IS
Norton's Mistovv of Iftebrasha
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CHAPTER IV CONTINUED (10)
Prom this vast purchaao of territory
adjacent to the previous holdings of!
the republic havo been created twelve
Croat states, namely: Louisiana, In
1812; Missouri, in 1821; Arkansas, In
1836; Iowa, in 1846; Minnesota, in
1858; Kansas, in 1861; Nebraska, in
1867; Colorado, In 1876; Montana, In
1889; South Dakota, In 1889; North
Dakota, in 1889; and Wyoming, in
1890. Although only about one-third
of Colorado, two-thirds of Minnesota,
and a littlo more than three-fourths
of Wyoming are parts of the Jefferson
purchase, yet we havo left of it In the
Indian territory and Oklahoma enough
to make several more states. The es
timated population of the land ceded
by Napoleon in 1803 was fifty thou
sand whites, forty thousand slaves,
and two thousand free blacks. More
than four-fifths of the whites and all
tho blacks except about one thousand
three hundred were In and adjacent
to New Orleans. The rest were scat
tered through the country now in
cluded in Arkansas and Missouri. The
population of the Louisiana Purchase
Is now about 14,000,000, and If it wore
as densely populated as Belgium,
which contains 636 human boIngssto
tho square mile, it would contain and
maintain 473,326,592.
The importance of the Louisiana
Purchase does not spring alono from
Ite extent and value as a vast terri
torial addition to the country, but very
largely from its momentous political
significance and effect. In tho first
place it was a pawn played by tho
great Napoleon In his universal game
of war and diplomacy, in which the
ancient empires of Europe were tho
stakes. Acquired by Franco under
Louis XIV., through exploration and
settlement hero and there, it was
ceded to Spain as a salve for sacri
fices on her part in the treaty of 1763,
which secured tho supremacy, of tho
English-speaking race on this conti
nent and in general as a colonizing
power, and was the territorial prep
aration for tho great republic. Before
Napoleon had forced himself into act
ual power as first consul, November
9, 1799, Talleyrand, who ruled under
tho dlreotory, had conceived tho Idea
of at once spreading out, France In a.
great colonial empire, ana curbing,
through near neighborship, the pre
tentious young American republic, by
securing the retrocession of Louisiana.
Spain's fortunes were going from bad
to worse, and after Napoleon's start
ling victory over the Austrlans at Ma
rongo la June, 1800, Talleyrand's mes
senger had but to demand tho retro
cession on the terms he proposed and
it was accomplished October 1, 1800.
Tho Spanish king, complaining that
France had not carried out her 'part
of tho bargain, delayed the delivery
of Louisiana, but finally yielded, Oc
tober 15, 1801, on the assurance of
Talleyrand that, "You can declare In
the name of the first consul that
Franco will never alienate If Mean
while Napoleon had won peace from
Austria by force, and from Great Brit
ain through diplomacy, so that now ho
prepared to take possession of Louis
iana; but first ho had to deal with tho
revolution of the negroes of tho Im
portant outpost of Santo Domingo, un
der the lead of Toussalnt.L'Ouverture..
Tho disaster which finally befell Na
poleon's army In Santo Domingo, and
the Impending renewal of his lrroprcs
fllble conflict with England,' led the
marvelously practical first consul to
abandon whatever thought he may
have Indulged of. a colonial empire In
America! It Is doubtful that he ever
fully entertained or .regarded as feas
ible this original dream of Talley
rand's. But at any rate, and In spite
of Talleyrand,, his unequaled executive
mind Kaw straight and clear to his
Durnose and acted with characteristic
decisiveness. In the early days of
April, 1803, he disclosed to Talleyrand,
and then to others of his ministers,
his purpose of ceding .Louisiana to
the United States. At the break of
day, April 11 tho day before Monroe,
Jefferson's special envoy for tho pur
chase of New Orleans and possibly
,tho Florldas also, arrived lh Paris,
'Napoleon announced to Marbols, his
. minister of finance: "Irresolution and
deliberation are' no longer In season?
'..I renounce Louisiana.' To attempt ob
stinately to retain It would bo folly.
