

How to Win Games

Some General Rules that All Players—Both on the Field and in the Grandstand—Should Understand

By Hugh S. Fullerton

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Detroit lost a world's championship by doing one little thing wrong. Chicago threw away two by wrong selecting Pittsburgh, with the highest honor within grasp, chose wrong just once and was beaten. Philadelphia's great Athletics came near defeat at the hands of a much weaker team by two bits of faulty play. Not one of these vital things that affected great series was an error that showed in the scores. They were examples of how the wisest of players and managers will make the wrong choice when one of two things must be done.

The plays considered here are those that are played over and over when the "if club" is in session. For, given a situation and the stage of the game, ninety-nine out of a hundred major league players can tell you exactly how that play should be made. It is the purpose of this article not so much to show how plays should be made, as when. A perfectly executed play may be correct at one time, and entirely wrong a moment later. I am going on the assumption that every boy in America knows how to play baseball, and understands the rules, which are the baseball primer. This tells how the primer is interpreted and applied by major league players.

As regards offensive baseball, the making of runs. There are two great types of teams; the teams that play for one run at a time (a class now heavily handicapped), and those that play for runs in bunches. Inside the last two years a change in conditions has forced a revolution in play and has brought a period of systematic attack with a view of making a bunch of runs at one time. Roughly speaking it may be said that for five years the American league has been developing this system while most of the National league teams were "one run at a time" clubs. The exceptions were the New York Giants in the National, which played the bunched runs game, and the Chicago White Sox, a team that, being strong in pitchers and weak in hitters, played for one run.

The team that plays for one run at a time must have supreme confidence in its pitchers. The entire system is based on the supposition that the pitcher is strong enough to hold the opposing team to a low score.

I have seen Connie Mack's Athletics, three runs behind, perhaps in the fourth or fifth inning, supreme in their confidence in their pitcher, make the one run safe, and crawling up run by run, tie and then win out. The Chicago White Sox, under Fleder Jones, and the Chicago Cubs during the time that Chance possessed pitchers upon whom he could rely, played the same style of ball and won. But as conditions of the game change, the style of play to meet them must also change.

There are three ways of reaching first base: A base on balls, by being hit by a pitched ball, by hitting the ball. The first two methods are so closely allied as to be one, and they form by far the most important part of the system of attack of any club. No team ever won a pennant that was not a "waiting team"—that is, one that could compel the opposing pitcher to "put 'em over in the groove." It does not necessarily follow that to be a "good waiting team" a team must draw many free passes to first. The object is not so much to force the pitcher to serve four wide pitches as



"Robber!"

so force him to use his full strength, and to get him "in the hole," which in baseball means to force him into a position where, to avoid giving a pass, he must pitch the ball over the plate. If the count is two and no strikes, the batter is morally certain the next ball will be over the plate, whether it is straight or a curve and he also knows that, in his anxiety to make certain of throwing the ball over the plate, the pitcher will not dare "put as much on" the ball as he would do if there were two strikes and one or two balls called. Therefore he is

practically certain that the next ball will be a good one to hit, and he will "set himself," "grab a toe hold," and double his chances of a base hit.

Ordinarily both the Detroit team and the Athletics are good waiting teams, teams that have opposing pitchers in distress perhaps as often as any clubs. Yet Detroit threw away a World's championship that looked easy, and the Athletics came near the same fate, by lapses in their system. In the World's series between Pittsburgh and Detroit it looked as if the Pirates did not have curve pitchers enough, or of sufficient quality, to prevent Detroit from slugging its way to victory. Fred Clark was forced to fall back upon Adams, a fairly good, but not sensational curve ball pitcher, who was young and inexperienced.

In the opening game Adams was as nervous and shaken as any pitcher ever was. He was trembling and white from nervousness and the strain. He passed the first batter without getting a ball over the plate, and with Bush, one of the best waiters and one of the hardest men in the business to pitch to at bat, Adams seemed in dire straits. There Jennings made the greatest mistake of his career. He



Manager Clark of Pittsburgh.

signed Bush to sacrifice on the first ball pitched. There was a groan from a dozen baseball men who realized that Jennings practically was refusing to let Adams throw away his own game. Bush bunted, Detroit scored, but had Bush been permitted to wait, Detroit probably would have won that game in the first inning, driven Adams off the slab, and, had they done that Adams never would have pitched again in that series; as it was he steadied, won the game, came back stronger and again still stronger and won the championship for Pittsburgh. In spite of that lesson Connie Mack did exactly the same thing in the World series in 1911, refused to let Marquard throw away his game in the first inning, and almost lost the game by it.

