

Cost of Equipment, Field Army Troops

	Q'master	Ordnance	Engineer	Signal	Medical	Total
Headquarters			\$3,263.00			\$3,263.00
1 regiment Infantry	\$149,354.66	\$71,705.44	271.00	\$2,073.69	\$536.35	223,941.74
1 regiment Cavalry	366,213.92	174,011.58	790.60	2,111.84	536.35	543,664.29
1 battalion 6-inch howitzers						
1 battalion 4.7-inch howitzers	402,839.91	1,804,275.28	120.00	3,821.77	1,509.95	2,212,566.80
1 battalion 4.7-inch guns						
1 regiment mountain artillery	258,523.22	474,821.19	120.00	3,821.77	536.35	737,822.53

board, which was composed of selected army officers, for the purpose of determining the amount of reserve of artillery and artillery ammunition necessary for an army of 1,000,000 men; reported that such an army would require reserves to the value of \$480,000,000 in artillery and artillery ammunition. The appropriations now being made for reserves of artillery and ammunition for our present army are based upon the report of this board.

Accepting these figures as our basis, an army of 3,000,000 men would require a reserve three times as large as that recommended by the Treat board. This would mean an investment of \$1,440,000,000 in artillery and artillery ammunition. The wastage in field equipment and arms is enormous in actual war. A reserve of at least 25 per cent must always be maintained of field equipment and small arms and ammunition, and this for an army of 3,000,000 men calls for at least a billion more of reserve supplies. So we have for arms, equipment, ammunition, and reserves for an army of 3,000,000 men, ready for action in 90 days, as the general staff has declared we must have, a total of \$5,016,000,000. This estimate does not include pay or the cost of subsistence, transportation, maneuvers, quarters, or the hundred other expenses that make up an army appropriation bill.

Mr. Fess. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Shallenberger. Yes.

Mr. Fess. Those figures are staggering to me.

Mr. Shallenberger. Yes; and I will give the gentleman others that will stagger him more.

Mr. Fess. We could probably raise the money, but how are we going to raise the men?

Mr. Shallenberger. That is a proposition that we will have to consider later.

Mr. Borland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Shallenberger. For a question. I have only five minutes.

Mr. Borland. If equipping an army becomes imperative, had we not better direct our attention to getting good results for our money?

Mr. Shallenberger. Yes.

The war department recommends a period of eight years for securing the reserves contemplated by the Treat board. Distributing the appropriations to provide equipment, armament, and reserves for the army, contemplated by the general staff plan, over a period of 10 years would necessitate appropriating \$500,000,000 a year. Add to that amount the cost of the regular establishment, which Gen. Scott states must be maintained, and the cost sums up \$850,000,000 a year. Add to that the cost of pay, transportation, subsistence and all other necessary expenses for the army of 500,000 citizens to be always maintained in the field by compulsory service, as the general staff plan contemplates, and the cost will easily amount to a billion dollars a year for the army alone.

We may be sure that the arms,

armament, and equipment required will have to be renewed every 10 years, because it is in present practice renewed oftener than this. If these figures seem somewhat excessive as an estimate of our probable military expenditures for the future, just compare for a moment the advance in those expenditures as appropriated for by this congress with those voted by the last. We must remember that we have only started upon the road to complete military preparedness, as advocated by those who are shaping the destinies of this nation today. Resist as much as some of you may, the expenditures for the army and navy will continue to grow greater and greater as the years advance, unless the whole world changes its policy and ideas upon the subject of war.

For the year 1916 you appropriated \$300,000 for aviation and \$150,000 for machine guns. This congress will appropriate almost one-half as much for these two items alone as was the entire cost of the army for the fiscal year 1916. I have taken the time of the house to read these estimates and comparisons as to the probable expenditures in the future for military preparedness, to give some foundation for the idea that I desire to advance.

The vast sums of money voted for national defense are appropriated under our present system with a lack of accurate knowledge upon the part of both congress and of committees that is monumental in its magnitude and is bound to result in a wastefulness of public money that would appall our constituents if they really understood it. We are spending billions of public funds upon the request, either in person or by letter, of department clerks and bureau chiefs who are interested mainly in the matter of securing the greatest possible expenditure of money by their departments. Possibilities of pay and promotion are always potential factors in determining the size of appropriations asked for by every department of this government.

I believe that every member of the military affairs committee of this house feels that we have to pass upon hundreds of millions of expenditures for the military establishment of this government about which we have not sufficient knowledge to act intelligently. We have the same machinery to determine and decide the government's expenditures for the army and navy that we had a few years ago when we voted about one-fourth the amount of public money for national defense that we are spending at present. Committees are fighting for jurisdiction as to appropriations for thirty or forty millions of dollars for aeroplanes and anti-aircraft armament about which none of them has any accurate knowledge either as to efficiency, cost, or need. The same thing is true as to artillery, ammunition, machine guns, and all military materiel.

