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About Omaha daily bee. (Omaha [Neb.]) 187?-1922 | View Entire Issue (July 12, 1903)
Wilderness to James River-By Major Edward J McClcrnand in Journal of Military Service Institute Cavalry Operations N THE early daya of Mar. 1, the Army of the Potomac, under Meade, was encamped on the yflpl north wide of the Rapldan, with ' headquarters at Culpeper. It con sisted of three Infantry and one cavalry corps. Of the Infantry, Hun cock com mnnded the Second, Warren the Fifth and Sedgwick the Sixth corps. The Second and Fifth each had four divisions, the Sixth but three. The cavalry corps, under Major General Sheridan, had three divisions, each commanded by a brigadier general. Tor tiert's division, the First, consisted of three brigades ; the Second and Third dlvi ions, commanded by D. McM. Gregg and 3. If. Wilson, respectively, were compored of two brigades each. Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt commanded the artillery re serve. Attached to the cavalry corps wir Ix batteries of horse artillery with thirty two guns. The Ninth corps at Warrenton, under General Burnside, constituted a separata command until May 24, when It was united to the Army of the Potomac, under Mead. . Grant, as lieutenant general, commanded both armies, with headquarters at Culpeper. The aggregate of this force was about 118, 00, with 823 guns and eight Coehorn mor tars. The cavalry had had about 12,000 officers and men. Confronting this host on the opposite si da of the Rapldan was the army of General Robert E. Leo, with headquarters at Or ange court house. It was composed of three Infantry and one cavalry corps, the latter under Major General James E. B. Stuart. The Infantry co a. First, Second and Third, were commanded by Ixmgstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill, In the order named. In the opening of the campaign the Second and Third corps had three divisions each, while Longstreet had but two, Pickett be ing detached. Brigadier General Pendleton was chief of artillery. Stuart's division commanders, each with the rank of major general, were Wade. Hampton, Fltshugh Lee and W. II. F. Lee. The Lees had two brigades each. The re bellion records assign three to Hampton, but Butler's brigade does not appear In the dispatches until the latter part of May, and apparently did not participate In tha part of the campaign we shall discuss. Sheridan places the aggregate of the enemy's cavalry at a little over 8,000. There were Ave batteries of horss artillery with twenty guns. Prior to the opening of the campaign this cavalry was guarding the fords of the Rapldan from above Lee'a army to Hamilton's crossing, and about this time we find Fltzhugh Iee at, or nenr, the latter place; Hampton at MM ford and -W. II. F. Lee at Orange court house. The strength of the confederate army was about 80,000 men, with 213 guns. The country between the Rapldan and tha James Is admirably adapted to a defensive campaign, being generally heavily wooded and Intersected by numerous streams, diffi cult to cross. In addition to the natural strength of many positions, artificial de fenses were added at numerous points on the road to Richmond. Soon after midnight May t the Army of the Potomac moved from Its position north of the Rapldan to enter on the ever memorable campaign which terminated at Appomattox court house on the 9th of April of the following year. After deducting the rarlous detachments ordered for escort and other duty, Sheridan crossed the river with an effective force of about 10,000 troopers. It Is not Intended to follow the move ments of the Infantry farther than U neces sary to m."fce the cavalry operations, which In a large measure depended upon or re sulted from them, perfectly clear. Warren's corps, followed by Sedgwick's, and preceded by Wilson's division, crossed at Germanla Ford, nine or ten miles below the right of Lee'a lino. Gregg, In advance of Hancock's onrps, and the reserve artil lery, crossed at Ely's Ford, six miles below Germanln, Torbert's division remained, for the day, north of the river, to guiird the fords above Germanla, nnd as a precaution against an attack In the rear. Wilson and ' Gregg drove off the confederate pickets, pasaed the river, and by 6 a. m., the pon toon bridges were ready for the Infantry and artillery to cross. A little after 1 p. m., a message was sent to Burnside to advance. The country about Old Wilderness tav ern was generally heavily wooded ond cov ered with dense undergrowth, with here and there a small clearing. Most of the roads were narrow and bad. - From Ger manla Ford to Todd's Tavern, we find the Germanla, or Brock, road. Intersecting this road were two others, leading to Orange court house, which were unusually good for this part of Virginia. The northern one was known as the Turnpike, and the other as the Plank road. By the two latter Lee was enabled to concentrate rapidly to meet Grant The crossing