

expressing the character of the things themselves. Man has been supposed to be so adjusted to nature that phenomena mirror themselves upon his soul; his conceptions are the reflected realities and of course exactly correspond to them. Bunsen and Muller call words phonetic types. Nature echoes through the soul in words.

The objections to this theory show that it has no solid basis in science. It is a mere assumption, of which there is no satisfactory proof, that there is any such nice adaptation of the soul and the body to nature, that the soul gives out the echoes of nature. There is an assumed physical condition open to inspection, but the inspection does not sustain the hypothesis. Whether "an infant crying in the night" may be "an infant crying for the light" or crying for the lactary it would certainly be difficult for the most acute philologists to distinguish.

Again, if words are the echoes of things, and the soul rings in answer to perceptions and sensations, there should be but one language for mankind. Renan perceives this difficulty and endeavors to get over it by saying that it is owing to difference of organization, of climate and outward circumstances, that the same thought or emotion produces different echoes in different races. But how is it that tribes, living in the same climate and having the same organic structure, speak languages unintelligible to each other?

Further, this theory assumes a condition of things once, but now no longer existing, and of whose existence we have no proof. It admits that this sensibility in the soul of primitive man is now lost. Now, at this point, the theory breaks down. It is agreed by scientific thinkers that, if we would explain occurrences by natural causes, it must be by causes now operating; and we must not assume that the world is differently governed from what it was at some former time. This is to introduce miracle. The theory confesses that it cannot explain the origin of speech

by any causes that science can recognize, and while professing to deny the miraculous, in this it is really driven to take refuge.

On this, then, and on other grounds, the ding-dong theory must be regarded merely as an ingenious speculation.

The bow-wow theory stands in sharp contrast to the one we have just considered. It is maintained with great ability by Prof. Whitney and supported by Farrar. Farrar, however, seeks to bring the two theories into harmony. Wedgewood, too, in his acute and scholarly contribution to the subject defends this hypothesis. The theory may be thus briefly stated. The earliest names of objects and actions were produced by the imitation of natural sounds, styled onomatopœia. A dog, for instance, from its bark was named a bow-wow, the cuckoo, from its notes, the movements of water, rippling, plashing, etc. Again, the interjections we use, the *ohs* and *ahs*, the *poohs* and *pshaws* contribute other elements. In onomatopœias and interjections are to be found the beginnings of speech.

This theory has the advantage on the side of natural phenomena and of logic. Words, it is said, are now made in this way, and the method is a practicable one for communication between those ignorant of each others language. An Englishman, for example, in a Chinese eating house points to a savory dish and says to the waiter "quack-quack?" with a significant shake of the head, the waiter replies "bow wow."

Unlike the former theory, this denies that speech is unconscious and instinctive. The necessity for communication was the impulse to speech. Language was a conscious contrivance and evolved by slow degrees. There may have been, and probably was, a period of mutism preceding articulate speech.

This theory, it is urged, accounts rationally for nearly all the words in any language. Prof. Whitney inquires, why, as nineteen twentieths of the speech we