

were superseded by new ideas and had to be thrown into the scrap heap.

"They said to us, this is a moving picture, it is something that nobody can paint and give you an idea of. It is not a static thing.

#### A PITIFUL HANDFUL.

"Therefore it became necessary for us to have eyes there in instant and immediate communication with us, and we sent over to France Gen. Pershing, and we sent with him not merely a division of troops — to that I shall refer in a moment—but we sent with him perhaps I can say safely the major part of the trained, expert personnel of the army. You know the size of the official corps of the regular army in this country when the war broke out. It was a pitiful handful of trained men, and yet it was necessary to divide them up and send over to France officers of the highest quality so that they would be at the front and see in the workshops and in the factories and in the war offices and in the armies, where consultations would take place immediately back of the front, so that they could see the thing with their own eyes and send us back the details by cable every day of the changing character of this war.

"Gen. Pershing's staff of experts and officers over there runs into the thousands, and they are busy every minute; and every day that the sun rises I get cablegrams from Gen. Pershing, from ten to sixteen and twenty pages long, filled with measurements and formulas and changes of a millimeter in size; great, long specifications of changes in details of things which were agreed upon last week and changed this week, and need to be changed again next week. So that what we are doing at this end is attempting by using the eyes of the army there to keep up to what they want us to do.

"Already you will find in your further examination into some of the bureau work of the department, some of the divisions, when they come down, you will find that schedules which were agreed upon, weapons which were selected and which we had started to manufacture, have been so far discarded that people have forgotten the names of them, almost, and new things substituted in their place, and those forgotten and new things in their places.

"So that if one gets the idea that this is the sort of war we used to have, or if he gets the idea that this is a static thing, it is an entirely erroneous idea. And when you remember that we had to divide this little handful of officers that we had and send so large a part of them to France, and then think of those who remained at home, you will realize, I am sure, that those who remained here had the double duty, insufficient for either aspect of it in numbers—and they still have this double duty—they had to go forward with manufactures, work out industry and industrial relations, they had to see about supplies of raw materials and manufacture finished products, and make from day to day alterations and changes that had to be made, and they had to be ingenious with suggestions, to see whether they could devise on this side something which had not been thought of ever there.

"They had to be hospitable to suggestions which came from the other side, they had to confer with the foreign officers who were here and were constantly being changed, so that men fresh from the front could be here to advise with us, and in addition to that every one of them had to be a university professor, go out into the life of the community, and selecting men who had mechanical experience and knowledge and training, but not military mechanical experience and knowledge and training, and adding to his original equipment the scientific training, that finishing touch which made him available for use as a military scientist.

#### HOW DEPARTMENT GREW.

"As a consequence this little group which stayed here have built the great special departments of the army. The ordnance department, starting, I think, with ninety-three or ninety-six officers, has now, as I recall the figures, something like 3,000 officers. They have had to be trained, they have had to be specialized, and that has had to go on contemporaneously with this tremendous response to the changing conditions on the other side.

"In the mean time, when we started into this war I think it was commonly thought throughout the country that our contribution at the outset might well be financial and industrial. The industries of this country were largely devoted at that time — the appropriate industries and

many converted industries were largely devoted to manufacture of war materials for our allies.

"As I suggested this morning, when we went into that market we found it largely occupied, so that our problem was not going to a shoe factory and saying make shoes for us. But it was going to a factory which never made shoes, because all the shoe factories were busy making shoes for people from whom we could not take them, and saying: 'Learn how to make shoes in order that you may make them for us.'

#### COULD NOT DISTURB MANUFACTURE FOR THE ALLIES IN THIS COUNTRY

"Now, of course, that is not true of shoes, but it is true of machine guns, it is true of other arms, it is true of ammunition, it is true of forging capacity, which was the greatest defect in the country, and all of this time we had not merely not to disturb the programme of Allies manufacture in this country, but we had not to cut off the supplies of raw material to our allies, and we had not to disturb the industry of this country to such an extent that products upon which they depended for the success of their military operations would be interfered with, both agricultural and commercial and industrial products.

"At the outset the idea was that we would be a financial and industrial assistance to our allies during the year 1918, and I think I probably can read from the Metropolitan Magazine for August a suggestion which will show what the current expectation of the country was. The editor of the Metropolitan Magazine was protesting against what he believed to be the intention of the government at that time."

Here Senator Weeks interrupted to ask if that was the magazine of which Theodore Roosevelt is associate editor. Secretary Baker replied that Mr. Roosevelt was a contributing editor, and continued:

"This magazine came out in August, 1917, and this editorial says:

"Since it is our war, we want to put everything into it so as to finish it in the shortest possible time, so that the world may be restored. To our mind the whole plan of the war department has been flavored with a desire to hold off until the Allies finish the war for us."