One of the mysteries of baseball for many years has been the excessive hitting power of every team Connie Mack, commander of the Athletics, leads. I believe the secret of his success lies in this jockeying with pitchers, waiting persistently to get the pitcher outguessed and puzzled and then breaking up the game with long drives. I believe that Mack has the following system of upsetting opposing pitchers, no matter how effective they may be: His team starts to do one thing in the first inning. If it starts to wait on the pitcher it waits consistently, every batter doing exactly the same thing. Perhaps for three innings, every batter will wait as long as possible before hitting. Then, just as the opposing pitcher begins to figure that the Athletics will take a strike or two and begins shooting the first ball over, the Athletics change and each man swings with full force at the first ball. Sometimes they do this for two innings, until the pitcher changes; then they will let the first ball go and every batter will hit the second ball. They keep at it until, in some inning, they get the cluster of drives for which they have been playing, pound out a bunch of runs and win.

There is no way of proving the theory, except by the scores, as Mack is about as communicative as a deaf and dumb diplomat, but in the scores I analyzed it was remarkable to see how many of the Athletics did the same thing, and hit the same ball in certain innings. The idea of the system seems to be to force the pitcher to do the guessing, rather than to try to outguess him. And such a system, persisted in and changed suddenly, would explain the hitless, fruitless innings during which some pitcher seemed to have the Champions at his mercy, and the sudden, slam-bang onslaught brings victory.

There is science and skill in the actual hitting of a ball, but the real value of hitting lies in advancing runners who already are on bases: The sacrifice bunt, the bunt and run, the hit and run and hitting as the runner starts, as differentiated from the hit and run. No club that simply at-

tempts to drive the ball safe can win consistently. The batter must help the base runner and cover his moves just as surely as, in war, the artillery must cover a cavalry or infantry charge.

The hit and run consists of the batter giving or receiving a signal so that both he and the runner know that on the next pitched ball the runner is going to start for the next base. The duty of the batter then is to hit the ball—and toward the spot most likely to be vacated by the infielder who goes to take the throw at second base. But the hit and run, effective as it has proved, has been found inferior to the run and hit. The difference is that the enemy has no chance to discover in advance what the play is to be. In the hit and run the passing of signals often warns the opposing catcher or pitcher of the intent to make the play. The result is that the pitcher "pitches out" (that is, throws the ball to the catcher so far from the plate that the batter cannot hit it) and the catcher, being prepared, throws out the base runner. Besides, either the runner or batter may miss the signal, with disastrous results. Still the signal is absolutely necessary when new players are on a team, and often between veterans, especially when the runner is a dashing and inventive player. The greatest of teams and players have been for a number of years abandoning the hit and run and playing run and hit; that is, the runner starts when he sees the best opportunity and the batter, seeing him going, protects him by hitting the ball or by hitting at it, so as to hamper the freedom of the catcher's movements. Crawford and Cobb, of the Detroit team, have used this system with wonderful success, and Crawford seldom fails to cover Cobb's movements.

The "All Star" team of 1910, which prepared the Athletics for their first championship, was composed of about as quick thinking a crowd of players as could be assembled. They held a meeting before they went into the first game against the champions and discussed signals. The second baseman, shortstop and catcher agreed on simple signs to notify the infield whether the shortstop or second baseman would take the throw at second. Then they decided not to attempt any other signal, but to play run and hit. Not once, during the entire series in which they beat the Champions decisively, did any batter fail to see the runner start, or neglect to protect him.

The run and hit is, of course, extremely difficult for inexperienced players. It requires a quick eye, a quick wit and a quick swing to hit the ball after catching a fleeting glimpse of the runner moving. The run and hit is the most effective style of attack yet devised, and especially adapted to the new conditions, its usefulness as a run producer and in advancing runners being greatly increased after the adoption of the livelier ball, late in 1910.

There is not, nor ever can be, any fixed rule regarding base running. It is all a study of the stages of the game. When one run is needed, any way to get to second base from first is the proper way. Remember that, in base running, the more the situation seems to call for an effort to steal the less chance to steal is given. The opposing pitcher knows that, with two out and a run desperately needed, the runner on first will probably attempt to steal on the first pitched ball; therefore he watches the bases more closely, the catcher is expecting the attempt, and is fortified, the second baseman and shortstop exchange signals and decide which will receive the throw. Therefore the runner who steals on "the wrong ball," that is, steals when the best authorities declare a steal should not be made, is much more likely to accomplish the steal than is the one who runs at the proper instant. In other words, when you must you seldom can, and when you don't need it it is easy. During last season in both the major leagues the runners violated every previously accepted rule. They stole with none out, with one or two out, stole on the first, second, third or fourth ball pitched, stole even with the count one strike and three balls. The season was a reversion to the baseball of 15 years ago in base running.

