. w.-.
j&.i,.-
.. i
Historical Record from the Time of the Ca
palliation of Manila to Admiral Dewey
and the United States Navy.
War wiili ilic Filipinos Has Uccn Fostered by (lie Democratic
Allies of Agiiinaldo How the Enemies of 'Our Country
Have Toasted William Jennings Bryan.
The Plrc In the Rcnr" Prevents
Alfttirs off the Islands
Dewey's
ANILA cnplttilnlod' to the
United Stilton forces, cpniiiiuud-
ed by Admiral Dewey, on May
1, 18DS.
In order to become Informed upon
tin; condition of nlYnlrtf In tlio Philip
pines, President McKlnley, on .Inn. -'0,
1S05), appointed a rpimnlHHlon coin
posed of PreHldont .T. G. Sclitiruiiiu, of
Cornell Unlvondty; Professor Dean,
Worcester; Chnrlcs Donby, lato Min
ister to Cltlitii; Admiral Dewey mid
General Otis. Tlio c'oiiiiiiIhhIoii winded
Its report to President McKlnley Nov.
2, 181)'.), and the .same was tnimiinlilcd
to Congress by tlio President, Feb. 2,
1000. It renxlH In pari iih follows:
"The undersigned commissioners un
pointed by you to Investigate affairs in
the Philippine IhIuihIs nnd to reporL the
result of their Investigations', together
with Ntioh recommendations iih might in
their Judgment bo culled for by the con
ditions which should be found to c.xisl
in those Islands, hnvc tlio honor to unb
uilt the following preliminary Htntemeiit
In compliance with your it-quest."
The commission next tells briefly how
It conducted the tank intrusted to it,
henrlng statements from nil dowses of
people in Manila iih to the cnpnlillltlcH of
the Filipinos for self-government, the
hnbltfl nnd customs of the people, mid
also the establishment of iiiuuicipal gov
ernments in many towns.
History of Ih'iiikI(i.
Turning to the history of the Island,
the commission attaches little Importance
to the divers rebellions which had pre
.coded that of 1&0U. Ak to IUIh move
ment the commissioners declare thai It
wiiH In no sense an nllempt. to win Inde
pendence, but Holely to obtain relief, from
Intolerable nbuses.
'lo Hitstnln tula Hlatemeul they quote
from an Insurgent proclamation, Know
ing thnt what was demanded wiih the ex
pulslou of the friars and the rcstltulitm
to the people of their IiuiiIk, with a di
vision of the episcopal seen between
Spanish and native priests. ILwns also
demanded that the Filipinos lmve parlia
mentary representation, freedom of the.
press, religious toleration, economic au
tonomy, ami laws Hlmilar to those of
Spain. The abolition or the power of
banishment was demanded, with a legnl
equality for all persons in law and equal
ity in pay between Spanish and native
civil servants.
Treaty with Bpiiulxli.
The commission declarer that these de
mands had good ground; that on paper
the Spanish system of government was
tolerable, but in practice every Spanish
governor did what be t,aw IK, and the
evil deeds of men In the government were
hidden from Spalij by strict press censor
ship. Allusion Is made to the powerful
Kntipunan Society, patterned on the Ma
sonlo order, nnd mainly made up of Ta
gnlos, an a powerful revolutionary force.
The war begun In 189(1 wiih terminated
by the treaty of Itlnc-un-ljnte. The Fili
pinos were numerous, but possessed only
about 800 small arms. The Spanish felt
that It would require 100,000 men to cap
ture their stronghold, and concluded to
resort to the use of money. Certain con
cessions were nlso decided upon, includ
ing representation of the Filipinos In the
Cortes, the deportation of the friars,
which was the principal question; the
grant of the right of association and of n
free press.
I'rntulHCH Not Kept.
Governor General ltlvera was willing
to pay $'2,000,000 in Mexican money
when Agulualdo and his cabinet and lead
ing otllcers arrived in Hong Kong. It ap
pears, however, that Paterno offered the
latter only 100,000, $200,000 to bo pnlij
when Agulnaldo arrived nt -Hong Kong
mid the balance when the Wdipiiios bad
delivered up their arms. The arrange
ment was not acceptable to the people.