"You see the editor was dealing with what he supposed to be the intention of the war department at that time, that we were holding off so far as actual military operations were concerned, and letting the Allies do the fighting.

"What he says we should have done, and I ask your particular attention to it, is this:

"We should have strained every energy to have got from 50,000 to 100,000 men to France this year."

#### PROGRAMME EXCEEDED

"That is, the year 1917. I tell no secret, but it is perfectly well known to everybody in this group that we have far exceeded what in August, 1917, was regarded as a programme so ideal that the editor of this magazine refers to it as a thing which we ought to have strained every nerve in a vain but hopeless effort to accomplish."

In response to a question by Chairman Chamberlain the secretary said the United States did not have more than the minimum number of men in France in August, 1917.

He continued:

"And then the editor goes on: 'And by next year, 1918, we could have 500,000 men to send over, or any part of 500,000 men which we could ship.'

"Now instead of having 50,000 or 100,000 men in France in 1917, we have many more men than that in France, and instead of having a half a million men whom we could ship to France if we could find any way to do it in 1918, we will have more than one-half million men in France early in 1918, and we have available, if the transportation facilities are available to us, and the prospect is not unpromising, one and one-half million who in 1918 can be shipped to France."

Senator Weeks asked whether the secretary knew who wrote the editorial, and Mr. Baker said he thought it was attributed to Mr. Wiggin, the editor-in-chief.

"Why," asked Chairman Chamberlain, "have you not felt it proper to let the public into your confidence with reference to these things that you are telling now?"

"Senator, I confess I have hesitated and I

still hesitate," replied the secretary. "I have here a statement from Field Marshal von Hindenburg, in which he is quoted as saying in a German newspaper, in contemptuous fashion of us, that we have advertised our preparations for this war in an unworthy manner."

"Do you think, for a moment, Secretary Baker," said the chairman, "that there has been any time within the last year that the German secret service has not been fully advised as to everything we have done?"

"Yes, senator, I know. If I may rely upon confidential information which we get from confidential sources, the German government is still mystified as to the number of men we have in France, or have had there at any time."

The chairman said he doubted this. After some discussion as to the policy of governments in announcing military secrets, Mr. Baker said it was not the policy of the American or other governments to do so and added:

"I am saying this now, because you have asked me why I have held back these facts until now. I am saying to you that you could not get from Great Britain at this minute, I do not know whether I could get from Great Britain at this minute, the number of soldiers Great Britain has in France or at home. I could get an approximation, I could get whatever information might be deemed helpful to the immediate military object to be accomplished, but I could not get from Great Britain or France either one, the actual number of troops they have at the front.

"It may be that that precaution is unnecessary, and yet that is the precaution which military men have observed, and I have no further point to make in the matter of the number of troops there than to show, as I was showing when I read that extract, that our original intention was to make our military effort in 1918, and in August of 1917 a zealous advocate of immediate military activity laid down the maximum obtainable programme a thing which has since been multifold exceeded.

#### WHY TROOPS WERE SENT.

"Why did we decide to send some troops to France in 1917? It is no secret. When Marshal Joffre came to this country from France, when the British mission came from France, they told us of a situation which we had not up to that time fully appreciated. There had been in France recently conducted before that an unsuccessful major offensive. The French people had suffered, suffered in a way that not only our language is not adapted to describe, but our imagination can not conceive. The war is in their country. This wolf has not only been at their doors, but he has been gnawing for two years and a half at their vitals, and when this unsuccessful offensive in France had gone on there was a spirit not of surrender, but of fate, about the French people, about the mighty military engine which they had seen prepared to overcome them for forty years was at them, and their attitude was that no matter whether every Frenchman died in his tracks, as they were willing to do, or not, that it was an irresistible thing, and so they said to us, 'Frankly, it will cheer us; it will cheer our people if you send over some of your troops.'

"We did send some troops.

#### LIKE BRITISH, OUR REGULAR ARMY WOULD HAVE BEEN DESTROYED

"At that place we had a choice. We could have sent over, as did Great Britain, our regular army, and in a very short preparation have put it into action and suffered exactly what Great Britain suffered with her 'contemptible little army,' as it was called by their adversaries. Our army would have given as good an account of itself as the British army did, but it would have been destroyed, like the British army, and there would have been no nucleus on which to build this new army that was to come over a little later, and it was deemed wiser to send over a regular division, but not to send over our whole regular army at that time.

"Then what happened was that that regular division went over and the people of France kissed the hems of their garments as they marched up the streets of Paris; the old veterans, wounded in this war, legless or armless, stumping along on crutches, perhaps, as they went up the streets of Paris with their arms around the neck of American soldiers. Not a single man in that division was unaccompanied by a veteran. America had gone to France, and