

enues of the federal government — when you remember how many men it takes to conduct this federal government, you can see that you are either going to build up an enormous bureau with a multitude of officials or else you are going to attempt to do this enormous work with a few men, who can not possibly attend to it.

The first suggestion is, therefore, that in the very nature of things there can not be an efficient regulation from this central source without the creation of machinery that is far beyond the calculation, so far as I have seen it stated, of those who have considered it from that side.

The second objection is a fundamental one, namely, that the further you remove the work of regulation from the people the more difficult it is for the people to control their representatives. If there is any virtue in representative government, it must be admitted that the representation is best when the representatives are nearest home and most completely submissive to the will of the people. The tendency that we have observed throughout this country is already sufficient to have impressed itself upon several states which have put back into the hands of the people a power with which they had parted — that is, reclaiming the government through the process of the initiative and referendum. In that we see evidence of a confidence in the people and a distrust of the people's representatives.

ONE DIVISION BETWEEN MEN

Now, this distrust rests upon several foundations; that is, there are several things that contribute to this distrust. In the first place, there is the natural bias of the man. Every man has a natural bias. If the word "natural" is objected to, I possibly ought to say that it is a bias that is CONTROLLING whether it comes in youth or comes after maturity. It is a bias on one side or the other of the great line that runs through society. There is just one division, as I understand it, between men, and that is the line that separates the man who is at heart a democrat from the man who is at heart an aristocrat, and I need not tell you gentlemen that I am not using the word "democrat" in a partisan sense. The word is 2,000 years older than the democratic party. It is a word which describes an attitude of the human heart, and that attitude which it describes is just the opposite of the attitude described by the word aristocrat. They do not differ in honesty, the democrats and aristocrats. They differ in bias, in point of view. The democrat believes in a society built from the bottom. The aristocrat believes in a society suspended from the top, and because of this difference of opinion the democrat believes that legislation ought to come up from the people; the aristocrat believes it ought to come down from the few.

To illustrate it, the man who is at heart a democrat believes that legislation should be for the masses. His philosophy is that if you make the masses prosperous that prosperity will find its way up through all the classes that rest upon the masses. The aristocrat, because of his point of view, namely, that society is suspended from the top, says, and he says it honestly, for he believes it, legislate for the well-to-do, and then be patient and wait until their prosperity leaks to those below.

Now, when you are choosing a representative everything depends upon the point of view. He may be just as honest a man as you could find, but if he really believes that the well-to-do must take care of the rest of the people his decisions are going to be entirely different from the decisions of the man who takes the other point of view, and believes that society is built from the bottom and that good comes up from the masses.

Now, it is not always easy to know a man's fundamental bias until you test him, and the further he is from you the more difficult it is for you to follow him and judge whether he represents you or somebody else. A democrat — taking the word in its fundamental sense — believes that the representative ought to ACT for the people. The aristocrat believes he ought to THINK for the people. If you take all this railway business to Washington you have to depend for all your regulation upon the men who are elected to congress and to the senate, who come a long distance from home and who are so remote from their constituency that the constituency is not able to watch them, and to

measure their fidelity in the matter of representation, so that when you surrender this power that the states now have and put it all here in Washington you make it more difficult for the people to watch the men who are their exponents and their spokesmen.

The second is that the temptations are much greater if you put the power here than if you kept it at home, because if an act of congress is to affect these railroad systems to the extent of \$50,000,000 a year or \$100,000,000 a year, the railroads find it to their interest to bring pressure to bear on the members of congress and the senators who are to act. I hope you will not think I am reflecting on the railroads when I say they may yield to temptation to exert an influence. I have known them to do so. You may remember that a few years ago some money was appropriated for the building of the Washington depot. Some of you may be able to tell me how much it was. Was it not two or three millions?

Mr. Esch. I think the District appropriated about three millions and the government about an equal amount.

Mr. Bryan. Congress appropriated something —

Mr. Cullop. The same as the District — one-half.

Mr. Bryan. At that time two of the leading railroads that enter into this place had their lobbyists in the corridor of the capitol issuing passes to the members, and I know of two cases where the railroad lobbyists refused passes to men who had voted against the railroads' interest. One was a lobbyist of one of the roads and one was the lobbyist of the other. If they will send their lobbyists to the capitol with their pass books — of course they can not do it now, because the pass business has been prohibited; that is, the issuing of passes has been stopped — if they will send their lobbyists to the corridors of the capitol with their check books to purchase, by passes, the votes of men on so small an appropriation as \$3,000,000, what will be the temptation when a brief statute may mean \$50,000,000 or \$100,000,000?