The promises were never carried out.
Spanish abuses began afresli, In Manila
nlone more than 1200 men being execut
ed. Hence Hporadlc risings occurred,
though they possessed nothing like tlio
strength of the original movement. The
insurgents Incited arms, nmiuuultlou and
leaders.
The treaty bad ended the war, which,
with the exception of an uiilniportnnt
outbreak In Cebu, had been confined to
Luzon, Spain's sovereignty in the other
islands never hnvlng been qucHlloncri, and
the thought of independence never hav
ing been entertained.
Dewey artil Agiiluoldn.
The report then tells how Gen. Angus
tiuo came to Manila as governor general
nt this juncture and war broke out' be
tween Spain nml the United States. An
jtustlno sought to secure, the, support of
the Filipinos to defend Spain against
America, promising them nutonoiny, but
the Filipinos did not trust him,
Then came the 1st of May and the tie
ntruction of the Spanish licet by Dewey,
with the resulting loa of prestige to'
Hpnin. Then In June Agulnaldo. ciinte.,
On this point the coniuiifeslon says:
"Tlio following memorandum on this
m
a Peaceful Administration of the
Lavton's Lcticr and
Denial.
iiubjecl has been furnished the commis
sion by Admiral Dewey:
'"On April a I, ISOS.the following ci
pher dispatch was received at Hong
Kong from 15. Spencer Pratt, United
States consul general at Singapore:
"'Aguitiiddn, insurgent leader, here.
Will come I long Kong, arrange with
commodore for genernl co-operation in
mirgenlH Manila if desired. Telegraph.'
"On the Hiiine day Commodore Dewey
telegraphed Mr. Pratt, 'Toll Agulualdo
come soon as possible,' the necessity for
haste being due to the fact thnt the
squadron had been not Hied by the Hong
Kong Government lo leave those waters
by the following day. The Mpindrou left
I long Kong on the morning of the 2."th,
mid Mirs Hay on the H7th Agulnaldo
did not leave Singapore tin H the 2(lth,
and so did not arrive In Hong Kong
in time to have a conference with tho
admiral.
"It had been reported lo the commo
dore as early as March 1, by the United
States consul at Manila and others that
the Filipinos had broken out Into insur
rection against the Spanish nuthorlty in
the vicinity of Manila, and on March ,'H)
Mr. Williams hnd telegraphed: 'Five
thousand rebels nrined In camp near city.
Loyal to us in case of war.'
No Alliance Made.
"Upon the arrival of the squadron nt
Manila it watf found that there was no
insurrection to sneak of. mid it was ac
cordingly decided to nllow Agulnaldo to
come to Cnvito on board the McCulloch.
He arrived with thirteen of his stuff on
.May If), mid immediately came on board
the Ol.vmpla to call on the commander-in-chief,
nfter which lie was allowed to I
land nt Cavlte and organize an army.
"This wns done with the purpose of
strengthening the United States forces
and weakening those of tho enemy. No
alliance of any kind was entered into
with Agulnaldo, nor was any promise of
inuopentlence made to him, then or at
any other time."
The commission's report then rapidly
sketches events now historical. It tells
la substance how the Filipinos attacked
the Spanish and how Gen. Anderson ar
rived, and Agulnaldo, nt his request, re
moved from Cavlte to Hucoor. Says the
commission: -
"Now for the first time rose the Idea of
national independence. Agulnaldo Issued
a proclamation lu which be took the re
sponsibility of promising It to his people
on behalf of the American Government,
although he admitted freely In private
conversation with members of bl cabinet
that neither Adinlrnl Dewey nor any oth
er American had made him nny Kiich
promise."
Growth of Friction.
The report states that Agiiinaldo
wished to attack the Americans when
they landed at Parannquo, but was de
terred by lack of arms and aiuintinltioii.
From that point on there wns a growing
friction between the Filipinos and the
American troops.
"There were no conferences," says the
report, ''between the olllcers of the Fili
pinos nnd our olllcers with a view to
operating against the Spaniards, nor wan
there co-operation of any kind.
There never was any preconcerted opera
tion or nny combined movement by the
United Stntes and Filipinos against the
Spaniards."