After reaching second base the problem of the steal is much more complicated. Most managers oppose stealing third, except in rare cases, on the grounds that the risk does not justify the gain, as a hit or a bad error will score a runner from second as easily as it will from third. In regard to the stealing of third. With a runner on second and no one out, the sacrifice bunt, even with the new ball, seems the play if the score is close—that is, close enough for one run to tie, or put the attacking team in the lead. With one out the steal is justified, especially when the fielders around second do not hold up runners or when the pitcher notoriously is weak in watching bases. In that situation I would advise attempts to steal at every opportunity provided the team is ahead or only one run behind. If more than two runs behind, stay at second and wait for hits; the chances of scoring on short passed balls, wild pitches or fumbles that would not permit scoring from second are too small to be counted on. The only justification for stealing third with two out, in my mind, is that the runner intends to bump or interfere with the third baseman and strive to force him or scare him into letting the ball go past far enough to permit scoring. This evidently was McGraw's idea in at least two cases during the last world's series—either that or his base runners blundered most astonishingly.

Stealing home is justifiable only un-

der the most desperate conditions or against a pitcher who palpably is so "rattled" that he is blind to everything except the man at the plate and allows the runner a flying start. Then an instant of hesitation by the pitcher may make the steal a success. It is good judgment, at times, for a fleet, daring man who is a good slider, to steal when the batter is helpless before a pitcher and when two are out.

The double steal, executed with runners on first and third is, according to the closest students of the game, proper under the following conditions: When two men are out and a weak batter or a slow runner is at the plate, and when one run is needed to win the game—the play in the latter case being justifiable with no one out, or with two out—but not with only one out. Many judges object to the play unless two are out—but last season I saw it worked repeatedly by clever teams with no one out. With runners on first and third and a decent catcher working, the double steal worked to get a runner over the plate; ought not to succeed in more than two cases in seven.

In the defensive end of the game every situation is a study of the batter, and, going beyond the individual batters it is a study of the stage of the game. The great problems of the game are: When to play the infield close, to choose between attempting a double play when runners are on first and third and letting the run count, and above all to place the outfielders with regard to the stages of the game.

The commonest blunders of really great managers and players are made in the disposition of the outfield. A great many captains who arrange their infield carefully pay little attention to the second line of defense, and really they rely more upon the individual brain work of the outfield than they do of the infielders. This is partly because they are more closely in touch with the infield and partly because of the fewer chances for the outfield to get into a vital play.

The outfield problems really are more vexing than those of the infield. The situation mainly is forced upon the infield. With a runner on third and one or none out, and the run means a tie or defeat, the infield is compelled to come forward. In the early stages of the game the manager is forced to decide whether to allow the run to score, or to try to cut it off, and must base his judgment on the ability of his pitcher to hold the other team to a low score, and of his own hitters to bat in enough runs to win. Teams such as Detroit and the Athletics, hard-hitting and free-scoring teams, can afford to let the other team gain a run, rather than risk its getting two or three, as they can score more later. Teams such as the old Chicago White Sox, "the hitless wonders" of the American league, could not allow the opposing team a run and had to play the closest inside game.

Many of the better major league teams, that is, those possessing fast infielders, will vary the play when runners are on first and third, one out and a run to be cut off from the plate by playing the first baseman and third baseman close, and bringing the short stop and second baseman forward only part of the way—holding them in position either to make a long fast throw to the plate or to try for the double play from second to first. I have seen Evers and Tinker make the double play from second to first even when both were playing close, changing their plan like a flash, covering second and relaying the ball to first at top speed, although they had played in to throw to the plate.

One of the greatest variations of the play I ever witnessed was made by McInnis of the Athletics. Collins and Barry were playing perhaps twelve feet closer to the plate than they ordinarily do, runners were on first and third, one out and a run needed to beat the champions. Collins and Barry intended to try the double play if it was possible and to throw home if it was not. McInnis and Baker were



Connie Mack.

drawn close with intent to throw to the plate. The ball was hit to McInnis on the second short bound, or rather to his right, and as he was coming forward and scooped the ball perfectly, he had an easy play to the plate. Instead of throwing there he flashed the ball like a shot to Barry at second base, whirled, raced for first and caught Barry's return throw on top of the bag, completing the double play. It was a wonderful play both in thought and execution, but I do not advise any other first baseman to attempt it.

