

tary of war. We shall have exchanged a balking horse for a willing one. The sullen submission of a conquered people will give place to genuine and universal gratitude toward America. The unborn National Life will leap for joy in the Womb of Time. Te Deums will be celebrated in every church of every town in the Archipelago from Aparri to Zamboanga. Aglipay himself may even say: "Now, Lord, let my schism depart in peace, for mine eyes have seen Thy salvation."

The great ocean steamship companies of the world publish the sailing dates of their vessels a year ahead. Everything else hinges upon this point of departure. All preparations, whether by crew, shippers or prospective passengers, are shaped to that end. Why cannot the same be done in the matter of the launching of a Ship of State? If three strong and able men, familiar with insular conditions, and still young enough to undertake the task—say, for instance, General Leonard Wood, of the army; Judge Adam C. Carson, of the Philippine supreme court; and W. Morgan Shuster, Collector of Customs of the archipelago; or three other men of like calibre—were told by a president of the United States, by authority of the congress: "Go out there and set up a respectable native government in ten years, and then come away," they could and would do it, and that government would be a success; and one of the greatest moral victories in the annals of free government would have been written by the gentlemen concerned upon the pages of their country's history.

To understand the causes of the present discontent, and how incurable it is except by a promise of independence at a fixed date, let me review this tragedy of errors which we have written in blood and selfish legislation in that unhappy land, as rapidly as may be consistent with clearness and commensurate with the ability of an inconsiderable person,—an individual whose only claim to be heard upon a great question like this must rest upon the circumstances that he was an eyewitness to the tragedy.

When trouble began to brew in the Philippines after the signing of the treaty of Paris, the Schurman commission, it will be remembered, was sent out, bringing the olive branch. It accomplished nothing. It was too late. War ensued. When the writer reached Manila early in November, 1899, he was detailed to the command of a company of Macabebes scouts, to develop fire for General Lawton's division, their commanding officer, Lieutenant Boutelle, of the artillery, having been killed the day before. On the way to join them, he met General Lawton's adjutant general at a place called San Isidro. The colonel said: "We took this town last spring, after a pretty stiff fight. Then, as a result of the negotiations of the Schurman commission, General Otis had us evacuate this place and fall back. We have just had to take it again." The Schurman commission hoped that the Filipinos could be persuaded to give up their idea of independence. The army knew better.

In the first half of 1899, General Otis inexcusably postponed recommending to President McKinley the call for federal volunteers. He did not really understand the seriousness of the situation. He conducted the campaign all the time he was there from a desk in Manila, and never once took the field.

The Volunteer Army of 1899 was to last, under the act of congress, for two years only—that is, until the close of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901. The insurrection had to be over at that time, whether or no. To use an expression of the theatrical managers, that date was to be "positively its last appearance." The Volunteers began their work in the fall of 1899, twenty-five regiments of them, and, shoulder to shoulder with the Regulars, pegged away cheerfully at the war, doing their country's work; and they had been vigorously convincing the Filipinos of the benevolence of our intentions for about nine months, when the idea of a second Philippine commission, a second olive branch, was conceived at Washington. The presidential election was to occur in the following November, and men high in the councils of the republican party at home believed that the success of the party would be seriously imperilled if the situation did not soon clear up, or at least improve, in the Philippines. The public press of that period contains interviews with such men, of the tenor indicated. In this state of the case, the Taft commission was sent out. Things looked dismal. Philippine stock was going down. Optimism was devoutly to be wished. Judge Taft did not disappoint his friends at home. He was not then a judge. He was a partisan of the republican party, an advocate. And, like many another able advocate, he persuaded himself that the witnesses whose testimony militated against his client's interest were, if not mendacious, at least blinded with prejudice. He ac-

cepted the views of natives not in arms, as against that of the army.

In June, 1900, when the Taft commission arrived, the military authorities had not forgotten the Schurman commission, and the folly of its efforts to mix peace with war; and they did not look forward with enthusiasm to the coming of the new outfit. These latter brought with them, like the Schurman commission, the theory that kindness would win the people over; and they at once proceeded to act conformably to that amiable delusion. Of course it was not long before they found abundant evidence to support their preconceived theory. Accordingly, on November 30, 1900, they made their first report to the secretary of war, in which, among other things, they announced this tragically optimistic conclusion:

"A great majority of the people long for peace, and are entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the supremacy of the United States."

The army entertained a diametrically opposite opinion. The military view of the situation about the same time was thus satirically expressed in General MacArthur's annual report to the secretary of war:

"\* \* \* The people seem to be actuated by the idea that in all doubtful matters of politics or war, men are never nearer right than when going with their own kith and kin. \* \* \*"

Allusion is then made to the "almost complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion." Then follows this humorous thrust: "\* \* \* The adhesive principle comes from ethnological homogeneity, which induces men to respond for a time to the appeals of consanguineous leadership."

If the Volunteers whose term of enlistment was scheduled to expire with the fiscal year, June 30, 1901, should have to be replaced by anything like an equal number of other troops, a call for further appropriations to conduct a long-drawn out and unpopular war, would surely try the patience of the American people, and endanger the ultimate fortunes of the republican party. Everything had to be shaped to avoid such a catastrophe. Whether the country should be ready for civil government on that date or not, it had to be. When Joel Chandler Harris's creation, "Uncle Remus," tells his little friend the story of Brer Rabbit's climbing the tree to elude the dogs, and the lad interrupts: "But, Uncle Remus, a rabbit can't climb a tree," the resourceful narrator very promptly replies: "Oh, but, honey, dis rabbit des 'bleeged ter climb dis tree." The administration was 'bleeged to climb the tree of civil government. Civil government was therefore duly inaugurated on July 4, 1901.