Kcrerence is made to Agtiinnldo's de
mand that ho be allowed to loot Manila
and tnkc the arms of the Spaniards. The
latter demand is said to confirm the state
ment that he Intended to get possession
of the arms to attack the Americans.
Waiting for Pretext.
Further evidence of the hostile Inten
tions of the Filipinos was found in the
organization of "popular clubs," which
Inter on furnished a local militia to nt
tack the Americans. The decrees of the
Filipino congress are also cited, as well
as the making of bolos (knives) in every
shop lu Manila.
l't Is shown that a considerable element
in tlio Filipino congress wished to address
to President McKlnley a request not to
abandon the Filipinos. (At this stage the
Paris conference was discussing the fu
ture of the Philippines.) The President
was also to be asked his deslie as to the
form of government he wished to estab
lish. Hut all this time Agulnaldo wns
preparing for war mid delaying these
messages, nnd It was understood that the
attack would come upon the first act by
the American forces, which would afford
a pretext.
Filipinos Ileulu Wnr.
A brief chapter then tells of
of success attending the effort
this tlmo by Gen. Merritt, throu;
the lack
made at
h a com-
mission, to arrive at a mutual under
standing with Agulnaldo as (o the Inten
tions, purposes and desire of the Filipino
people. This brings the story up to the
outbreak on the evening of the -1th of
February, with the attack upon the
American troops, following the action of
the Nebrnskaii kcutinel. The commis
sion, in concluding this chapter, .says:
"After the landing of our troops Agul-
nrMo inni!" up IN in.nd that it U'citd lo
lioiemnry to fi'nt tin- American, and
after the making of the treaty of pfiro
at Pnrii this determination was Hrcngih
ened. Ik did not openly declare that he
Intended to fight the Amerlrans, but he
excited everybody, and especially the mil
itary men, by claiming independence, and
it Is doubtful whether lie had the pow in
to check or control tho iinny at the time
hostilities broke out.
.No Alternative Left.
"Deplorable as war is, the one In which
we are now engaged wns unavoidable
by us. Wc were attacked by a bold, ad
venturous and enthusiastic army. No
alternative was left to us, except Igno
minious retreat. It is not to be conceived
of that any American would have mine
tinned the surrender of Mmilla lo the
Insurgents, Our obligations to oilier ni
tions, to the friendly Filipinos and to
ourselves mid our ling demanded thnt
force should be met by force.
"Whatever the future of the Philip
pines may be, there Is no course open to
us now except the prosecution of the war
until the Insurgents are reduced to sub
mission. The commission is or the opin
ion that there lias been no time since tin1
destruction of the Spanish squadron by
Admiral Dewey when it was possible to
withdraw our forces from the Islands
either with honor to ourselves or with
snfety to the inhabitants."
Kcl -ii of I error.
The commissioners then tnkc up the
condition of the country at the time of
their nrrtval, comparing it with condi
tions existing when they left a slnrt time;
ngo. A vivid picture is given of the an-'
archy existing among the inhabitants in
and about Manila during the early,
spring.
"The situation in the city," says the
commission, "wns bad. Incendiary fires
occurred dally. The streets were almost
deserted. Half of the native population
hail fled and most of the remainder were
shut in their houses. HiisinesH was at a
standstill. Insurgent troops everywhere
faced our lines, and the sound of rifle fire
wits frequently audible lu our house. A
reign of terror prevailed. Filipinos who
had favoied Americans feared nssassinn
tion, and few had the courage to come,
out openly for us. Fortunately there'
were among this number some of the best
men of the city."
Restoring Public Confidence.
The report then speakit of the isnu
mice of the commission's proclamation
mid the good effects It had on public ten
tlmeiit. The natives, accustomed to Span
ish promises, urged upon the commission
that acts instead of promises should be
given them. As a resuljt native law courts
were established and this greatly aided
in the restoration of public confidence.
The How of population soon began to set
toward the city. Natives who had fled
from their homes returned.
Ah showing the limited scope of the
rebellion the commission states:
"We learned that tho strong nntl-Amer-
lean feeling was confined to the Tngnlo
provinces, nnniely, MnnHii, Cavlte, La-
guna, liatangns, Morong, Hulncan,
Ntiovn Kclja, Principe, Infanta and Zam
bales. It was strongest In the first slx
nntned, and hardly existed In the last
four.
