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band of war or goods destined to or proceeding from ports within the belligerent territory affected.

"There is no doubt that our government will insist upon this position; that is an important thing, the exact date of the note is not material. My reason for desiring to have the matter presented to Great Britain at once, was not that Germany had any right to ask it, but because I was anxious to make it as easy as possible for Germany to accept the demands of the United States and cease to employ submarines against merchantmen. There is no reason why any German-Americans should doubt the president's intentions in this matter. I am sure that everyone will, on reflection, recognize that our duty to prevent loss of life is more urgent than our duty to prevent interference with trade—loss of trade can be compensated for with money, but no settlement that the United States and Germany may reach can call back to life those who went down with the Lusitania—and war would be the most expensive of all settlements because it would enormously add to the number of dead.

"Fourth: I hope that Germany will acquiesce in the demands that have been made, and I hope that she will acquiesce in them without conditions. She can trust the United States to deal justly with her in the consideration of any changes that she may propose in the international rules that govern the taking of prizes. The more generously she acts in this matter the greater will be the glory which she will derive from it. She has raised a question which is now receiving serious consideration, namely, whether the introduction of the submarine necessitates any change in the rules governing the capture of prizes. The position seemingly taken by Germany, namely, that she is entitled to drown non-combatants because they ride with contraband, is an untenable position; the most that she could insist upon is that, in view of the introduction of this new weapon of warfare, new rules should be adopted—separating passengers from objectionable cargo. If the use of the submarine justifies such a change in the law of blockade as will permit the cordon to be withdrawn far enough from the shore to avoid the danger of submarine attack, may it not be found possible to secure an international agreement by which passengers will be excluded from ships carrying contraband, or at least from those carrying ammunition? It would require but a slight change in the shipping laws to make this separation, and belligerent nations might be restrained from unnecessarily increasing the contraband list if they were compelled to carry contraband on transports as they now carry troops. Personally, I would like to see the use of submarines abandoned entirely, just as I would like to see an abandonment of the use of aeroplanes and Zeppelins for the carrying of explosives, but I am not sanguine enough to believe that any effective instrument of warfare will be abandoned as long as war continues. The very arguments which the advocates of peace advance against the submarine, the aeroplane and the Zeppelin are advanced in favor of them by those who conduct war. The more fatal a weapon is the more it is in demand, and it is not an unusual thing

to see a new instrument of destruction denounced as inhuman by those against whom it is employed, only to be employed later by those who, only a little while before, denounced it.

"The above suggestions are respectfully submitted to those of German birth or descent, and they are submitted in the same spirit to naturalized citizens from other countries. To the naturalized citizen this is the land of adoption, but in one sense it may be nearer to him than it is to us who are native born, for those who come here are citizens by voluntary choice, while we are here by accident of birth. They may be said to have paid a higher compliment to the United States than we who first saw the light under the stars and stripes. But, more than that, it is the land of their children and their children's children, no matter for what reason they crossed the ocean. They not only share with us the shaping of our nation's destiny, but their descendants have a part with ours in all the blessings which the present generation can, by wise and patriotic action, bequeath to the generations that are to follow.

"W. J. BRYAN

First and Second German Notes

Mr. Bryan issued the following statement June 13:

"My attention has been called to a number of newspaper editorials and articles which, in varying language, ask the question, 'Why did Mr. Bryan sign the first note to Germany and then refuse to sign the second?' The argument presented in the question is based upon the supposition that the two notes were substantially the same, and that the second note simply reiterates the demands contained in the first. Then they declare it inconsistent to sign one and refuse to sign the other. The difference between the two cases would seem obvious enough to make an answer unnecessary, but, lest silence on the subject be taken as an admission of inconsistency, the following explanation is given.

"The notes must be considered in connection with the conditions under which they were sent. The first note presented the case of this government upon such evidence as we then had. It was like the plaintiff's statement in a case, his claim being based upon the facts as he presents them. I did not agree entirely with the language of the first note, but the difference was not so material as to justify a refusal to sign it. Then, too, I was at that time hoping that certain things would be done which would make it easier for Germany to acquiesce in our demands. The three things which I had in mind which, in my judgment, would have helped the situation, were, first, an announcement of a willingness upon our part to employ the principle of investigation embodied in our thirty peace treaties; second, action which would prevent American citizens from traveling on belligerent ships or on American ships carrying contraband, especially if that contraband consisted of ammunition; and, third, further insistence upon our protest against interference of our trade with neutrals. I thought that these three things were within the range of possibilities, and that two or at least one was probable. Some weeks have elapsed since the first note was sent and we have not only failed to do any of these things hoped for, but Germany has in the meantime answered, and in her answer has not only presented a number of alleged facts which, in her judgment, justified the deviation which she has made from the ordinary rules applicable to prize cases, but she has suggested arbitration.

