

other were visiting each other; they were being hospitably received and royally entertained. When one of them had a birthday, the others all joined in wishing him many happy returns of the day. It would be a libel upon the rulers now at war to say that they knew that a cause existed adequate to produce such a war. For had they known of the existence of such a cause, it would have been their duty to their subjects to lay aside social festivities and the exchange of compliments that they might join together and remove the cause of war. But without a race cause, a religious cause, a family cause, or any cause visible to the public, this war began, and such a war as history has never known! There must be a cause and it must be a human cause, for no one who loves God would ever blame Him for this inhuman war. It behooves us to find the cause, that, knowing the cause, we may, by avoiding it, avoid the consequences.

I have tried to find the cause of this war, and, if my analysis of the situation is correct, the cause is to be found in a false philosophy—in the doctrine that "might makes right." This doctrine was formerly proclaimed quite publicly; now it is no longer openly proclaimed, but it is sometimes practiced when the temptation is sufficient. Before you become excited—while you can yet reason, I appeal to you to set the seal of your condemnation against this brutal, barbarous doctrine that "might makes right." And that you may see more clearly the importance of reaching a conclusion and proclaiming it, I call your attention to the fact that there is but one code of morals known among men and that is the code that regulates individual life. If this code of morals is not to be applied to nations, then there is no moral code which can be invoked for the regulation of international affairs.

If I were an artist, I would carry with me a canvas and reproduce upon it one of McCutcheon's recent cartoons. He represents war and anarchy by two brutal looking human figures. Across the breast of war he has written "might is right," and across the breast of anarchy the words "dynamite is right." I challenge you to draw a line between the two doctrines. The nation that takes the position that it is at liberty to seize whatever it has the power to seize, and to hold whatever it has the strength to hold; the nation that plants itself upon the doctrine that might makes right, has no system of logic with which to address itself to a citizen or subject who, as against his neighbor or as against his government, invokes the kindred doctrine that dynamite is right.

If you will take your Bibles and turn back to the story of Naboth's vineyard, you will find that Ahab violated three commandments in order to secure a little piece of land. The commandments read, "Thou shalt not covet;" "Thou shalt not steal;" and "Thou shalt not kill," and these commandments are not only without limitation, but they are not subject to limitation.

Take for instance the commandment against covetousness. After specifying certain things that must not be coveted, the commandment concludes with the clause "or anything that is thy neighbor's." If this has any meaning, it covers everything. There is no process of reasoning by which we can retain that commandment and make it binding upon the conscience of the individual if we hold sinless the nation that covets the territory of another nation. And yet the coveting of territory has been the fruitful cause of war.

And so with the commandment against stealing. It does not read "thou shalt not steal on a small scale;" it simply says "thou shalt not steal." And yet I am not telling you anything new when I tell you that as a rule—not always, but as a rule—it is safer even in this country for a man to steal a large sum than a small sum. If he steals a small sum he is just a common, vulgar thief and nobody has any respect for him; if he has any friends they are careful not to allow the fact to be known. If, however, he steals a large sum, he has two advantages over the petty thief. In the first place, if he steals enough, he can employ the ablest lawyers, and his lawyers can usually—not always, but usually—keep him out on bail until he dies a natural death while they discuss technicalities in all the courts of the land. And he has a second advantage; if he steals a large sum, he can always find enough people to furnish him social companionship who will be so amazed at his genius that they will never mention his rascality in his presence. If we find it so difficult to visit the same indignation upon grand larceny that we do upon petty larceny we must not be surprised if,

when one nation steals a large amount from another nation, there are some who regard it as an act of patriotism.

And the commandment against killing does not read that you must not kill unless a large number join with you. On the contrary, the Bible plainly declares that "though hand join in hand, they shall not be unpunished." And it does not say that if you do kill, you should be gentle about it and use the most approved methods. On the contrary, there is no intimation anywhere that the moral character of the act can be changed by the method employed in putting an end to a human life. It is just a plain, blunt "thou shalt not kill," and yet as we read history we are compelled to admit that it has been easier for governments to hang one man for killing one man than to punish killing by wholesale. And many poets have felt impelled to express themselves much in the language employed by the author of Gray's Elegy who speaks of those who "wade through slaughter to a throne, and shut the gates of mercy on mankind."

I have called attention to these commandments for the purpose of emphasizing the fact that if we adopt the doctrine that "might makes right" we must prepare to repudiate all of the moral code upon which we rely for the protection of individual life and the guarantee of private property.

The nations that adopt the doctrine that "might makes right" are quite sure to act upon the maxim "like cures like," the foundation upon which the law of retaliation is built. The logic of the law of retaliation is like this: If your enemy is cruel, cure him of his cruelty by being more cruel than he; if your enemy is inhuman, instead of attempting to lift him out of his inhumanity by the power of a good example, be more inhuman than he. Nations that enter a war on the theory that "might makes right" are soon in a neck and neck race for the bottomless pit, each nation justifying its own cruelty and inhumanity by the cruelty and inhumanity of its enemy.