Revolt Not 7'opuliir.
"The population of these provinces Is
estimated to be about l,fi00,000. but it
should not be supposed that even in tlm
six provinces immediately "ndjneont'to
t,.,u,. ,i i .......... ,.. .,.,.. I
.ii.....! uk inuini.- wi-iu milieu in uieir
opposition to us. Even here there was
a strong conservative clement, consisting
of people of wealth and Intelligence, op
posed to tlio wnr.
Under the bend, "The Rebellion not n
National Movement," the report treats
of the rebellion outside of the provinces
of Luzon, where, it is stated, the upris
ing was viewed at first with indifference
and Inter with fenr. Throughout the
archipelago at largo there was trouble
only nt those points to which armed Ta
galos had been bent in considerable num
bers. Auk American Help.
The machinery of insurgent "govern
ment" served only for plundering the
people under the pretext of levying "war
contributions, while many of the insur
gent olllclals were rapidly accumulating
wealth." It is stated that the insurgent
ndinlnlstratlon throughout the Interior
was worse than in the days of Spanish
nilsiule. In many provinces there was
absoluteanarchy, and from nil sides came
petitions for protection and help.
In speaking of Gen. Mat-Arthur's
movement northward the report tells of
the insurgent method of intimidating the
natives by telling them fearful tales con
cerning the American soldiers. This
method of procedure, eminently success
ful nt first, in the end recoiled on Its au
thors. Troops lirlng Peace.
As to the state of affairs when the
commission left the report says:
"Before the commission left the Philip
pines nearly all the inhabitants hnd re
turned to those ruined villages. Many
or the houses had been rebuilt. Fields
that had lain fallow for three years were
green with growing crops. Municipal
governments were established, and the
people, protected by our troops, were en
joying peace, security and n degree of
participation In their own government
previously unknown in the history of the
Philippines. Attempts of the insurgents
to raise recruits ami money in the prov
ince of ltulncan were proving abortive,
except when backed by bayonets and bul
lets, and even in such cases the natives
were applying to us for help to resibt
them."
The chnpter devoted to "Establishment
of Municipal Governments" gives in de
tail the efforts in that direction. There
were many dilllcultles encountered. The
condition of the people wns found to be
must pitiable. They had been plundered
by the Insurgent troops, who had robbed
them of jewels, money, clothing and even
food, so Hint they were literally starving.
Peaceful citizens had been fired on, Wom
en had been maltreated.
Plnu of Government.
There was general satisfaction that the
Americana had come at last, and condi
tions seemed favorable for an American
propaganda. The towns of Itacoor and
linns were selected for the purpose of
experiment, and after talks with the
loeal "head men" n local form of govern
ment was established. Encouraged by
the result, the work wns continued at
Pnrannqtio and Las Pittas, with binillnr
good results.
At the request of Gen. Lnwton, who
had been asblgned to this work by Gen.
Otis, the commission prepared a (.iinple
scheme of municipal government, similar
enough to the old system to be readily
comprehensible to the natives, but. g'ving
ihcm liberties which thc Ind never be-
I loro cujw cd. 1 Iii- scheme was adoptid
ami gave general si.tisfaction.
In every instance onthtislnsm ran high
before the conlnilsslonors took their de
parture, and cheers were raised for Gen.
Lnwton and for the country which he
represented.
Hccurc Good Itrniiltn.
With a single exception the ofllclals
elected proved worthy of the trust Impos
ed in them, and conditions very rnpidly
Improved In the newly organized towns.
Governments were organized with more
satisfactory results in Pmiducnn, Santa
Ann, Snn Felipe, Merl, Sun Pedro and
Machei, while a slightly different system
was put Into effect In Mnlabon, Polo,
Obnndo, Meycnuya, Yang and Malolos.
The commission states that a large
amount of supervision over the affairs of
our new municipalities proved necessary,
as the olllclals were timid mid slow to
comprehend their new duties. At many
of the elections the voters went about
' asking who they were expected to vote
for." and it was only with great diffi
culty that tliey were persuaded to exer
cise the right of free suffrage.
