

operated in connection with the postoffice department; this reform has already been recommended by one republican postmaster general, Mr. Wanamaker, and the matter is now being investigated by an industrial commission.

The populists, while holding to their belief in the government ownership of railroads, have given their influence to all legislation which tended toward the regulation of railroads or the securing of reasonable rates.

On the money question the populist party has done a great deal of educational work. It has steadfastly defended the greenback against the attacks of the national banking interests and has insisted that the right to issue money is a sovereign function of government which cannot safely be delegated to private individuals or corporations. The democratic party has in two conventions supported this doctrine, although differing from the populists on the subject of redeemability. The democrats advocate a legal tender greenback, issued by the government, redeemable in coin, the government to exercise the option as to which coin, while the populists believe in an irredeemable greenback. This difference, however, has not prevented the democrats and populists from acting together to save the greenback from annihilation.

The populists believe in the quantitative theory of money and favor bimetallism because it would give more money than monometallism. While the democrats in the Senate and House of Representatives had for twenty years been voting for free coinage at sixteen to one, the populists were the first to name the ratio in a national platform. The unexpected and unpromised increase in the supply of gold, while it has tended to lessen the immediate importance of the money question, has vindicated the quantitative theory which is advocated by democrats and populists but was until recently denied by republicans.

The populists, as might be expected, oppose imperialism and trusts. They also unite with the democrats in favoring arbitration and condemning government by injunction and the blacklist.

No one who understands the history of the last ten years can doubt the influence which the populist party has exerted upon public affairs. It has been a great educational factor and the democratic party has strengthened rather than weakened itself by endorsing a number of propositions which are called "populistic." To repudiate our populist allies and surrender to the corporate influences which now dominate the republican party would be as impolitic as it would be unpatriotic. The democratic party has no reason for existence except to champion the cause of the people. It must stand ready to co-operate with those who are fighting organized greed, for to refuse such co-operation is to give aid and comfort to the common enemy.

A Naked Sword.

On the evening of February 16, 1900, Secretary of the Navy Long delivered an address before the Home Market Club of Boston. On that occasion Secretary Long said:

It is certain cause for congratulation that the extreme imperialists who resisted the treaty have been signally overthrown. By resisting its ratification

they have been insisting upon the extremest imperialism and have out-Heroded Herod. They not only would have prolonged the war with Spain, but would not have taken out of the hands of one man, the president, absolute authority over the Philippines limited only to the indefinite scope of what is called the war power, wielded by a purely military arm holding a naked sword. Think of that for imperialism! It is a great credit to the President that like Julius Caesar and George Washington, he has refused this offer of a kingly crown. On the contrary the good old democratic plan has been adopted of putting the disposition of these islands into the hands of the American people, who will duly express their will through their representatives in Congress assembled. I have no doubt the President is delighted to have the elephant off his hands and on theirs.

This is very interesting in the light of the present situation. Mr. McKinley possesses "absolute authority over the Philippines, limited only to the indefinite scope of what is called the war power, wielded by a purely military arm holding a naked sword."

Unlike Julius Caesar and George Washington, Mr. McKinley did not "refuse this offer of a kingly crown." On the contrary, he seems to have eagerly seized the offer, and he is wielding a "naked sword" with all the evident delight of the most pronounced imperialist in history.

If Mr. Kinley would be "delighted to have the elephant off his hands," he has, indeed, a poor way of displaying his pleasure.

Compare the speech of Secretary Long, delivered less than fourteen months ago, with the Spooner resolution, which conferred, upon persons to be chosen by the president, "all military, civil and judicial powers," to be exercised under the President's direction—and behold the difference!

"Conquest," Said the President.

In the correspondence concerning the Paris treaty, referred to in a former issue, will be found some interesting telegrams which passed between the commission and the state department discussing the theory to be advanced for the holding of the Philippine islands. Mr. Day, speaking for a majority of the members of the commission, cabled the President on November 3, 1898, saying that the demand for the Philippine islands could not be based on conquest. The following is the message:

United States Peace Commission, Paris, November 3, 1898—10 a. m. (For the President.—Special.)—After a careful examination of the authorities, the majority of the commission are clearly of opinion that our demand for the Philippine Islands can not be based on conquest. When the protocol was signed Manila was not captured, siege was in progress and capture made after the execution of the protocol. Captures made after agreement for armistice must be disregarded and status quo restored as far as practicable. We can require cession of Philippine Islands only as indemnity for losses and expenses of the war. Have in view, also, condition of islands, the broken power of Spain, anarchy in which our withdrawal would leave the islands, etc. These are legitimate factors. Have written fully. Thursday, 11:30 morning. DAY.

Secretary of State Hay immediately replied:

Department of State, Washington, November 3, 1898.—The President has received your dispatch of this date and awaits your letter. Meantime, however, the question may be ultimately determined. He assumes you have not yielded the claim by right of con-

quest. In fact, the destruction of the Spanish fleet on May 1 was the conquest of Manila, the capital of the Philippines. The President is confident that the commission will be able to make a treaty on just and honorable grounds; a failure to do so would be greatly to be regretted. DAY.

On the following day Mr. Day renewed his protest and Commissioner Davis added a separate opinion in support of Mr. Day's communication. They read as follows:

Paris, November 5, 1898—2:20. (For the President—Special.)—Telegram of November 3 from the Secretary of State received. We have not yielded the claim by a right of conquest. Telegram to you on that subject was on the afternoon of discussion with Spanish commissioners. We shall not foreclose important matters without advising you. We are doing all in our power to secure treaty in accordance with your views. In the opinion of a majority of the commission we shall not promote this end by putting forth the claim that Manila was taken by conquest on May 1. Subsequent military operations and capitulation, no less than mutual acceptance of protocol, preclude making demand upon that ground. Our opinion as to ineffectiveness of capitulation after protocol has already been stated. DAY.

I think we can demand cession of entire archipelago on other and more valid grounds than a perfected territorial conquest of the Philippine Islands, such as indemnity or as conditions of peace imposed by our general military success and in view of our future security and general welfare, commercial and otherwise. I think the protocol admits all these grounds, and that the ground alone of perfected territorial conquest of the Philippine Islands is too narrow and untenable under protocol. Friday, 3:30 afternoon. CUSHMAN K. DAVIS.

The President in his reply again insisted that the commission should rely, in part, upon our right to hold the islands by conquest. It will be seen, therefore, that the President deliberately and after repeated warnings clung to the doctrine that conquest can give title to lands and peoples.

Jefferson in 1791 said, in a letter to William Short, "If there be one principle more deeply written than any other in the mind of every American, it is that we should have nothing to do with conquest."

Mr. Blaine in 1890 introduced in the pan-American conference a series of resolutions the first of which declared, "That the principle of conquest shall not, during the continuance of the treaty of arbitration, be recognized as admissible under American public law."

The second declared, "That all cessions of territory made during the continuance of the treaty of arbitration shall be void if made under threats of war or in the presence of an armed force."

Jefferson, speaking for democrats, repudiated the doctrine of conquest; Blaine, speaking for republicans as well as democrats, adds his condemnation, but President McKinley insists upon conquest as one of the sources of title to the Philippine Islands. If we have a right to take the Philippine Islands by conquest, we have a right to take any other islands or continents in the same way. The doctrine of conquest is absolutely destructive of the doctrine set forth in the Declaration of Independence. If one is true, the other must be false; the President chose the European doctrine and abandoned the American doctrine when he gave his instructions to the commission.