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About Omaha daily bee. (Omaha [Neb.]) 187?-1922 | View Entire Issue (July 12, 1903)
Cavalry Operations Wilderness to James River-By Major Edward J. McClernand in Journal of 3Iilitary Service Institute (Continued from Page Four.) necessary for Sheridan to rci!:n the Cor litn's Lrhlge and SpottsylvanU rouds, and Which led to the battle or Todd'a Tavern, above described. Lee divined Grant's In tention and ordered Stuart to select routea Murine the day. leading to Spottsylvanla, for the um of the infantry and artillery, nd that night started Anderson, who took mmmiiid of Longtreet'a corps after the tetter was wounded on the bth. Grant also commenced the movement of his Infantry, Warren leading via Todd's tavern and Alsop's. Sheridan's comblnatlona for this tnovo atent were as follows: As stated, Merritt and Oregg wers sncamped near Todd'a tavorn. and Wilson At Alsop's. The two fejrrrer wwe ordered to t&ka position near Snell's bridge over the Po; Gregg marching via Cor Ibin's bridge to Shady Grove church, and Jfetrltt followlrg. At the last named gkue Morritt was to pass Gregg, and go to the Block House, when Gregg was to retire on the anme place. Wilson via to reach the Work House, hy iy of Bpntt aylvanla. The evident object of this ordor was to delay the enemy at the crossing of tho Po, should he try to reach Spott ylvanla Court House. General Meade, upon his arrival at Todd's tavern, changed th! irders given to (iregg und Merritt, without notifying Sheridan. tlrcgg was ordered to take position at Col bin's bridge, and Merritt to move on the Court House, In advance of Warren. In the darkness, on a narrow and poor road, the cnaalry and Infantry became Intermixed, and much delay nnfl confusion resulted. When Sheridan learned of the rhange, and upon reaching Merrill's column, he found "Warren complaining of being aelaycd by the cavalry, whereupon Sherldnn drew Merritt off the rond. The latter, however, together with Warren, had n heavy engagement dur ing the morning with Kt'zhugh Lee's and Anderson corps. In front of the Court House, and both were driven hack. Wilson, In pursuance of the orlglnul order, moved on the Court House. He mt the enemy's plcVets nt the Ny, drove them back, and beating Wlckhsira's brigade of cavalry took possesion nf Spottsylvnnla. where he states he remained at least two hours. He now learned the enemy had crossed the To, and was engaged with Wnrren and Merritt, whereupon he fell back and took position near Alsop's. He says he had been Informed the Ninth corps (TBnrnslde's) would follow to the Court House, and claims If It had done so "the "bloody battles which fallowed would at least not have been fought at Spott yJvunla." As a result of Ihesn misunderstand ings a bitter controversy took place dur ing the day between Meade and Sheridan, during which the latter said he could beat Stuart if' permitted to go and try. Meade repentrd the remark to Grant, who replied: "Did he say so? then let him go out and do It." With that end in view the cavalry corps was concen trated during the day at Alrlch's. Before dropping the dispute between the two generals. Justice to Meade dictates the remark that perhaps the tavjlry. Instead of being ordered to start for Snell's bridge at daylight, might have moved at an earlier hour, thus not only leaving the roads free for the Infantry, but making more certain the possession of the bridge. The pnm ob ject might have been gained hud Gregg and Merritt "bivouacked farther to the front, and Tint have -fallen buck to Todd's tavern after the success of the previous day. It Is not certain their position at the tavern Inter fered with the passage of the infantry. hut It would twin the cavalry should have been well to the front by the time Warren reached that point. On the other hand. Sheridan may not have been Informed of the hour ot for the Infantry movement. It Is clear that at this time Ooneral Meade was given, rm oecnsions, to Ignoring the oavalry oommander. The iwi of the cav alry corps at the battles of the Wilderness, Including May 8. was 710 killed, wounded and atlaslng. Karly on the morning of the th the cav alry corps, with three days' rations and half a day's forage (all there was on hand), commenced It march to gain the resr of Loe'a army and to give buttle to his cav mlry. The line of march passed through Masnapemax church and Chlieshurg to An derson's ford, on the North Anna. The column marched on one rood and waa nearly .thirteen mlli-s long, but Sheridan preferred this great length, to the dangers from possible failures. In necessary concen trations, that might result from following different roads. Stuart learned during the day of the movement, and started in pursuit with his TSecond division, and one turtgade of the Third. Fttxhugh Lee overtook the rear guard of the union cavalry, under Puvles, near Chlleaburg, and pushed It vigorously, but through grod management on the pnrt mt tho rear guard t'tmmandor, the march of th column was not tnaterlitlly Interrupted. Sharlnan declined bat tie "here, wishing, ho aaya, te first pass the two Annas with the hope of obtaining supplies. Merrttt crossed at Anderson's ford shout rfmrk. and during the night moved on Deasror