ScIiooIh for Vnnlln.
The commissioners Hum up the situa
tion at the time of their departure as
follows:
"When we left Mnnlln a largo volume
of business was being done, and tho
streets were so crowded as to be hardly
safe. The native population wns quiet
and orderly and all fear of an uprising
had long since passed. An eflicient corps
of native policemen was on duty. A
system of public schools in which English
wns taught had been advocated by the
commission and established by Gen. Otis.
Some (1.000 scholars were in attendance.
"I'n the Tagnlo provinces of Luzon,
where the niiM-Ainerican feeling had been
strongest, public sentiment had greatly
changed, as evidenced by the fnct that
the military governor or Hntangns hnd
offered to surrender ids troops and his
province if we would only send a small
force there. The HIcols, in southern Lu
zon, had risen against their Tagalo mas
ters. The Macabebes were clamoring for
mi opportunity to fight in our ranks, nnd
native soldiers and scouts were already
serving under Gen. Lnwton.
Pclicllloti I'ylmr Out.
"Stories of Hie corruption of insurgent
olllcers were becoming dally more com
mon, and the disintegration of the ene
my's forces was steadily progressing. The
hope or assistance from outside sources
seemed to be all that held them togeth
er." Having given so much attention to the
Inland of Luzon, the commission then
takes up in detail the conditions in the
other islands. On this point it is stated
that the rebellion is essentially Tagalo.
and when it ends in Luzon it must end
throughout the archipelago. The situa
tion elsewhere than in Luzon is .summed
up as follows:
"The only island, npurt from Luzon,
whore serious trouble threatens, Is Pa-
nny. to wlilcli a considerable force of Ta
galo soldiers wns sent before the out
break of hostilities. Mnny of the Visnv-
aus of this island are opposed to the Ta
gnlos, however, and It is not believed
that the latter can make u formidable
resistance.
Oppimo tlie TntruloH.
"In Snmnr. Ley to nnd Mnsbnte the Ta
galo invaders arc numerically few and
ni-o dUUU'otfli.UUo-uuUvcs of those Isl
ands, whom they have oppressed. We
were assured that 200 men would suffice
to restore order In Mindoro. Uobol was
asking for troops. The Calamlnnes isl
anders bad sent word thnt they would
welcome us. There can be no resistance
in Palawan. Satisfactory relations had
already been established with the war
like Moros, whose sultan hnd previously
been conciliated by a member of the com
mission, and In Mindanao this tribe had
even taken up our cause and attacked
the Insurgents, of whom there are very
few In the island.
"In Cebu we have only to reckon with
the lawless element, which has never
been very formidable there."
Special attention is given to the Islnnd
of Nogros as this seemed a field well
adapted to the extension of nn American
system. Here the natives have adopted
a local form or government, Including a
congress, nnd had raised the American
flag. They believed themselves capable
or managing their own affairs and asked
for a battalion of troops to hold in check
a mountainous band of fanatics. The
battalion was furnished, but the people
proved unable to carry out their program
owing to ill reeling nmong their own offi
cials. The Americans remained popular.
Need American "ulc.
At the request or Gen. Otis a new and
simplified scheme of government Tor the
island, giving the people n large voice in
their affairs, but placing an American in
rull control, was put into operation. It
brought nbout satisfaction, and public or
der is better in the island to-day thnn nt
any time during the last twenty years.
Summarizing the failure of the native
form of government and the success of
the American control, the commission
says:
"The flat failure of this attempt to es
tablish an Independent native government
in Nogros, conducted as it was under the
most 'favorable circumstances, makes It
npparent that here, as well as In the less
favored provinces, a large amount of
American control Is nt present absolutely
essential to n successful administration
of public affairs."
Kffnrta for Pence.
The efforts at conciliation with Agui
nnldo and his vnrious commissions are
set forth in detail. These commissioners
were assured of the beneficent purposes
of the United Stntes nnd the President's
readiness to grant the Filipino people as
large a measure of homo rule and as
ample liberty ns consistent with the end
of government, "subject only to the rec
ognition of the sovereignty of the United
States a point which, being established,
the commission invariably refused even to
discuss."