. .' .' Have an interview this very
day' with Mr., Livingston." Ho had
said tho day before that he feared
England would seize Louisiana' as the
beclnuing of war; and already, April
.8, he had countermanded tho order
for General Victor to sail with his
army to tako possession of Louisiana.
When in an intervlow later In tho day
Livingston was "Still harping on my
daughter," begging only lor wow Or
leans and West Florida, he was dis
concerted at tho sudden demand of
Talloyrand, "What will you glvo for
tho whole?" Tho next day Livingston
conferred with Monroe, hut in tho
afternoon ho met Marbois, who invited
him to his house, and during tho night
a nreliminary understanding was
roached. After much haggling about
tho price tho papers wore signed dur
Ine the earlv days of May, but wore
dated back to April 30. Napoleon
GouEht to preclude danger of tho sub
Benuent cession of tho territory to
Rncland. or any other rival power,
and to protect tho Inhabitants, who
wero mainly French and Spanish, In
tho onioyment of their religion and
racial propensities, by Inserting tho
following guarantee in tno treaty:
"The inhabitants of tho ceded torri
tory shall be Incorporated in the union
of tho United States and admitted as
soon as possible, according to the
principles of the federal constitution,
to tho enjoyment of all tho rights, ad-
antages and Immunities of citizen
ship of tho United States; and in the
meantime they Bhall bo maintained
and protected In the free enjoyment
of their liberty, property and tho ro-
Igion which they profess."
Though this vast territory had act
ually been pressed upon the Ameri
can ambassadors, its acquisition was
ndeed a triumph for tho young re
public.
"Livingston had achieved the great
est diplomatic success recorded in
American history. ... No other
American diplomatist was so fortunate
as Livingston for tho Immensity of
tils results compared with the paucity
of his means. , . . The annexation
of Louisiana was an event so porten
tous as to defy measurement. It gave
a now faco to politics, and ranked in
llstorlcal Importance next to the Dec
aratlon of Independence and tho adop
tion of tho Constitution events of
which It was the logical outcome; but
as a matter of diplomacy It was un
paralleled, because it cost almost noth-
ng."
But Livingston's cup of glory turned
to ashes on his Hps. Ho was charged
with corruption In the distribution of
tho part of tho purchase price which
was to bo paid to American claim
ants, and the credit tho public gave
Monroe elevated him to the presiden
cy, whoro ho was so fortunato as to
mako his name known of all men by
tho timely enunciation of tho "Mon
roe Doctrine," which was adopted as
an expedient for tho safety of tho still
young and not yet firmly founded re
public and Its Institutions, and which
s still maintained as a principle of
American polity, but more perhaps
through tho Influence of tradition than
of the. original need or expediency,
this motive having been superseded
by on of wider scopo and farther
reach though not definitely defined or
conceived. Tho direct bearing of an
account of the Louisiana Purchase
upon a history of Nebraska will now
begin to appoar, and. Is forecast In the
following estimate of its political ef
fect or sequel:
On the transcendent importance of
that event, asldo from the expansion
of territory, w.o get some Idea when
wo reflect that the Missouri compro
mise, the annexation of Texas, the
compromise of 1850, tho Kansas-Nebraska
bill, the Drod Scott case and
at length the Civil war, wero events
n regular sequence directly traceable
to It, not one of which would havo
occurred without It."
Tho .sweeping conclusions of tho
eminent jurist are doubtless technic
ally correct, but there Is a hint in
them of the almost dogmatic Impli
cation In many historical accounts of
the famous purchase that It was a
work of chance a result of tho acci
dental extremity of tho fortunes of
Napoleon and of the Spanish nation
at that particular time, and of thq
acumen of several American politi
cians. Mr. Adams partially corrects
this misapprehension when he de
clares that tho acquisition of Louis-
ana was "tho logical outcome, of the
Declaration of Independence and tho
adoption of the .Constitution." But
tho historian would havo been equally
correct and more fundamental If ho
had said that the acquisition was tho
oglcal outcome of the ascendency of
the English race and English Institu
tlons In North America, as against
the Latin race, which was formally
determined by the result of the
French and Indian war and tho treaty
of 1763. The expulsion of Franco and
Spain would have been completed by
the same English race without tho In
cident of the secession of tho colonies
and tho division of English territory
which tho Declaration of Independ
ence prqclalmed. While tho great Na
poleon's necessity of trying conclu
sions with England at home In 1803,
just as his predecessor had tried con
clusions with England In America In
1763, and his pecesslty of diverting
tho troops with which ho Intended to
tako possession of and defend Louis
iana to put down the Santo Domingo
rebellion, probably at onco precipl
tated this final surrender of French
pretonslon to America which might
havo been held In solution yet for
some timo, sun tno precipitation
would havo been only a question of
time: and it is not unlikely that there
would havo been tho Bamo evolution
ary working out of tho question of
slavery and of union, tho samo trag
edy and tho samo glory. Tho first
view, in short, has tho fault of em
piricism, of explaining an Important
social phenomenon as an accident in
stead of a natural evolutionary pro
cess.
