when the German lias at last used up his.ieservese, to take the of fensive themselves. This was some what foolishly expected by most of us at the crisis of the recent fighting be fore Amiens, when there was little exact knowledge as, to the strength of allied reserves and a general misap prehension of the extent of the British defeat and the remoteness of the main mass of French reserves, who were then covering Baris against a thrust from Kheims. Frankly, such information as comes to rue tends to dissipate all hope of any immediate or even remote allied counter offensive, save in the case of some German breakdown, no more to be expected than an equally complete allied collapse. Focli has not more troops than the Germans, nor Is he likely to have any large excess. The American troops, who are getting over with admirable rapidity now, will not be in a condition of training to make them usefui in such an operation this year, although many of them may be employed to advantage in quiet sectors or even brigaded ' with French and British in some of the more active sectors. Foch Will Economize. What seems to be the general ex pectation is that Foch will hold on to liis reseVves, use them with extreme parsimony and—since it is a matter of life and death- -avoid using them more rapidly than Hindenburg uses his. Ho must come to tire end of the campaign with at least as many reserves in hand as the German to avoid disaster; he may hope to have a slight superiority, but not a superiority warranting a major offensive in October, after lie and JIind*nbutg have both lost from 1,000,090 to 1.800 ena it- the struggles that are bound to come. Foch’s problem, then. Is not the problem of taking the offensive at the close of the German attack. He can- ‘ not hope, save in case of an accident, to have enough reserves left for this. His problem is to hold the German this year, imposing as great casualties | as possible and losing as few men as possible* that there may be a cam paign of 1919. We must get the conditions of this gigantic battle clearly In mind. It is a colossal Waterloo, with the French generalissimo playing the British role and the Americans playing the role of the Prussians a century ago. The Ger man has decided, as did Napoleon, to risk everything on a decisive battle be fore all his enemies are ready. He has won initial successes, as did Na poleon. On a large scale his progress to date suggests Ligny, but he has still to win the decisive phase and he must win it this year. Watching the ebb and "flow of the battle in the next weeks and months we are bound to keep this essential condition in mind. The German must destroy the military power of Britcfin or of France to win the war this year. He may shift his attack to the French and strike at Rheims instead of at Amiens or at Calais, but he must dis pose of one of his enemies, and if he fails then there is an end of any hope of winning a complete_victory, of end ing the war by a western treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He will tiave to nego tiate with the prospect of facing a new American army next year if he does not get peace by negotiation. Allies Will Not Crack. ^ And this brings me to my third' point. Is there any change of a.col lapse of the French or British public under pressure which may compel large dislocation of the British line and considerable evacuation of French territory? I do not believe it, and credible and material evidence coming to me from both France and Britain seems to prove that neither country will break under any strain that is now conceivable. For Britain to break now if the kaiser reached the channel would be the ruin of the empire and the end of security at home, for with the kaiser at Calais, London would be a closed port and the Straits of Dover commanded by German cannon. As for the French, their condition is infinitely bettor than it was a year ago, and so far they have suffered relatively slight losses in the fighting of the cam paign. Nor were their losses great last year. It is upon the British that the great strain has been put in the past two years, but the strain has not suf ficed to break them nor is there the smallest reason for believing that they will or can break now, when to fail would be to surrender their position as a great power and their own safety in the British Isles. We shall do well to recognize that the* British have suffered terribly in the past two years, and that it is unwise and unjust to expect of them what we now expect of ourselves. War weari ness is a fact in Britain, as it is in France. We have seen signs and w'e shall probably see more signs of the strain in the next few months. But it is a good time to read about what hap pened in the north in 1864 of our own civil war. In a sense, the situation comes down to this: The British and French alike are putting in their last reserves. Neither will have any considerable re serve when this present campaign is over. They could not and would not do this were it not for the visible dem onstration that America is coming. Their strength will enable them to hold the line this year with such minor aid as we can supply. But it would not enable them to face another campaign if there were not from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 of American troops to count on next year. But the 1,000,000 is an established and calculable fact: this being so there is not "the smallest chance that French or British publics will think of making peace with the German, who has scored ! material but not decisive successes this , year and will seek to get peace by negotiation based upon his present j holdings and without regard to Ameri can man power which is to intervene next year. The French, having held the line until we arrive, will not be ready to make peace on the basis of 1914. Alsace-Lorraine will be the smallest price they can exact and are entitled to exact. The British will not make peace while their enemy still sits at Calais and threatens India. Germany’s Hope in East. Unless Germany can hold Russia and the Balkans, witlT their Asiatic fringes, she cannot hope and does not hope to escape the appropriate ruin which the war promises for her. But none of the allies can consent to the perpetuation of German rule and domination in Russia and along the Black sea with out insuring future wars and preserv ing the precise Prussian peril we are all fighting to abolish. Tliis fact has^ conic home to the masts of the German people, and explains in some slight de gree their present unity, livery class of German subject knows that ruin is inevitable unless there be conquests and indemnities. Thus, when the present campaign ends and the German begins his peace maneuvers, as he certainly will if de cisive victory has escaped him, his very necessities will compel him to de mand terms which his enemies could ohlv accept if they were conquered. And they will not be conquered, but will have at their hand a great, new force, a practically Inexhaustible reser voir of American man power, while German maa power, like their own, will have been well nigh exhausted, at least wasted, beyond the possibility of another such offensive as we are now facing in the west. As for hunger and war weariness driving the German people to rebellion —they may rebel, but it is idle to ex pert or hope that they will. Russia yielded to her misery and permitted internal disorder to lead to external weakness, and the German people have the spectacle of Russia before them now to serve as a warning. And it will serve as a warning. The eastern con quests will contribute much to alle viating the hunger and to supplying necessary things which the blockade has kept out of Germany. The worst of the food problem will probably be over permanently before next winter closes. It seems to nle that the German leaders and rulers will still be able to control their subjects, if not by prom ises of fresh victories at least by the fairly accurate representation of what anything but a victorious peace will now mean, not merely for the present, hut for future generations of Germans. Germany, l