Within less than six months thereafter, the flames of insurrection broke out anew in Batangas and the adjacent provinces, and it became necessary to give the military a free hand. General J. Franklin Bell accordingly invaded Batangas and the region round about, with an ample force, a brigade, and proceeded to wage war—the sort of war General Sherman described, only more so; for General Sherman did not practice reconcentration. General Bell went there to make those people "long for peace." And he did make them "long for peace," or, to use his own language, "want peace and want it badly." General Bell is not to be blamed for this. He is a brave and skillful soldier, one of the best in our own or any other army. He was simply doing his duty, obedient to orders. This Batangas insurrection of 1901-2 would never have occurred had not Governor Taft persisted in believing that the Filipinos could be genuinely satisfied with something less than independence. This error led him to reduce, most imprudently, the army of occupation and the number of army posts, against military advice, thereby giving the insurrection a chance to get its second wind. If the army of occupation had not been so reduced, reconcentration would never have been necessary, in Batangas or elsewhere. Reconcentration tactics are born of numerical weakness. If you have troops enough thoroughly to police a given territory, no need for reconcentration will arise there. Reconcentration is an admission that you are not able constantly to provide protection for all the people. As a corollary of the fundamental mistake indicated, a constabulary force was organized, which, it was believed, could control the situation. That it has never been able to do so is a matter of record in the official publications both of the Manila and of the Washington government. The fact is solemnly admitted in the recitals of a law now on the statute books of the Philippine islands. Section 6 of Act 781, of the Philippine commission, approved June 1, 1903, providing for reconcentration, begins thus:

"In provinces which are infested to such an extent with ladrones or outlaws that the lives and property of residents in the outlying barrios are

rendered wholly insecure by continued predatory raids, and such outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones or outlaws their sources of food-supply, and it is not possible, with the available police forces constantly to provide protection, etc."

Such are the conditions which today warrant reconcentration in the Philippines—whenever "it is not possible with the available police forces" to protect the peaceably inclined people. It will thus be seen that we are now doing in the Philippines the very thing for which we drove Weyler and his Spaniards from the Western Hemisphere. Reconcentration under the military authorities is bad enough, even with the superb equipment of the commissary and quartermaster departments of the army. But reconcentration conducted by inexperienced civilians and unfriendly constabulary is simply unsportsmanlike.

Caring for the peaceably inclined people, or pacificos, as they were called in Cuba—those who upon being told to do so voluntarily come within the zone or radius prescribed in the order for reconcentration—is not the only problem which can be competently handled by the military alone. There are the prisoners brought in by the policing force, from time to time, because found outside the prescribed radius, and put in the provincial jail. An ordinary jail, with 400 to 800 people crowded into it within a short period of time, cannot be properly handled by inexperienced hands. The sanitary conditions are sure to become bad and foul, and more or less disease and death is certain to ensue.

In the latter part of 1903, about the middle of November, the writer was sent to hold court in the province of Albay, where quite a formidable insurrection had been in progress for about a year, without suspension of civil government. There had been as many as 1,500 men in the field on each side, at times. Reconcentration under the law quoted had been resorted to. There had been as many as 700 or 800 prisoners in the provincial jail at one time, so he was told. Toward the close of the term, just after Christmas, when most of the docket had been disposed of, and there was time for matters more or less perfunctory in their nature, the prosecuting attorney brought in rough drafts of two proposed orders for the court to sign. One was headed with a list of fifty-seven names, the other with a list of sixty-three names. Both orders recited that the foregoing persons had died in the jail—all but one between May 20 and December 3, 1903 (roughly six and one-half months), as will appear from an examination of the dates of death—and concluded by directing that the indictments against them be quashed. The writer was only holding an extraordinary term of court there, and was about to leave the province. The regular judge of the district was scheduled soon to arrive. He did not sign the proposed orders, therefore, but kept them as legal curios. A correct translation of one of them appears below, followed by the list of names which headed the other (identical) order.

If the military authorities had had charge of those prisoners, it is safe to say that the mortality among them would have been far less; that possibly half, or even three-fourths, of those who died, would have lived. Political necessity, inherent in our form of government, kept the army from acting then, and keeps it from talking now.

When the civil government was set up in July, 1901, the army took a back seat, and looked on with more or less impatience, ready to say, "I told you so"—eager, of course, to get a chance to fight again. Gentlemen of the military profession have a predilection that way. The writer was, of course, entirely in sympathy with the civil authorities having been promoted from the army to the judiciary, and rather enjoyed seeing the army behave with becoming subordination, according to orders, even if it did not like to do so. It is human nature to enjoy the possession of power. Nor did he ever give much thought one way or the other to the question of the original wisdom of setting up the civil government against military advice, until he became aware of the death of these 120 prisoners in the Albay jail. This gave him pause. It was impossible to escape the reflection that just about that number had died in the Black Hole of Calcutta. After that, however, he labored all the harder to uphold the civil government by speedy trials of persons incarcerated, with a view to minimizing the necessity for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus; and, finally, early in November, 1904, in the province of Samar, broke completely down in health from trying to dispose properly of overcrowded jails, before the people awaiting trial died. The province of Samar was at that time being overrun by several thousand brigands, and in less than one hundred days more than 50,000 people had been made homeless by their depredations, according to the sworn testimony of a constabulary officer of the province, who appeared as a witness before