News of the retrocession of Louis
iana to Franco, which reached Amor
lea about eight months after it had
been agreed upon, disclosed tho In-
horent or inevitable opposition to the
reinstatement of Franco. And so Jef
ferson was moved by fear of such an
event to write in July, 1801:
"Wo consider her (Spain's) posses
sion of the adjacent country as most
favorable to our Interests, and should
sco with an extreme pain any other
country substituted for them."
Spain, unlike her then monstrously
militant neighbor of tho samo raco,
was already too Inert to be seriously
inimical. Madison, Jefferson's secre
tary of state, wrote, September 28
1801, to Livingston, who had Just
roached Franco, that tho proposed
change of neighbors was a matter of
'momentous concern." If allowed,
"Inquietudes would bo excited In tho
southern states whoro numerous
slaves had been taught to regard tho
Fronch as patrons of their causa."
Livingston, who perceived tho per
plexities of tho situation, wroto to
Madison several months beforo the
cession that ho was persuaded that
tho whole business would result. In
the relinquishment of Louisiana to the
uniteu states, it was plain, more
over, to astuto American statesmen
that the reoccupatlon of Louisiana by
the French undldx tho work of tho
Seven Years' war and nullified tho
treaty of 1763. Jefferson's feeling
seemed to grow strongor, and he
wroto to Livingston, April 18, 1802,
that New Orleans was so important
to the United States that whoever
hold It was for that very reason nat
urally and forever an onemy, and that
tho day Franco took possession of tho
city tho ancient friendship between
ler and tho United States ended and
alliance with Great Britain became
necessary. Nor woro English states
men slow to foreseo tho natural se
quence of events. Beforo tho cession
had been mootod Lord Whltworth, tho
British ambassador at Paris, had pre
dicted that America would reap tho
first fruits" of tho coming Fronch
war with England; and Addington, an
ticipating Napoleon's own later reason
for tho cession, told Itufus King that
tho first step of England on tho out
break of war would bo to solzo Lopls-
ana.
Tho Interesting question as to Na
poleon's real reasons for alienating
Louisiana from Franco will perhaps
never bo settled. Of our lato stand
ard historians of tho United States
Adams gives tho question tho most
thorough consideration; and whllo ho
seriously damages, If he docs not com
pletely demolish tho. reasons usually
given, ho falls to establish others In
their place.
Bonaparto had reasons for not re
turning tho colony to Spain; he had
reasons, too, for giving It to the United
States, but why did he alienate the
territory from Franco? Fear of Eng
land was not tho true cause. Ho had
not to learn how to reconquer Louis
iana on the Danube and tho Po. . .
Any attempt (on the part of England)
to regain ascendency by conquering
Louisiana would havo thrown tho
United States Into the hands of
Franpe; and had Bonaparte antici
pated such an act he Bhould havo
helped it Evory diplomatic
object would have been gained by ac
cepting Jefferson's project of a treaty
(tor xs'ew Orleans alono) and stoning
it, without tho change of a word. . .
Tho real reasons which Induced Bona
parte to alienate the territory from
Franco remained hidden In tho mys
terious processes of Ills mind. Angor
with Spain and Godoy had a sharo in
It, disgust for tho sacrifices ho had
made, and Impationco to begin his
now campaigns on tho Rhino, possi
bly a wish to show Talloyrand that his
policy could never bo revived, and
that ho had no choice but to follow
into Germany, had still more to do
with tho act."