Dam etui Ion t cut the Virginia. Central railroad. fcarete detachment of the enemy was encountered, ana about 400 union prisoners were recaptimd who had been taken at the Wilderness. Eight or ten miles of railroad and telegraph Imo were destroyed, also two locomotives, three trslns, ninety wagons and, according to Northrop, the confederate commissary gen eral, KM.QTX) rations of flour and VK.OUO ra tions of meat. How severely the loss of those supplies was felt is shown by a cir cular sent out by this eommlssury general on may 10. In an endorsement to the con federate secretary of war, se says "the offi cers throughout the state have been al ready urged to collect all the corn, flour and meat possible. The losses at Heaver I)am have caused me to order the following Instructions to Ik sent to all stations nt accessible pHnts, vli.: "The Interruption of railroad transportation and the destruction of our subsistence by the enemy renders it necessary to call upon every person In your dlstilct to contribute immediately a portion of their supplies for the use of the army. Impress freely If necessary Act with promptness, as the exigency is great." Some of the supplies destroyed might have been saved for ths use. of the union cavalry, for, as Merritt says, "many stores ware destroyed which would, as our nfter experience developed, have been very use ful" to our command. On the morning of the 10th Stuart, from the north hnnk of the North Anna, shelled Mcrrltt's camp and skirmished with Gregg nd Wilson, who bivouacked on that side. The march, however, was resumed without dlfflou'ty. Karly in the morning the Fifth United States cavalry. Captain Arnold commanding,, was sent to Davenport's lirige, near Anderson's ford, as a precau tion against attack from that quarter. The regiment was surrounded, but gallantly cut Its way out. Gregg and Wilson crossed (lu- ing the morning. The possession of Hoaver Dam waa also important in open ing a way to Richmond by the Negro Foot road. Stuart crossed the North Anna the same rooming at the ford and bridge above men tioned, but Instead of pursuing the road taken by his enemy he turned off In the direction of Hanover, Intending to march rapidly mnd place his command be tween his fo" and Richmond. He tele graphed General Bragg, in the city Just named, to be prepared in the entrench ments to meet Bhe:idan, saying, "his force Is large and If attack is made it will bo principally as dismounted cavalry, which tights better than the enemy's infantry. Please have this repeated to General Je." Bhe.idan halted on the night of the 10th on the south aide of the South Anna, near Ground Squirrel bridge. At 9 p. m. of this date Stuart's force, consisting of Wick ham's, Gordon's and Lmnni'i bri gades, was at Hanover Junction. At 2 a. m. on the 11th Da vies' brigade of Urlgg's division was sent to cut the rail road at Ashland. Davies reached the sta tion In advance of Stuart and destroyed a locomotive, train of cars and damaged nbout six miles of the road. He then re joined Sheridan at Alien's station and the entire comaiand moved on Yellow tavern, "Merritt In the lead, Wih?on following and Gregg in the rear." Stuart, however, with two brigades, reached the tavern first and took position near the forks nf the road. From some point south of Hanover lie had detached a brigade to again follow Sheri dan's rear, and so he now found between himself and this brigade the entire union cavalry. As Merritt approached the Brcok turnpike he 1 named of Stuart's force and position and at once pushed forward to the attack and, soon getting possession of the turn pike, h drove the enemy several hundred yards to the east. Sheridan quickly brought up Wilson and one of Gregg's brigades and formed his line on the east side of the road. Stnart, with his Inferior force, held on manfully, and with a buttery that enfiladed the lirouk read "made Yellow tavern an unenmfortably hot place." Custer, with the First Mlchlg-in, ass'sted by a Vermont regi ment, charged this battery. At the same time the dismounted troops along the lino moved forward. Custer hroke the erumy's left nnd captured two guns. Glbbs' and T)e- ln's brigades drove his center and right from the fluid, while one of Gregg's bri gades drove Gordon back, who had followed in the rear tf the -union column. This victory gave Sheridan control of the road to Richmond. Aftc- Cusier's charge the main body of the enemy re tired In disorder toward Ashland, while a small party went toward Richmond. The latter rejoined Fttzlrugh Ioe near Mechan insvllle. The casualties on each side wero quite severe. The confederate ctuso sus tained a great loss In the death of that gallant and able cavalryman, J. R. B. Stuart, who was mortally wounded In this battle. Fticridan whs now near the only remaining railroad by which supplies could be sent from Richmond to Lee at Spottayl vanlu, and on this day, the ltth. Mr. Sttdihm, the confederate secretary of war. Buys: 'General Lee is calling on the presi dent for supplies, but because of the result of the battle of Yellow Tavern they cannot be sent tonight, and the Central road baa only one engine between Richmond and the break, at Heaver dam." How far General Leo was influenced, by uncertain cuonaittuications, tn als JaLur re trograde movement last oarriod harm to tba south side of the North Anna, f will let each ono of my readers Judge for himself. 