In the PUBLIC EYE

MAJ. M'CLAUGHRY'S HUMANE METHODS



Maj. R. W. McLaughry, who has been warden of the federal prison at Leavenworth for fourteen years, resigned his position a few days ago. He is seventy-four years old.

Discussing his treatment of prisoners, the major said: "The question of proper imprisonment resolves itself simply to this: Is it better to beat a man through his prison term and turn him out a criminal, or make him do good, honest work, and keep his mind off of mischief and endeavor to reform him? The philosophy of that theory acting on the convict himself is helpful. It's up to him if he doesn't get along all right."

"I have sought always to eliminate aristocracy inside the bars. I have long contended that one man should not have more than another, simply because his friends are better fixed, financially, than the poor prisoner. If one man was to have turkey Christmas day every man should have turkey. They have the same passions, likes and hatreds inside the walls they had outside. Some people seem not to realize that. Always when a prisoner was brought before me, I thought of his family and the probable future of the man himself, when his term was up.

"If a man was morose I put him in a cell with a cheerful fellow. If he was inclined to be suicidal, I put him in a cell with one whose talk was full of hope. I have installed Saturday afternoon baseball games. The men look forward to them like kids and behave themselves. For if they do not, their baseball tickets are taken away from them."

NEW COLLECTOR OF NEW YORK'S PORT

John Purroy Mitchel, independent Democrat and president of the board of aldermen of New York, has been appointed collector of the port at that city to succeed William Loeb, Jr. The selection brought what the White House termed "a happy solution" to a contest in which state leaders of every wing of the New York Democracy had taken a lively part.

Mr. Mitchel was acting mayor after the shooting of Mayor Gaynor by J. J. Gallagher Aug. 9, 1910, until Mr. Gaynor was able to resume his official duties.

Candidates for the post, which pays \$12,000 a year and carries with it the appointment of an army of employees in the country's biggest custom house, were numerous from the start.

For a time political circles expected a break between the administration and Senator O'Gorman. Recently, however, friends of Mr. Mitchel, whose candidacy had been dropped at his own wish some time ago, renewed their efforts in his behalf and when the president went to the Capitol to talk with Senator O'Gorman about it, the New York senator himself suggested Mr. Mitchel as the best man for the position.

Mitchel was born thirty-four years ago in Fordham, N. Y.

After graduating from Columbia university and the New York Law school, he entered the office of William B. Ellison, a lifelong friend and the counsel of Mitchel's uncle, Henry D. Purroy.



CALHOUN PREDICTS PEACE FOR CHINA



William J. Calhoun, the retiring American minister to China, arrived in Washington the other day. Mr. Calhoun, accompanied by his wife, left Peking on Feb. 27, and so is somewhat out of touch with current events in China.

"China is at her crucial point just now," said Mr. Calhoun. "I have not been informed as to what has transpired recently, but up to date the powers of the central government seem limited. I mean to say that the powers of the new government are not clearly defined yet, and until they are the functions of the government necessarily will be limited.

"There is a division of opinion among those in politics in China as to just what the powers of the government should be. Some are in favor of the form of government that obtains in this country, while others like that of France, where practically the president has no power and the

house of deputies rules. All these dissensions grow out of a fear of a too centralized power.

"I don't look for any bloody war in China. The politicians will fuss about, but it will all come out peacefully. Neither do I see any war clouds between Japan and China."

FILIPINOS' RESIDENT COMMISSIONER

When in November last the selection of a successor to Benito Legarde, the resident commissioner from the Philippines at Washington, became necessary, the Filipinos promptly chose Manuel Earnshaw of Manila.

This election was held according to law, by the Philippine commission, acting jointly with the Philippine assembly, the general legislative body of the Philippines.

It was a matter of first importance to the Filipinos, this election. The Jones bill, which looked to the independence of the islands at the end of eight years, though dying with congress on March 4 last, is standing, resurrected, at the door of the coming extra session, eager to take its chances with a congress beyond doubt far more favorable to it than the congress that has just passed. The immediate future is pregnant with something for the Philippines.

The position of resident commissioner, to which Mr. Earnshaw was elected last November, is one of great delicacy. He is accredited medium of intercourse between the Filipino people and the American people. His true functions are more nearly those of a minister from a foreign country than of a representative participating in a common government.