The eoininirsion adds that nothing came
of negotiations, as Aguinuldo's emissaries
were without powers, and merely came,
and came again, for information. Courte
ous reception was accorded to the insur
gent commissions, nnd earnest appeals
made to stop further bloodshed, nil wit
nessing "the spirit of patient conciliation"
exhibited by tin! American commission in
endeavoring to reach an nmicnble adjust
ment with the insurgents, as well as tho
obduracy of Agulnaldo.
On Self-Govcrtimcnt.
The report sums up tho result of these
fruitless exehnuges as follows:
"No better proof could be furnished
that the primary object of his struggle Is
hot, as is pretended, the liberty of the
Filipino people bat the coiitfi uuii-v of
bis own arbitrary and despotic power.
In nny event, the American pool le may
reel confident thnt no effort wns omitted
by the commission to secure n peaceful
end of the struggle, but the opportuni
ties they offered and urged were nil neg
lected, If not, Indeed, spurned."
The chapter devoted to "Capacity for
Self-Government" Is the result, the re
port stntes, of diligent Inquiry for sev
oral months, lu the course or which a
great number or witnesses were exam
ined, or nil shades or political thought
and varieties of occupation, tribe mid lo
cality. TrlbcBi Not n Nation.
The mot striking nnd perhaps the most
significant fnct in the entire situation is
the multiplicity of tribes Inhabiting the
archipelago, the diversity of their lan
guages (which are mutually unintelligi
ble) and tlio multifarious phases of civ
ilization ranging nil the way from the
highest to the lowest. As to this the
report says:
"The Filipinos nre not n nntion, but
a variegated assemblage oT different
tribes and peoples, nnd their loyalty is
still or the tribal type."
Converning their intellectual capacities
the commission says:
"As to the general Intellectual capaci
ties or the Filipinos the conimls.-ion is dis
posed to rate them high. Hut excepting
in a limited number or persons these ca
pacities have not been developed by edu
cation or experience. The masses of the
people are uneducated.
Nceil of IMiicat Ion.
"That Intelligent public opinion on
which popular government rests does not
exist in the Philippines. And it cannot
exist until education lias elevated the
masses, broadened their intellectual hori
zon and disciplined their faculty of judg
ment. And even then the power or selr
governnient cannot bo, assumed without
considerable previous training and experi
ence under the guidance and tutelage of
an enlightened and liberal foreign power.
For the bald fact Is thnt the Filipinos
have never had any experience in govern
ing themselves."
The report shows thnt this inability ror
self-government Is due to the old Span
ish regime, which gave the Filipinos lit
tle or no part In governing themselves.
After reviewing this Spanish system tho
commission sums up on this point:
"This is nil the training In self-government
which the inhabitants of the Phil
ippine Islands have enjoyed. Their lack
of education nnd political experience,
combined with their racial and linguistic
diversities, disqualify tlu'in, in spite of
their mental gifts and domestic virtues,
to undertake the task of governing the
archipelago at the presdit time. The
most that can be expected of them is to
co-operate with the Americans in the
ndininistrntion- of general affairs, from
Mnnlln ns a center, nnd to undertake,
subject to American control or guidnnce
(ns may be found necessary), the admin
istration of provincial and municipal af
fairs. ?Tii8t Kctnln Rule.
"Fortunately, there are educated Fili
pinos, though they do not constitute n
large proportion of the entire population,
nnd their support and services will be of
Incalculable value In iunugtirutiug nnd
maintaining the new government. As ed
ucation advances and experience ripens,
the natives may be intrusted with n larg
er and more Independent share of govern
ment, self-government, ns the American
ideal,' being constantly kept In view ns
the goal. In this way American sover
eignty over the archipelago will prove a
great political boon to the people.
"Should our power by any fatality be
withdrawn tlio commission believes that
the government of the Philippines would
speedily lapse into nnnrchy, which would
excuse, IT It did not necessitate, the in
tervention or other powers nnd the even
tual division or the islnnds among them.