81ieridan now thought be might puss be tween the outer and Inner lines of fortifi cations around Richmond, and reach the James river via Fair Oaks, and with this end In view he massed his command on the plateau south of Meadow bridge about daylight of the 12th. Wilson attempted to pass certain works, but failed, when it be came painfully evident a new route must l selected. Custer was accordingly ordered ts secure Meadow bridge, but Fltshugh Ijee, who had assumed command of the confederate cavalry after Stuart was wounded, bad correctly Judged the situa tion, and waa now found tn position north or the bridge, which was partially de stroyed. Merritt was directed to take bis entire division and repair the bridge. He was also Informed the crossing must be made at all hazards. While the work on the bridge was in progress, Lee opened fire with his artillery and dismounted troopers, and the confederate infantry came out from their works around Richmond, and attacked Wilson and Gregg. In his dispatch of May 14 to Meude, Sheridan estimates the strength of this infantry at two brigades, but later, in his memoirs, he places It at three brigades of veterans, and about 5,000 irregular troops. Gordon's brigade of cav alry, which, as stated, was In Sheridan's rear at Yellow tavern, also attacked Gregg from the Hrook road. The situation was now critical for the union cavalry, one from which nothing short of first-class generalship could extri cate It. Sheridan, who never showed to bettor advantage than in the crisis of bat tle, rose to the occasion. Everywhere he met the enemy with a bold front. Wilson was driven back at first in some confusion, but Gregg, in a strong position, brought the enemy to a stand by moar.s of the Are from his repeating (Spencer) carbines, aided by the batteries, and Wilson's men were rallied. Finally the confederate in fantry were driven back, as were the cavalry from the Hrook road, and Merritt forcing the passage of the bridge and driv ing Lee toward Gaines Mill. Sheridan re maining master of the Held. The litter says "I was apparently hemmed in on nil aides, hut relying on the celerity with which mounted troops could be moved. I felt perfectly confident that the seeming perilous situation could be relieved." He adds, "even If it had not been our good for tune to defeat him, wo could have crossed the Chlckahoralny, if necessary, at several points that were discovered by scouting parties." It is perhaps well for the fame of the hero of the ride from Winchester, he was not compelled to attempt such a passage. The effect of the fire of the repeating carbine is mentioned both by Gregg and Sheridan, and doubtless it largely con tributed to the victory. After the battlo tho Virginia Central railroad was destroyed for some distance on both sides of the river. Sheridan now marched leisurely, via Gaines MM. to Haaall's Landing on the James, reaching that point on the ltth. Here, he communicated with Butler at Bermuda Hundred, and obtained supplies for 12.000 men and 14,000 animals. Among the men he, of course, numbered the artil lerymen, and doubtless his 200 and more prisoners, as well ns the 400 union prisoners recaptured at Beaver Dam. The troopers were tn high spirits, and according to one of Butler's officers they thought they could go anywhere and do anything. Tho horses were Jaded; S00 were turned over as un serviceable, and a number had been shot enroute, to prevent their fulling into the hands of the enemy. Their weakness was due to tho lack of forage, as the marches bad been short. In fact throughout the raid which termi nated at Chesterfield Station May 24, "tho average distance traveled per day did not exceed eighteen miles, tho longest be ing thirty." The less of the cavalry corps. Including the nrtlllery, from May 9. when the raid commenced, to the 14th, was fifty-four kilUd, 337 wounded and 2:4 prisoners total 625. As the e was but little lighting after Unvlng Haxall's Landing the30 figures prac tically answer our present purpose. I have not betn able to ascertain the confederate lotM. While on the James, Sheridan and Butler consulted about the former passing to the south side. In a dispatch of the 14th to Mccde, Sho.ildan says. "If I could be per mitted to crcBs the James nnd go south ward I could almost ruin the confederacy." This proposition opens a large and interest ing field for discus Ion, but time will not permit its consideration. On the lith But ler actually ordered Sheridan to cross, but no further action was taken. Tho distribution of the cavalry for the pcasag of the Rapidan, with a division in advance of the infantry at each crossing nnd annthc guarding the fords above Ger mania, was Judicious, but, unfortunately. Immediately upon crraring two-thirds of this arm was practically thrown upon the defensive, by being compelled to guard the wagon trains and reserve artillery, a duty thit could have been more effectually and erouomlcally performed by Infantry, spe cially in tho heavily-wooded country around ChauooUoravUla. U U be answered ths in fantry was needed at the front, it may bo remarked that 