

of soul he judged better of himself than did the administration. Like Hood in superseding Johnston, Burnside, in superseding McClellan, virtually received a command to fight; and the disaster at Fredericksburg is attributable more to the fact that Burnside was driven into it than to any deliberate intention. Burnside remained with his old corps and retrieved his honor at Knoxville and in the overland campaign. Although without a superior as a corps commander, he will never be named among the great generals of the war.

The Chancellorsville campaign was brilliant in its conception, vigorous in its beginning, and disastrous in its culmination. To leave Sedgwick to masquerade at Fredericksburg, while Hooker secretly and swiftly placed the remainder of his force on Lee's left, was brilliantly conceived and executed. Here Hooker lost his balance, for instead of pushing vigorously forward by the left, connecting with Sedgwick, and intrenching on the heights, he remained supinely at the river, giving Lee time to concentrate and to take up all the advantageous positions. The interest, far from centering in the army of the Potomac, is transferred to Lee's masterly stroke in preventing a union of Sedgwick and Hooker, and in driving the former across the Rappahannock, and to "Stonewall" Jackson's brilliant flank movement. Hooker lacked the well balanced mind, and the imperturbability that is an essential military quality. Consequently he also must remain off the roll of great generals.

General Sherman's career presents a remarkable parallel to that of General Grant. Being but a colonel at Bull Run, he quietly gained his renown in the west, winning his first laurels in his stubborn defence of Shiloh church. At Vicksburg he conducted his flank creditably, but after that he seemed to lose some of the confidence centered in him by his operations in his strategic triangle, while at Chattanooga his presence is overshadowed by the army of the Cumberland. In May, 1864, like Grant, but on a more equal footing with his opponent, he began a great offensive campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, the second Richmond, and against Johnston, the second Lee. Had Hood not superseded Johnston, the siege of Atlanta would have been parallel to the siege of Petersburg and Richmond. Sherman's march to the sea is remarkable only for its magnitude; and the surrender of Johnston was consequent only on the fall of Lee. Sherman was one of the great generals. He was conservative in methods, and his campaigns were unmarked by eccentric failures. Still to a stubborn adherence to sound principles, he added sufficient judgment and strategic instinct to avoid becoming a mere ditch digger. He was methodical and sure; and, although he never opposed the storm of battle like Thomas at Chickamauga, nor turned defeat to victory like Sheridan at Cedar Creek, his glory, won by judicious adherence to sound methods, is equally great.

Added to this class of really or practically independent commanders, there is another class—those division or corps commanders—who are distinguished by exemplary conduct in operations or by brilliant aid which they gave their superiors. Schofield's retreat from before Hood will always be one of the most interesting episodes in the history of the invasion of Tennessee. Hancock's brilliant manipulation of his corps in the Gettysburg and overland campaigns will never be forgotten. Thomas, appellation, the "Rock of Chickamauga," is well earned; and Sheridan's ride from Winchester to Cedar Creek is fitly celebrated in verse. Still they were but the executors of another's will; and the mind which plans is superior to the arm which executes. To the commanding general such an opportunity seldom comes, for his is the office to think and not to fight. In strategy, he

must lay out the lines of operations, with reference to topography and the enemy's force; and his corps commanders execute the details. In battle he must likewise supervise all and allow to his subordinates the minutiae. The crisis must fall upon one of his lieutenants; and yet he is superior in generalship to his lieutenants as mind is superior to muscle.

There is one general that we have nearly forgotten, and to forget him would be great injustice; for in the qualities of decision, force of character, command of resource and expedient, quickness of comprehension, instinctive knowledge of time and circumstance, and especially strategic ability which constitute the military leader, he far exceeded his contemporaries. I refer to the victor of Stone's river, the captor of Chattanooga, W. S. Rosecranz. He first appears prominently in the battle of Iuka, Mississippi; and, about this time, appears a lack of harmony between him and Grant. This is not strange, for we can well understand that Rosecranz, with his rare powers, found himself hampered by the dullness of Grant. The second commander of the Army of the Cumberland, he found a weapon admirably forged and tempered; and how he carried it from Nashville to Chickamauga is a matter of history.

The battle of Stone's River was brilliantly planned. To make a feint attack with the right, which was then to retreat, while the left, followed by the centre, rapidly crossed the river and fell on Bragg's right, leaves nothing to be desired. By these means Rosecranz expected, and not unreasonably, to envelop Bragg, cut off his retreat by getting in his rear, and force him into the country in the direction of Salem. The success, then, depended on the right maintaining its position, at all odds, for at least three hours, until the left had crossed the river and overwhelmed Bragg's right. Rosecranz made his mistake—and who could foresee the result—in placing McCook, a man on whom he knew he could not depend, on the right; and McCook, shortsighted that he was, who had solemnly promised to hold his ground at all hazards, made his mistake in prolonging his line of camp fires far beyond his flank, and thus leading Bragg to greatly prolong his left. Truly do momentous disasters follow little failures. Had Thomas been placed on the right, upon which the success of the battle depended, the result would have been different, for Thomas was too brilliant a general to have blundered, and too stubborn a fighter to have yielded.

The battle of Stone's River, opened as had been planned; but, curiously enough, Bragg had formed for his plan an exact counterpart of Rosecranz's. Bragg placed Breckenridge, on whom he could rely, on the right, and massed his force on the left. No sooner, therefore, had the battle opened, than McCook found himself assaulted and far out-flanked by the best of Bragg's army. His right division gave way immediately and went skurrying to the rear, followed by his centre division. Seeing what was coming, Sheridan, commanding the left division, connected with Negley, commanding Thomas' right division, and, far refusing his own right, protected the rear of Negley's lines. Here the repeated rebel charges were fearful and the carnage great; but Sheridan held fast. This brief respite gave Rosecranz time to form a new line; and here in the midst of disaster, with his right, on which he depended, gone, and swarms of yelling rebels far out-flanking him, "Old Rosy" first showed that remarkable executive ability for which he is famous. Undismayed, grasping with his brilliant mind all the stages and conditions, and almost intuitively seeing the correct maneuvers, he more resembled a powerful electric battery, infusing into all whom he met a mighty, stimulating