"Only through American occupation,
therefore, is the idea of a freo. self-governing
and united Philippine common
wealth at nil conceivnble. And the in
dispensable need "from the Filipino point
or view or maintaining American sover
eignty over the archipelago is recognized
by all intelligent Filipinos nnd even by
those insurgents who desire an American
protectorate. The latter, it is true, would
take the revenues and leave us the re
sponsibilities. Nevertheless they recog
nize the indubitable Tact that the Fili
pinos cannot stand alone.
"Thus the welfare of the Filipinos co
incides with the dictates of national hon
or in forbidding our abandonment of the
archipelago. We cannot from nny point
of view escape the responsibilities of gov
ernment which our sovereignty entaiio,
mid '.he commission is strongly persuaded
that the performance of our national duty
will prove the greatest blessing to the
peoples of the Philippine Islands."
PrnlHe for Troop.
One of the closing chapters of the re
port is devoted to a tribute to "our sol
diers and sailors lu the war." The com
mission says that the presence of Admiral
Dewey as a member of this body makes
it unfitting to dwell on his personnl
achievements, but lie joins in the eulogy
of his comrades. The commissioners wit
nessed some of the many brave deeds of
our soldiers, nnd they declnre that all that
skill, courage and a patient endurance
can do has been done in the Philippines.
They dismiss the reports of the dese
crating of churches, the murdering of
prisoners nnd the committing of unmen
tionable crimes, and say they are glad to
express the belief that a war was never
more humanely conducted, adding:
"If churches were occupied it wns only
ns a military necessity, and frequently
their use ns forts by the insurgents had
mnde it necessary to train our artillery
upon them.
Hrlglit Trade Future.
"Prisoners were taken whenever oppor
tunity offered, often only to be set nt
liberty after being disarmed and fed. Up
to the time of our departure, although
numerous spies hnd been captured, not a
single Fillpluo hnd been executed. Such
wrongs ns were casually committed
against the nntives were likely to be
brought to our attention, nnd in every
case that wc investigated we found a
willingness on the part of those In author
ity to administer prompt justice,"
The commissioners give n general view
of tho vnlue of the islands, their richness
In agricultural nnd forest products, their
mineral wealth and their commanding
geographical position. They 6tnte that
the Philippine Islnnds should soon be
come one of the great trade centers of
the East. Manila Is already connected
by new stenmship lines with Australia,
India nnd Japan, and she will become
the mutual terminus of many other lines
when a ship canal collects the AtiooiUc
with the Pachic It ur.uot be d Milled
that commerce will greatly bo rc.asc, And
the I'n. ted S'ntes . ill obtain n largo
share in this treatment.
Itclieflt tn iHtnitrtq.
Manila, with the immunity whicfi It has
thus fur enjoyed Trout that terrible pest,
the bubonic plague, should become n dis
tributing center ror China, Slum, the
Strnlts Settlements, Tonquln, Anunm and
Australln.
The report concludes:
"Our control means to the inhabitants
or the Philippines lnternnl peace and or
der, a guarantee against foreign aggres
sion and against the dismemberment of
their country, commercial and Indtistvral
prosperity and as large a share of the
affairs of government as they elinll provo
fit to take. When peace and prosperity
shall have been established throughout
the archipelago, when educntlon shall
have become general, then, in the lan
guage of a leading Filipino, his people
will, under our guidnnce, 'become more
American thnn the Americans them
selves.' "
Dewey Itcnril T-"rniu.
On May 20, 1SDS, Admiral Dewey ca
bled to the Navy Department:
'Agitiiuildo, the rebel conimnnder-In-chief,
was brought down by the McCul
loch. Organizing forces near Cavlte, nnd
may render assistance which will be val
uable." On May '0 the Secretary of the Navy
telegraphed to Admiral Dewey as fol
lows: "It is desirable, as far as possible, and
consistent for your success and safety,
not to have political alliances with tho
insurgents or any faction in the Islands
that would Incur liability to maintain
their cause in the future."
To this telegram Dewey replied:
"ltecelpt of telegram of May U(J is ac
knowledged, nnd I thnnk the department
for the expression of confidence.. H.ivo
acted according to the spirit of depart
ment's Instructions therein from the be
ginning, nnd I have entered Into no alli
ance with the insurgents or with any fac
tion. This squadron can reduce the de
fenses of Manila at any moment, but It
Is considered useless until the arrival of
sufficient United Stntes forces to retain
Iiossession."