I have purposely applied this false philosophy to those far away before applying it at home because I have learned by experience that it is easier to persuade people to endorse a proposition when applied to others than when applied to themselves. But if I may assume that you have followed me and that we are now in agreement, I am now prepared to apply this false philosophy to a matter with which we are compelled to deal whether we desire to do so or not. The issue is upon us and can not be avoided.

There was a time when some believed that war was a moral tonic—when some actually thought that unless people were kept up to fighting pitch they would degenerate. That seems absurd to us, for we know that, if war were necessary to man's moral development, it would not be left to accident or chance. If war were a necessary thing, we would plan for it as we plan for other things which we consider necessary. We know that food is necessary for the body and therefore we provide that the body shall receive food at stated intervals. The intervals being adjusted to the body's needs. And so, because we believe the mind in need of education we provide for terms of school. If we believed war to be necessary we would call in experts and ascertain just how long a man could go without killing some one and yet maintain a high standard of civilization, and then we would provide for wars at such regular intervals as, in our opinion, would insure man's progress, and the time between wars would be like the time between school terms—a time when we could rest and relax and get ready for another war. This we would do if we regarded war as necessary. But, however war may have been considered by some in the past, the world now believes war to be not only unnecessary and undesirable but a calamity.

If there are any who doubt this I am prepared to furnish recently secured testimony. When this war began the President offered mediation and the rulers of the nations then involved immediately answered and their answers were so much alike that one answer might have served for all. What did they say? Each ruler said in substance: "I am not guilty; I did not desire this war; I am not to blame for this war; some one else began it." They all with one accord denied responsibility. The world is to be congratulated that we have reached a time when no ruler in a civilized land dares to admit that he caused this war or even desired it—this is a long step in advance. It is not necessary, therefore, to waste any time in an effort to prove

that war is a curse. That may now be taken for granted, and we are at liberty to devote all of our energies to the prevention of war.

But just when it has become possible to unite in an effort to prevent war we find a radical difference of opinion as to how war can be prevented. A propaganda is being actively carried on which has for its object the establishment of the doctrine that the only way to preserve peace is to get ready for war. The exponents of this theory admit that war is a horrible thing and that it should be avoided, but they contend that the only way to prevent war is to organize, arm and drill, and then stand, rifle in hand and finger on hair-trigger—and preserve the peace. I never expected to hear this theory advanced after the present war began. At each session of congress, during the past fifteen or twenty years, we have heard some advocating this doctrine and insisting on more battleships and a larger army, but their interest could generally be traced to their business connections—they were anxious to furnish the preparedness themselves and therefore advocates of the theory. But when this war broke out I thought that at least one good would come of it, namely, that no one would hereafter stand before an intelligent audience and argue that preparedness would prevent war. If war could be prevented by preparedness, there would be no war in Europe today, for they have spent a generation getting ready for this war. They had the kindling all ready; all they needed was a match. When the war broke out those best prepared went in first and others followed as they could prepare, and I believe that, if we had been as well prepared as some now ask us to be, we would be in the war today shouting for blood as lustily as any of them.

This is so serious a matter and it is so vitally important that we should follow the course best calculated to prevent war that I beg you to listen while I present the reasons which lead me to believe that the preparedness for which they now propose would not only not prevent war, but would actually provoke war—that with the things that necessarily accompany it preparedness would inevitably lead us into the wars against which they ask us to prepare. In the first place we can not have a period of preparedness without submitting ourselves to the leadership of those who believe in the doctrine that peace rests upon fear; that we can only preserve the peace by making people afraid of us. This is the folly of the ages—the very theory that has led Europe into this present conflict. And more, if we are to be driven to preparedness by the scares that are now being worked up, we must follow the leadership, not of those who advocate moderate preparedness, but of those who insist upon extreme preparedness. If we must prepare a little because we are told that one nation may attack us, we must prepare more if another group of jingo warriors against an attack joined in by several nations, and we must go to the very limit if a third group pictures an attack in which the world will combine against us. There is no limit to the amount of preparation that we shall need if we are to provide against every imaginary danger and every possible contingency.

The real question which we have to decide is, What shall be our standard of honor? Shall it be the European standard—which is the duelist's standard—or shall it be a standard in keeping with our aspirations and achievements? The advocates of extreme preparedness are attempting to fasten upon this country the duelist's standard of honor and we know what that standard is because we had it in this country a hundred years ago. When that standard was supported by public sentiment men were compelled to fight duels even when they did not believe in the practice; they were branded as cowards if they declined. The case of Alexander Hamilton is an illustration in point. While I prefer the ideas of Jefferson to the ideas of Hamilton, I recognize, as all must, that Hamilton was one of the heroic figures of the revolutionary days. He fought a duel and fell, and the last thing he did before he left home for the fatal field was to prepare a statement which he left to posterity, saying that he did not believe in the practice, but that he felt it necessary to conform to the custom in order to be useful in crises which he thought he saw approaching. The duelist standard of honor was this: If a man had a wife and she needed him, he had no right to think of his wife; if he had children and they needed him, he had no right to think of his children; if his country needed him, he had no right to think of his country. The only thing he could think