McMaster, on tho other hand, puts
tho orthodox, or generally accepted
reasons Into a nutsholl, thus:
"New combinations wero forming
against him (Napoleon) In Europe;
all England was loudly demanding
that Louisiana should bo attacked;
and, lest It should be taken from him,
ho determined to sell to tho United
States."
Somewhat more at longth, and will-.
ing to credit Jefferson with shrewd
foresight, Schouler adopts tho samo
reasons:
"The accident for which Jefferson
had hero allowed was, In truth, tho
speedy renewal of hostilities between
Franco and England. Tho treaty of
Amiens had been too hustily drawn
up, and its adjustment of disputes was
too Incomplete to bo moro thaa a truco
between them. . And thus It came
to pass ere Monroe could reach Paris.
, . Napoleon alter nis aurupt lasn-
lon had relinquished, and most reluc
tantly, his designs upon tho American
continent, under the pressure of a
speedy war with England, and tho
necessity of- preventing tho United
States from making tho threatened
alliance with his enemy. Forced to
surrender tho Mississippi, in any event
ho resolved to. put it out of tho reach
of his Immediate foo, and gain tho
gratltudo of a now and rising power.
He needed money, furthermore, In aid
of his warlike operations."
Rhodes essnys littlo on this topic
beyond croditing Jefferson with long
headedness: "Tho possession of the mouth of tho
Mississippi was a commercial ncces
slty, and Jefferson showed wisdom In
promptly seizing tho opportunity pre
sented by a fortunato combination of
circumstances to secure tho purchaso
of this magnificent domain."
But it Is easier and porhaps safer
to glvo over attempting to Interpret
tho motive and design of the arbiter
of tho Nebraska country, who is lik
ened to deity, and acknowledge that
"his ways are past finding out." For
a noted Englishman, even, avows that
ho was "p. supernatural force"; that
"his genius was supromo"; that "ho
raised himself by suporhuman facul
ties," and "carried human fnculty to
tho farthest point of which wo havo
accurate knowledge." And wo find tho
head of tho, English array character
izing him as "tho greatest soldier and
ruler, tho groatost human being whom
God has over allowed to govorn here
bolow. . . Ills greatness In poaco,
his success In war. his wisdom as a
rulor, his gonius as a commander, all
comblno to mako him tho most re
markable man whom God over cre
ated."
But whllo Napoleon's part in this
great transaction romalns equivocal,
or not positively to his credit, Joffer-
son's reputation for groat capacity and
consummato sagacity in his part has
boen established by a century's Bevor-
est Bcrutlny. From tho time of the
retrocession of Louisiana by Spain to
Franco In 1800 tho position of tho
United States was diplomatically very
delicate If It was not dosperate.
France had been Insolently preying
upon our commerce, and Livingston
was obligod to compllcato demands
for damages on this account with his
negotiations for tho purchaso of Now
Orleans. No friendship could bo ox-
poctod from England excopt as It
might bo played off against Franco.
In its constant peril of ono or tho other
of thoso greatest powers, Spain took
frequent opportunity to visit tho young
republic with both Insult and Injury;
and though Napoleon's oxtromlty fur-
nlshod our opportunity for tho Louis
iana acquisition, its original stimulus
and lnltlatlvo caino from nn Imperious
domane. 35 froo commerce, through
tho channel of tho Mississippi river,
by tho settlors of. tho wostorn parts
of Kentucky nnd Tennessee.