Here are some examples of results under our present system taken from the records of hearings had be-

fore the military committee of the house.

The service rifle which the soldier carries with him into battle is the most important weapon with which an army fights. No other single arm compares with it in effectiveness in battle.

The chief of ordnance states that an army of a million men would require 1,250,000 rifles to properly arm it. An army of 3,000,000 men would therefore require more than 3,500,000 rifles. We have at present 700,000 service rifles—about half enough to equip an army of 1,000,000 men.

No manufacturer in the United States is equipped to manufacture a single rifle such as our army uses, nor could they produce them in quantities in less than a year's time. Therefore the only source of supply we have is the government arsenals. They have a capacity of at least 600,000 rifles a year.

Notwithstanding the fact that the war in Europe has been going on for more than two and a half years, "sparks have been flying," and we have been constantly on the "verge of war," in three years we have added less than 25,000 rifles a year to our supply.

The actual figures showing the number of rifles manufactured are: In 1914 we made 26,545 rifles; in 1915, 25,972; and in 1916, with the war in Europe still coming closer to us, we manufactured and secured 13,628 rifles; or in three years we have added 66,000 rifles to our reserves.

One of the wonders of this war has been the development of large caliber field howitzers and mortars that are used in countless thousands on the battle lines of Europe, and without which modern infantry entrenched in ditches and armed with machine guns and military repeating rifles, could not be dislodged but could hold their positions indefinitely.

If our troops were required to dislodge an entrenched enemy with the field artillery we now have, they would find it an impossibility except at the end of frightful slaughter. The heaviest caliber field artillery we have is a 6-inch howitzer, throwing a shell weighing 120 pounds, and never designed to be used against modern intrenchments, and we have not enough high-explosive shells of that caliber to keep the guns we have in action for a week. If large-caliber mobile guns, throwing high-explosive shells at high angles, are essential for driving men out of modern intrenchments, and every military authority says they are, then we have not made much progress in three years in this direction, with the example of the war in Europe constantly before us. We have not manufactured a single gun of heavier caliber than 6-inch.

The third astonishing development of this war has been in the increased use of the automatic machine rifle. The record shows we had last year ten hundred and seventy-seven machine guns of various varieties. The bill for 1916 carried an appropriation of \$150,000 for machine guns,

but none were purchased or manufactured. Last year congress voted \$12,000,000 for machine guns. This would have purchased 16,000 machine guns of the Lewis or Colt type, which are being used in thousands in actual battle by the English, French, Belgian, and Russian armies, and now being manufactured in the United States by thousands every month.

The machine-gun board recommends the purchase of 17,283 guns in three years. We gave them enough to buy 16,000 gas-operated machine guns last year, and they actually purchased 353. Over nine millions of last year's appropriation has been contracted for to be used in payment for 4,000 heavy machine guns, requiring four water tanks with each gun, from a company which has never yet manufactured a single gun of the kind we have contracted for, nor does anyone know when they will be able to deliver them. It is bound to be in the future at the best, and no one is certain that a gun such as the army will accept will be gotten under this contract.

The above is our record for the past three years, as I have been able to obtain it, as to our achievements thus far in preparing for the possibility of war in the matter of securing rifles, heavy field artillery, and machine guns, the three most essential arms with which to equip men for battle.

Mr. Kelley. Can the gentleman tell me how long it took the Remington Arms Co. to make the English rifle after they got the order?

Mr. Shallenberger. The information given the committee was that it took about 18 months. We talk about getting an army trained. We will have to have 3,000,000 men if we go into that European war, if we do anything worth while. A colonel from Kentucky or New York or some other place the other evening—Col. Harvey, I believe—made a speech in this city, and in it he said that he wanted to send our regular army of 100,000 men to that European battle line, and told of how those people would cheer when they saw that 100,000 men coming to battle, and how their hearts would leap, and all that sort of thing; but, Mr. Chairman, England has sent 5,000,000 men to that battle line, France has sent 7,000,000 men to the battle line, and Russia has sent 10,000,000 men, and they have not been able yet to make a dent in the German line, if that is the line you are going to fight. We will have to put millions of men into the European war if we are going to turn the tide of victory. We will have to train them before they go to that battle line, but we will have plenty of time to train them.

Mr. Sherley. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Shallenberger. I can not yield. If we finally get these guns, we will have plenty of time to have the boys trained, but we will have to train them with something else than rifles.

Mr. Sherley. If the gentleman will permit me, I think it is only fair to the record to show the truth. The gentleman is talking about the number of rifles. It is true we have not been manufacturing many. Why? because we have many more rifles than we have men or any immediate prospect of getting men, and there was need of other kinds of munitions.

Mr. Shallenberger. The record shows that we have contracted for