I was in congress for a couple of years, and I know what difficulty we had whenever any question affecting the railroads came up. You will recall that it took 10 or 15 years to secure a change in the law relating to the interstate commerce commission, enlarging its powers. It took 10 or 15 years to secure it, after the commission had asked, year after year that this power be granted. What was it that prevented it? It was the influence of the railroads in your national capital. Your railroads were powerful enough to thwart the will of the people on that subject and to influence the senators and members of congress. I remember that the president of one of the railroads was elected to congress, and he came, after he was elected, under the privileges of our rules, and, sitting on the floor of congress, he directed the fight against the measure that the railroads were opposing.

Now, I only mention these as some of the things you have to consider. When you take from the states the power that they have and put it all here you make every congressional contest a fight with the railroads of this whole country, for, remember, that the railroads of the whole country will be interested in the election of every congressman in every district. They will be interested in the election of every senator from every state, because one vote may decide a question that may mean \$10,000,000 or even \$100,000,000 to them.

CORRUPTING FORCE IN NATION'S POLITICS

So, it seems to me the direct result of this will be to bring into national politics a corrupting force greater than we have ever known before, and that every congressman will be subjected to pressure after he gets here, and that we will find these railroads picking out the men who are to run and furnishing them the means with which to secure nominations, and with the means with which to secure elections — not necessarily doing things which violate the statutes. They may not furnish money, because under our present law that would have to be accounted for and corporations can not contribute to campaign funds; they can not furnish passes, because that has been prohibited; but remember that the railroads run into all the towns of any importance, and have their agents there; they have their attorneys; they have

their station agents and their adjusters, and they have the men whom they call upon to testify, if damage is done; if there is an injury, there are certain physicians who testify as to the extent of the injury. They have their entire working force, and when you put the entire working force of all the railroads behind a candidate for nomination and, after he is nominated, behind the candidate for election, you bring into politics a tremendous special interest that can not but have its influence upon the politics of the country. And when you send to Washington a man who comes as the representative of any special interest, he is open to the solicitations of every other special interest, for the special interests have to stand together, and any man who comes with a commission — a secret commission — from any special interest is here to trade his vote on any subject with the representative of any other special interest that needs his help.

Now, that, to my mind, is a consideration that can not be overlooked by those who are dealing with this subject in a large way.

The third point is that the absorption of legislative power by the federal government and the surrender of all legislative power by the state governments will practically obliterate the lines of the states and weaken them in the discharge of their duties, while it will tremendously increase the centralizing forces that are at work in our government. I believe that no one has better stated the merits of the dual form of government than Webster when he spoke of an indissoluble union of indestructible states.

PRESERVATION OF LOCAL UNIT NECESSARY

Now, it is just as necessary that the states should be indestructible as it is that the Union shall be indissoluble, for our government rests for its success upon the plan that enables the units to take care of the things that relate to them, leaving to the federal government the control of the things that relate to all the states. It is just as necessary, to my mind, that the local unit shall be preserved and shall be safeguarded as it is that we shall act as a unit on all matters that affect the nation. And that is necessary for exactly the same reasons that I have mentioned before. The people at home can better attend to the things at home, and if this federal government attempted to take care of all matters it would so enormously increase the work to be done at Washington that it would be absolutely impossible to do it with any scrutiny.

What do you find here? I have not seen the statement for two or three years, but I remember when we had 10,000 bills introduced in one congress.

Mr. Adamson. It has got to 30,000 now.

Mr. Bryan. Well, gentlemen, you see my service is of a very ancient kind, and there has been a great growth since. Thirty thousand bills. What congressman or senator attempts to consider, to examine, or to understand any large percentage of the 30,000 bills that are introduced? Of course you say that the committees sift these out.

Mr. Adamson. If you will permit me to answer that question, I will tell you that some congressmen are so wise that they pretend to study all of them and pretend on the floor of the house to know more about them than the committees that unanimously reported them.

Mr. Bryan. I notice you say "pretend."

Mr. Adamson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bryan. That would express an opinion. According to your judgment it is mere pretense?

Mr. Adamson. I think generally so. There is not one case in ten thousand that a man knows more about them than the committee.

Mr. Bryan. I think you are right.

Mr. Sims. In the recent congress there were over 40,000 bills and joint resolutions introduced in both houses.

Mr. Bryan. So you see how conservative I am, gentlemen, in my statement.

When it comes to the committees you have a number of committees, and when you divide 40,000 bills and resolutions among the committees of the senate and house you can see what a number of them go to one committee. How many committees have you in the senate or house?

Mr. Esch. About 53 in the house.

Mr. Bryan. That would mean an average of