Beforo tho closo of tho war of tho
Revolution John Jay, minister to
Spain, had In vain negotiated for an
acknowledgment of this prlvllogo,
which wns claimed on good grounds
as a natural right by vlrtuo of our
claim of ownership of tho entire onst
bank of tho river as far as Now Or
leans, and of succession to tho right
of free navigation guaranteed to our
grantor, Great Britain, by tho treaty
of 1763. But thon, as now, Interna
tional treaties and International law
wore made to bo violated with impu
nity as against tho weaker party, and
tho United States was tho weaker
party. When Jay, for diplomatic rea
sons, ngrced that tho disagreeable
matter should not bo pressed agalnBt
Spain for twenty-flvo yearB, tho rost
lessness of the Kantucky and Tennes
seo pioneors broko Into rlotousness',
and preparations were mado to sot up
a separate govprnmcnt, and to send an
armed expedition to forco tho free
passago of tho river beyond New Or
leans. But, crushed In tho adversity
of tho Napolqonlc wars, Spain relented
In 1795, and guaranteed freo passago
of tho river and a place'of deposit, for
American cargoes at New Orloans for
the period of throo years. Tho bold
westerners regarded this agreement
as a tempqrary makeshift, and eggod
President Adams on for a permanent
settlement. Evon Hamilton, with
many' followers, urged tho necessity
of talcing advantage of Spain's holp
lnssness and seizing and holding Now
Orleans by force; but Adams hold
them off. Jefferson's administration
Inherited this persistent domand for
a permanently froo Mississippi, and
ho silenced Its Insistent clamor by
sotting on foot tho negotiations for
tho purchaso. Godoy, who In every
thing save tho ultlmato power to on
forco his policy and rights vas a
match for Talleyrand and Napoleon,
had been recalled to powor as foreign
minister of Spain after sho had been
persuaded into the retrocession, and
ho skilfully played .every device for
dolay of tho final delivery. Godoy's
bold strategy and Toulssant's revolu
tion in St. Domingo put off Fronch
occupation of Louisiana until, by the
spring of 1802, Jofforson's eyes had
opened wido on the situation. For
"tho whole power of tho United States
could not at that day, oven If backed
by tho navy of England, havo driven
ten thousand French troops out of
Louisiana." Morales, tho Spanish In
tendant at Now Orleans, had goaded
tho temper of tho free trado western
ers to the acuto stago by refusing to
extend the right of passago and do
posit at tho end of tho threo years,
as the treaty of 1795 had stipulated;
and when restitution wns ordered by
Godoy's' Influence, March 1, 1803, It
was too lato.
Tho Spanish tariff on trado through
tho Mississippi, which drovo tho pio
neer western colonlBts to revolution.
and but for tho peaceful diplomacy of
Jefferson must havo Involved tho fore
Iblo conquest of New Orleans, was
from 50 to 75 per cent. For tho last
forty years a tariff tax on western
agriculture, equally as high, haB been
Imposed by tho forms of law at tho
port of Now Orleans and every other
port or tno union, aim us most stren
uous and ablest opponents havo balled
from tho samo old Kentucky common
wealth. It Is Interesting to reflect
that porhaps tho aggressive courage,
brljliancy, and legal acumen of our
present-day Kentucky tree-traders
tho Wattorsons and Carllslos aro an
Inheritance from thoso pioneer rovo
lutlonlsts against the Spanish tax on
trado which was so appropriately
named after Tarlfa, a Spanish free
hooter at tho passago of Gibraltar of
a still earlier day. And thus tho ro-
calcltrant Godoy, playing for timo,
hoping against hope to freo Spain
from tho shackles of Napoleon, flvo
hundred thousand Santo Domingo ne
groes frenzied with tho passion for
personal freedom,, and the necessity
of tho Kontucky and Teanesseo set
tlors fora free market for their to-
bacco, flour, bacon and hams wore tha
purchase.
Whllo Hamilton's policy for getting
New Orleans was to seise first and
nogotiate aftorward, and early la
March, 1803, Congress authorized J.af
forson to call out eighty thousand
troops, ho resolutely kept the key to
the situation and continued "to palli
ate and endure."
"Thoy who sought thus to lessen
confidence In tho president, and to
tako the Mississippi entanglement out
m li. j i 1 1 l . , a.
ui his uiHcrtuiunury cururui ay cuv i.
ting the knot, underrated at this crista
tho ability of a moHt consummate antt
experienced negotiator; ono with i
whom, In a matter of foreign diplo
macy, Hamilton himself boro no com
parlson."
Whllo Adams, in his rigid Impartial
Ity, apparently sees that Jefferson
might have been open to the chare
of having dalllod too long in his pas- ,'
sion for peace, in face of tho imminent,
danger of Napoleon's occupation with' 'r
an Impregnable force, If tho outcome t
hnd been disastrous or less glorious, 1
yot ho Is constrained to unqualified!
recognition of his great dlplomatlo
skill.