"A rejection of the arguments, which she presented and of the allegations made, together with a reiteration of the original demands creates a very different situation from that which existed when the first demand was made. As I have before stated, my fear has been that, owing to the feeling existing in Germany, the government might, upon receipt of such a note under such circumstances, break off diplomatic relations and thus create a situation out of which war might come without the intention of either side. I am sure the president does not want war and I am confident that our people do not want war; I have no reason to believe that either the German government or the German people desire war. But war, a calamity at any time, is especially to be avoided now because our nation is relied upon by both neutrals and belligerents as the one nation which can exert most influence toward bringing this war to an end. If we were,

by accident, to be drawn into the conflict, we would not only surrender the opportunity to act as a mediator, but we might become responsible for drawing other nations into this contest. When we see how one nation after another has been dragged into this war, we can not have confidence in the ability of anyone to calculate with certainty upon the results that might follow if we became embroiled in the war. No one will be happier than I if the president's plan results in a peaceful settlement, but no one was in a position to say what effect our note would have upon Germany, or what results would follow if she in anger broke off diplomatic relations, and I was not only unwilling to assume the responsibility for the risks incurred—risks which no one could with any degree of accuracy measure—but I felt that, having done all I could in the cabinet, it was my duty to undertake, outside the cabinet, the work upon which I have entered. I have no doubt that the country will unanimously support the president during the war, if so great a misfortune should overtake us, but I believe the chances of war will be lessened in proportion as the country expresses itself in favor of peace—not 'Peace at any price'—but peace in preference to a war waged for the redress of such grievances we have against Germany; at least against war until we have given Germany the opportunity which we are pledged to give to Great Britain, France and Russia—to have every difference of every character submitted to an international commission of investigation. I would contend as earnestly for the application of the treaty principle to the Allies as I contend for it in the case of Germany. If the principle is sound, it ought to be applied to every country with which we have a difference, and if it ought to be applied to all, I think it is better to suggest it in the beginning than to accept it later after a seeming reluctance to apply it.

"I understand that Secretary Lansing has already given out a statement correcting an inaccuracy which appeared in this morning's papers. I appreciate his kindness. It is true that I saw the final draft of the note just before my resignation took effect, but it contained an important change. I had no knowledge of this change at the time my resignation was tendered and accepted. This change, while very much softening the note, was not however sufficient, in my judgment, to justify me in asking permission to withdraw my resignation. As Germany had suggested arbitration, I felt that we could not do less than reply to this offer by expressing a willingness to apply the principle of the peace treaties to the case. These treaties, while providing for investigation of all questions, leave the nations free to act independently after the international commission has concluded the investigation.

"W. J. BRYAN."

STATEMENT OF MR. BRYAN

Mr. Bryan issued the following statement, June 11, 1915:

"I am glad to note the change in the tone of the press in regard to the note to Germany. From the time the papers began to publish forecasts down to yesterday, the jingo editors have been predicting that the matter would be dealt with with 'great firmness,' that Germany would be told that there must be no more delay in the acceptance of this country's demands, etc. Instead of waiting until the note was issued they put their own construction upon it in advance and colored it to suit their own purposes. It is a relief to find the papers now emphasizing the friendly tone of the note and pointing out that it does not necessarily mean war. Something has been gained if the warrior journalists at last realize that the country does not want war, but that, on the contrary, it will support the president in his efforts to find a peaceful solution of the difficult problem raised by the use of submarines against merchantmen."

A great deal of unnecessary debate is being indulged in as to whether the progressive republicans who left the party with Roosevelt will return if he goes back. Those who followed because Roosevelt represented principles they cherished won't come back because he thinks it expedient as a matter of anti-democratic politics. Those who followed him because they thought he would lead them to victory will probably face about if he does. And meanwhile the old guard is preparing to pick out the ticket for the wanderers to support in 1916.