Ajiutnntdo Cnuplrc.
As soon as Agiiinaldo discovered ho
was to have no assistance from the Unit
ed Stnto3 he commenced to conspire
against our forces there, intending to
overthrow the authority of this Govern
ment in the islands.
Dewey' Strnnsr Dctiiu.
In a pamphlet afterwards published
by Agiiinaldo, enltled "The True Vei-ion
of the Philippine Involution," he charged
that Admiral Dewey had assured him
that the United States would rccognizo
the independence of the Filipinos. When
this was published, the admiral wrote the
following letter to Senator Lodge:
"Dear Senator Lodge: The statement of
Emilio Agtiinnldo, recently published in
the Springfield Kcpublicnn, so far ns it
relates to me is u tissup of ralsehood. I
never promised him, directly or indirect
ly, Independence for the Filipinos. I
never treated him ns nn ally, except so
far as to make use of him and his sol
diers to nssist me in my operations
ngninst the Spaniards. He never uttered
the word 'independence' in any conver
sation with me or my officers. The state
ment thnt 1 received him with military
honors, or snlutod tho Filipino flag, is ab
solutely fnlse. Sincerely yours,
"GEOItGE DEWEY."
Autiinnldo Organizes Revolution.
On May 111 Agiiinaldo Issued threa
proclamations, one containing decrees aa
to tho treatment of the Spanish enemy,
another announcing the establishment of
a dictatorial government with himself aa
dictator, and the third containing further
decrees concerning military operations.
In the following July he organized n
revolutionary government with himself
ns President. During thnt month the
several detachments of the United Stntes
army arrived at Manila, and on July 25
Gen. Merritt took coinmnnd, nnd Ad
miral Dewey sent the following dispntch:
"Merritt arrived yesterday in the New
port. The reninindor of the expedition is
expected within tho next few days. Slt
untion is most critical nt Manila. The
Spanish may surrender at any moment.
Merrltt's most difficult problem wiM be
how to deal with insurgents tinder Agiii
naldo, who has become aggressive and
even threatening toward our army."
Hostilities Rcguii by Aguinuldo.
On Aug. 13 Mnnlln wns captured, and
or this and subsequent events the Philip
pine commission, composed or Admiral
Dewey, Gen. Otis, President Schurman,
Prof. Worcester nnd Gen. Denby, snys:
"When the city of Manila was taken on
Aug. 13, the Filipinos took no pnrt in tho
attack, but came following in with'a view
of looting the city and were only prevent
ed from doing so by our forces preventing
them rrom entering. Agiiinaldo claimed'
that be had the right to occupy the city;
he demanded or Gen. Merritt tho pnlaco
or Malacannn ror himself and the cession
of nil the churches of Maniln, nlso that
a part of the money taken from the Span
iards as spoils of war should be given up,
and above all that he should be given tho
arms of the Spanish prisoners. This con
firms the statement already mnde thnt
he intended to get possession of these
nrms for the purpose of attacking us. All
these demands wore refused. After tho
taking of Maniln the feeling between the
Americans and the insurgents grew worse
day by day. Agiiinaldo removed
his seat of government to Malolos, where
tho so-called Filipino congress assembled.
Flltptno I'pi-pnrcd for Wnr.
On the 2lst of September a significant
decree passed the Filipino congress im
posing a military service on every malo
over 18 years of age, except those holding
government positions. In every carriage
factory and blacksmith shop in Manila
bolos (knives) were being made.
Danger signals now multiplied. Agul
naldo endeavored to get the war making
power transferred from congress to him
self, and also urged a heavy bond Issue
to secure one million dollars for the pur
chase of arms and ammunition.
It is now known that elaborate plans hnd
been perfected for n simultaneous attack
by tho force within and without Manila.
Persistent attacks were made to
provoke our soldiers to tire. The insur
gents were insolent to our guards and
made persistent and continuous efforts
to push them bnck and advance the In
surgent lines further into tho city of Ma
nila. To Attnck Americans.
Early in Jnnunry, 1800, Agulnaldo had
his plnns perfected so ns to be ready to
commence hostilities against tho Ameri
can forces.
TJio following order, which has never