10.0M aggressive horsemen operating to the front and left front of the army, would have greatly relieved the pres. sure on the foot troops. Burnatde's colored division, which waa latter sent to tho trains, might well have been assigned to this duty from the start. Attention has already been called to what might have been accomplished at Parker's store, in front of Hill's corps, had Wilson's entire division remained there on the Cth. The recrninoissanoe to Craig's meeting house waa undoubtedly a wise precaution, but it should have been made by Gregg's division, with Torbert following as far as Corbln's bridge. The withdrawal from Todd's tavern on the afternoon of the Cth was a mistake. If Hancock's left had Indeed been turned, the union cavalry. Instead of retiring toward Chancellorsvllle, should have fallen upon the flank and rear of the turning force. The unfortunate failure f Sheridan's com binations, because of misunderstandings, to hold the passage of the To at Snell's bridge was deplorable, no matter whether this re sulted from unnecessary delay In starting the cavalry, or from General Meade's usur pation of the duties of his cavalry com mander. Sheridan's orders were wise nnd their fulfillment would have given Grant a decided advantage. Both on this occasion and on the Bth when Wilson was ordered from Parker's without Sheridan being in formed, the latter was badly treated, and it is plain there was in Meade's mind no plan for unity of purpose by the cavalry corps, and it explains how in previous cam paigns its strength had ben frittered away. The control of the confederate cavalry was far more systematic. Scattered, to per form guard duty and to obtain supplies be fore the campaign opened, they were quickly concentrated on the right of their army, and Jeft free to act in their proper sphere. At one stage of the battle of the Wilderness we find them near the FurnaceB, that is to the rear of the union left, alarming the commander of the Army of the Potomac about the safety of his trains and misleading Hancock by their fire as to the nature of the uttack. Fitzhugh Lee's arlval at Spottsylvanln, on the 6th, thus securing Snell's bridge for his army and preparing the way for Anderson's corps, was timely and of great service to General Lee. On this, as well as on previ ous occasions, Leo relied greatly upon his cavalry. On the 7th a staff officer of Gen-e-fil Lee inforrr.s Stuart "he (Lee) relies upon you to keep him accurately Informed of the enemy's movements." On the nlpht of the same day Meade changes Sheridan's orders to two-thirds of his corps, and does not even Inform the litter cf the fact. The raid on Lcc's communications, com menced on the 9th, was fruitful of brilliant results, although perhaps all was not ac complished tint m'ght have been. It drew off much of Stuart's force, and simplified the guarding of the trains nnd reserve ar tillery. It resulted In disastrous de feats to the enemy's cavalry at Yellow tavern and Meadow bridge and correspondingly increis-ed the con fidence and esprit de corps of Sheridan's troopers. It seriously interfered with sup plying the confederate army and alarmed the Richmond government as to its ability to continue these supplies. It perhaps failed In not damaging the railroads smith of the North Anna as fully as might havo been done. After the battle of Yellow Tavern It Is believed Sheridan might hivo devoted his whole energy to the elestruc tion of both railroads toward Hanover Junction, and destroyed them to such an extent that Lee would have at once been forced to retire to the vicinity of Cold Harbor, thus shortening the battles around Spottsylvania, and eliminating those near the North Anna and Totopotomy. Kven after Meadow bridge the same was possi ble. It is true Sheridan was short of for age, hut the results within reach wero worthy of great sacrifices. His march to Haxall's Landing was made very leisurely. In fact he "encamped nt Walnut Grovo from 2 o'clock p. m. of tho 12th until 9 o'clock a. m. of the 13th." This campaign well Illustrates the many uses of the dragoon, nnd goes far to Justify Kflpatrlck's assertion that cavalry can fight any place, except at sea. To begin, we find the union cavalry covering the advance, and protecting the flank and rear of the army during the passage of tho Rapidan; then well to the front seeking information at Craig's meeting house, and next, covering the left flank of the infantry In battlo at the Wilderness, and In truth Wilson at one time was sent to the right flank, because of alarming but incorrect In formation sent In from that quarter by some r.ew and Inexperienced cavalry oper ating there. Again, we find It under orders to move at early diwn and seize a strategic point (Spottsylvnnla) to possess which each army was straining every r.erve. It Is true the latter orders came to nuught, hut only because of unfortunate flehy or uncalled Tor Interference, or both, and not through any weakness of the northern cavalry. On the part of the south, up to rhla stage of tho war, we find greater confi dence bestowed by the commanding gen eral of the Army of Northern Virginia upon his chief of cavalry, than was correspond ingly shown In the Arrrry of the Potomao. tCoaUniMd oa Pago Ftfieeoj