"With Infinite pertinacity Jeffersom.,:
ussenco nnd genius of his statesman If
ship lay In peaco. . . . The con
con J;
wr.
slstoncy of tho careor became m
remarkablo on account of tho soeni
Inconsistencies of tho moment. Ha
was pliant and yielding In manner, but
steady ub tho magnet Itsolf in alrru
His manouvors botwoon tho angry I
west and the arbitrary first consul of ;
France offerod an oxamplo of his po
lltlcal method. Mo meant that thora
should bo no war." i:
Tho consciences of republicans evl
dontly suffered a severe gnawing be ';
causo necessity Impelled them to vio
late their construction of the Const!
tutlon to got Louisiana. Jefferson
urgod an amendment which would
grant "an enlargement of powor from
tho nation," rathor than by moro con
struction to "mako our powors (In -eluding
treaty powors) boundloss,"
and tho Constitution "blank papor." Q
But Jefferson was no loss consistent
and certainly moro logical than his
follow republicans in tho Houso and ,
tho Sonnto. Although It may be "hard
to see Jiow any president could have4
boon moro federalist than Jefferson
himself," confronted by thlB Imperious k
necessity of acting outsldo the ac
knowledged narrow limits of the writ ,
ton Constitution which theoretically ."
restrained him, yot ho frankly con j
f no an1 that tin waa f nnti nlnnllw t t
iviiuvu bilUU I1U Y 1. 1 if, IV, (Ail J TV 1 UUfil
but as frankly avowed that ho should
"acqulesco with satisfaction, confiding
that tho good senso of our country;
wjll correct tho evil of construction
yhen It shall produce 111 effects."
Breckinridge and Nicholas, on tha
othor hand,, tho ono author of tho Ken
tucky, and tho othor ardent supporter
of tho Virginia resolutions, now began
to see Implied powers In tho Consti
tution which, would amply support tha
present purposo. John Qulncy Ad
ams, representing tho youngpr and
more mo'dorato federalists, 11 ko Jeffer
son, desired tho acquisition, but Ilka
am also thought a constitutional
ampndmont necessary and, cooporat
ng witn tno administration, like Jef
ferson, offerod an amendment for .tha
purposo. Contrary to somewhat au
thorltatlve assertion, tho ground of
Jefferson's constitutional objection in
cluded that of tho acquirement of ter
ritory as well as the right, which, watt
Involved in the treaty, of adding thla
territory, acquired since tho formation
of the Constitution, as states to tha.
Union.
Tho extremo federalists, such aa
Piokorlng of Massachusetts and Oris
wold of Connecticut, In a fit of qapri
clous, obstructionist partisan temper,
Insisted that tho treaty was absolutely
unconstitutional and void, their chief
contention being that It Involved tho
admission of this now territory aB a.
state In tho Union which could not bo
done without the consent of all tho
othor states, since tho Constitution
applied In this sense only to tho ter
ritory comprised within tho United J
States when It was adopted. "Noth
ing so fully IllustratOB tho low stato
to which tho onco prosperous fodor
allstB wore fallen as tho turbulent and
tactions opposition they now mado to
tho acquisition of Louisiana." But
rhn m M CI a nP f Vir nnnnlt nennnnnnoil
tho purchaso a bargain," and Joffer-7
son knew that ho was safe In their,'
hands. "He would accept tho treaty;
summon Congress, urge tho House and
Senate to perfect tho purchaso, and
trust to tho Constitution being mended
so as to mako tho purchaso legal!"
Ho called Congress In sp'eclal session
in Octobor; tho Senate almost unani
mously ratified tho treaty, and a bill
to carry It into effoct was passqd with
only five votes against it In tho Sen
ate, and twenty-five federalists voted
against it in tho Houso, seventeen of
whom wero from Now England. Noth
ing moro was hoard of "mernHng tho
Constitution." Neither Jefferson, or
Breckinridge, republicans, nor Adams
or Pickering, federalists, could then
discern that out of tho same revolu
tion which had produced only our
rigid written Constitution, hobbled by
Hamlltonlan "chocks and .balances,"
tho seeds of a British policy wero al
ready growing whoso full fruitage was
soon to bo a constitution mado to tho
order of public opinion directly by tho
supremo popular houso of parliament
Providence of tho great Louisiana
(TO BE CONTINUED)