of the Infantry being as sured, Wilson pushud on to Parker's store, and Gregg to Chancellorsvllle. Warren took position at the Wlldorness Tavern and intrenched, and by sunset Sedgwick was in position on his left, Hancock encamped Six miles east of Warren. A large force of confederate cavalry hav ing been reported near Fredericksburg. Sheridan ordered Gregg to bivouac near the Second corps. At 7:40 p. m. Wilson reports ; f 1 'rB'" j y i '': ' ,;v r 'v.;! MAJOR EDWARD J. M'CLERNAND, Rily During the Maneuvers Last from Parker's his patrols have been to the-Catharpln road, and also to within a mile of Mine Run, and only met small par ties of the enemy. Lee, however, had learned of Grant's movement, and had started his army to confront him. Hill was to move via the Plnnk r-ad, and to be fo'.lowed by Long street, who In the middle of the afternoon was at Gordonsvllle, more than twenty miles away. Ewell was nearby, and halted for tho night on the Turnpike, four miles east of Mine Run. Stuart was aware of Wilson's presence at Farker's, and Fltx hugh Lee knew a large cavalry force was near Chancellorsvlllo. We shall find Stuart's cavalry the next day moving to ward Corbln's bridge. Torbert crorsid at Ely's ford at daylight on the 6th, and moved to Chancellorsvllle. At 6 a. m.. on thj same date, Wilson, In compliance with orders from General Meade, which Sheridan says were not com municated to him, left one regiment at Parker's, and with the balance of his di vision pushtd en to Craig's meeting house, on the Catharpln road. Mcintosh, one of Wilson's brigade commanders, claims the regiment left at Parker's dismounted and with Spencer carbines resisted and delayed a large force of the enemy's Infantry for three hours. The entire division used In a similar way would probably have caused such delay that Grant would have been able to organlie his first line of attack with more method, and with better results. As It was his Infantry was thrown Into action In great haste and with much confusion. The regrment referred to being driven back, dl:ect communication with. Wilson was lost, and his retreat via Parker's cut off. These facts, however, were not known to him un til afternoon. By 8 a. m. Wilson's advance brigade arrived at Craig's, and Just beyond encountered Rosaer's brigade of Hampton's division. After several handsome charges Rosser was driven back about two miles. At this time the rear brigade waa posted at the Junptlon of the Catharpln and Par ker roads. Shortly after noon the enemy, being re-enforced, assumed the aggressive and drove the union cavalry hack, the ad . vance brigade being forced back on the rear one, and then both were compelled to IT. 8. A. From a Photo Taken at Fort Fall. retire. Wilson now learned the road to Parker's was held by confederate infantry, and ho decided to retire to Todd's tavern by a country road, but soon discovered his enemy was pushing in the same direction along the Catharpln road. With some diffi culty he managed to extricate his command and reached Todd's tavern, where he was met by Gregg's division, which had been sent to his assistance by Sheridan as soon as that officer had been Informed by Meade of the condition of affairs. Orepg attacked the enemy, who was following Wilson, and after a sharp fight drove him beyond Cor bln's bridge. The two divisions encamped so as to cover the roads meeting at Todd's tavern. Let us now glance at the Infantry strug gle during the day. Burnside, who, as tt.iUd, was at Warrenton on the 4th, moved promptly when Informed the Army of the I'oiomac was crossing, and although some of his troops had to march forty miles, the head of his co'unm was crossing, at Ger manla ford, early on the morning of the 6th. He did not, however, get into action on this date. Warren was ordered to move early to Parker's store, but met the enemy enroute. This fact was reported by Meade to Grant, who at 8:24 a. m. directed "If any oppor tunity presents Itself for pitching Into a part of Lee's army, do so without giving time for disposition." Aa Meade repeated these directions to Warren, with orders to "attack aa soon as you can," it la evident Warren's real fighting did not commence until the morning was well advanced. At 11 a. m. Mcintosh, with a regiment of cav alry, reports he has been seriously engaged with the enemy's infantry arriving via Parker's, and says as yet he has received no assistance from Crawford's division, which constituted Warren's advance force on the Parker road. These statements are Important aa showing the infantry battle on this part of the field did not commence early In the morning, as might bo Inferred from at least one leading history of the en gagement, as well as to show the part Wil son's division might have played In front of Hill's corps, had the entire division been entrenched at Parker's. Infantry continued to arrive, until beforo night tha Amy of the Potomac was) hotly engaged with Ewell'a and Hill's corps. The union lines extended from near Roach's to the intersection of the Brock and Plant roads. The confederates, to the west, con fronted this position. The next day tha union left rested near Trlgaa, and Lee's light was correspondingly extended. On the evening of the 6th Grant's right, under Sedgwick, was forced back to the Ger manla road. Tho battle of the Sth was bloody, without material advantage to either side. Sheridan's movements were hampered, by having to guard, near Chancellorsvllle, a train of over 4,000 wagona and the artil lery reserve. At 11:10 p. m., he writes to Meade, "I cannot do anything with the cavalry, except to act on the defensive, on account of the Immense amount of ma terial and trains here. Why cannot In fantry be sent to guard the trains, and let me take the offensive?" Certainly mors might have been accomplished by the fed eral cavalry. With superior forces they should have endeavored to beat Stuart, and to carry confusion to Tree's right and rear. The confederate cavalry, however, mused General Meade to be anxious as to his left. May 6. At 2 a. m. on this date Custer, with Ms own nnd Devln's brigade, ad vanced from near Chancellorsvllle to the Junction of the Furnace and Brock roads, from whero he opened communication with Gregg at Todd's Tavern. Later, Custer was ordered to advance along the Brock road, for the purpose of harassing Long street's corps, wnlch was reported as mass ing on Hancock's left. He met Fltshugh Lee and a severe engagement oecurred, both sides clnlmlng victory. Custer did not harass Longstreet, but he did open com munication with Hancock's left. Hancock heard the firing, nnd believing Longstreet was attempting to turn his left, re-enforced It. At 1 p. m., Meade, because of Incorrect Information, became alarmed about his left flank, and Informed Sheridan that Han cock's left had been turned and directed him to draw In his cavalry nearer the trains. This was done, Cunter retiring about dark. The report proved to be a mistake, and the ground surrendered had to be recovered the next day at .the cost of a cavalry battle. During this day, the 6th. the Infantry fighting was sanguinary In the extreme. Burnside and Longstreet were both up. The latter extended Lee's right, while two divi sions of Burnslde's corps were placed in the lines of the Army of the Potomac to . All unoccupied intervals; the third division (colored), under Ferrero, was sent to assist In guarding the trains, and Burnside did not Ree It again until July. An Impartial study of the rebellion records will. I think, convince one that the tactical advantage rested with Lee. It will be remembered -he forced the union right back during the evening. Grant, being on his enemy's flank, or at least compelling him to form line of battle parallel to his line of communications (to ward Richmond) possessed the strategical advantage. Referring to the Infantry battle of this day. Grant says, "the ground fought over varied in width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. The killed and many of tho severely wounded, of both armies, lay within the belt where It was impossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by bursting shells and the conflagration raged." The Impression In Lee's army was that Grant was beaten and would retire. Fltxhugh Iee asked Sluart if, in case the enemy retreated, it would not be well for him (Lee) to cross the Rapldan and get on his flank. They failed to properly Judgo the metal of their antagonist, who a few days later said, "I shall take no backward step," and who made good his word, though it cost a series of as bloody battles as tha world ever saw. On the 7th it became necessary for tha union cavalry to regain the ground volun tarily given up the day before. "This led to the battle of Todd's Tavern, a spirited fight for the possession of the cross roads at that point, participated in by tha enemy's cavalry and Gregg's division, and two brigades of Tolbert's division," now commanded by Merrltt, Torbert being I1L Sheridan's orders for this engagement were for Gregg to assail the enemy on the Catharpln road with one brigade and drive htm over Corbln's bridge, while Merrltt at tacked him with the reserve brigade on th Rnottsvlvanla road. In conjunction with Davtea' brigade of Gregg's division, which was to advance via the Plney church roa4 and Join Merritt'a left. After a stubborn resistance Stuart retire toward Corbln's bridge and Spottsylvania, That evening Sheridan posted Wilson at Alsop's, and withdrew his other divisions to the vicinity of Todd'a tavern. This withdrawal turned out to be unfortunate. The fighting on this day. the Vth, between the Infantry was comparatively little, but Grant had despaired of crushing Lee In the Wilderness, and decided to threaten his communications and line of retreat, by moving to Spottsylvania, and gave orders accoidlngly to move that night. It was this proposed change that rendered It (Continued on Page Fourteen.)