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H
HI JTKINLEY'S MESSAGE.
HI AS READ BEFORE THE NATION-
HHl AL CONGRESS.
Bfi Vfcalti of Oar Money 8y tem Pointed
BB Oat The Cuban Question Dl cus ed at
Bfi . * > njta Other Foremen Matters
H9 ] Speedy Annexation of Hawaii Urged
BS Alaska in Need of Attention , Etc.
H National and International Questions.
Bl WASHINGTON , Dec. 7. The mes-
BWBtfll * aBG o President McKinley is as fol-
B' ' I lows :
BflBr I To the Senate and House of Reprc-
B' I en tat Ives : It gives me pleasure to ex-
fl I tend greeting to the Fifty-fifth con-
H , I gress.assembled in regular session at
i I the seat of government , with many of
K i -whob-e senators and representatives
H' ' 1 I have been associated in the legisla-
B E * * v * EC-rvice. Their meeting occurs un-
B 1 tl2r idicitous conditions , jusUyIn-j
Hl sincere congratulation and calling for
Hi our grateful acknowledgment to a be-
B' xeficent Providence which has so sig-
Bifl nally blessed and prospered us as a
BfS nation. Peace and good will with all
Hijl the nations of the earth continue un-
Bjjffi J Iroken.
BftB - matter of genuine satisfaction is
Hfn * he growing feeling of fraternal re-
B | card and unification of all sections of
B'l our countryf tnc incompleteness of
Bl rhich ha" ; too long delayed realization
Bl of tae highest blessings of the union.
Bf The spirit of patriotism is universal
Bf &n& * s ever increasing in fervor. The
Bf public questions which now most en-
BJ Cross us are lifted far above either
BBSs partisanship , prejudice or former sec
I tional difference. They affect every
I H • I > art of our common country alike , and
B | ' permit of no division on ancient lines.
Bl Questions of foreign policy , of revenue ,
H | ; the soundness of the currency , the
B | Inviolability of national obligations ,
B tbe Improvement of the public service
Hff WLT.pchl to the individual con.cl' -juc- '
Bli ° * every earnest citizen to whatever
Bjl party he belongs , or in whatever sec-
BI tion of the country he may reside.
H | | | The extra session of this congress ,
Hj | I 'Which closed during July last enacted
B" Important legislation , and while its
B-J full effect has not yet been realized ,
Hjf -what it has already acomplished as-
Bfi cures us of its timeliness and wisdom.
Hp To test its permanent value further
Bi1 time will be required and the people ,
BjP satisfied with its operation and re-
BSl cults , thus far , are in no mind to with-
BH Jiold from it a fair trial.
fj Tariff legislation having been settled
BBS'S y * ne cxtra session of congress , the
BH question next pressing for considera-
Bij' * lon is tJiat of tne currenCyTne work
Bl ) * ' putting our finances upon a sound
Bri basis , difficult as it may seem , will
BBB If ap er.r easier when we recall the llnan-
H | | | cial operations of the government
Hl since 1866. On the 30th day of June
B | ; of that year we had outstanding de-
Bgi ! mand liabilities in the sum of $728 , -
Jff 868,477.41. On the 1st of January ,
Blf 1879 , these liabilities had been reduced
m3i to $443,889,495.88. Of our interest-bear
ing obligations the figures are even
more striking. On July 1 , 186G , the
I principal of the interest-bearing debt
of the government was $2,332,331,208.
On the 1st of July , 1893. this sum had
toot-i reduced to $585,0P.7,103 or ai ag-
sswgg : ; ! gregate reduction of $1,747,294,108. The
BBE I < interest-bearing debt of the United
H [ [ § \ Etates on the 1st day of December ,
BBWf ; 1897 , was $847,365,620. The govern-
flBMj I anent money now outstanding ( Decem-
Hff ber 1 consists of $346,681,016 of
flf ! United States notes , $107,793,280 of
Bl 1 treasury notes issued by authority of
ni the law of 1890 , $384,963,304 of silver
R | certificates and $61,280,761 of standard
Bi ' ' silver dollars.
u W'ilh the great resources of the gov-
Hg ernment and with the- honorable ex-
Hh ' ample of the past before us , we ought
Bfffi no * - ° hesitate to enter upon a cur-
w rency revision which will make our
HfK demand obligations less onerous to
W | the government and relieve our finan-
BiK cial Jaws from ambiguity and doubt.
HHH The brief review of what was ac-
npilj complished from the close of the war
H | 3 to1S93 , makes unreasonable and
Bfm groundless any distrust either .of' our
H9 nim\il ability or soundness , whii < >
BB tne situation from 1893 to 1897 must
BIbH admonish congress of the immediate
Km .necessity of so legislating as to make
Bfi I the return of the conditions then pre-
IsBuVailing impossible.
Eww There are many plans proposed as
HB | < B remedy for the evil. Before we can
Hraijfind the true remedy we must appre-
Bk 'Ciate the real evil. It is not that our
Bicurrency of every kind is not good ,
H "for every dollar of it is good ; good be-
BfiHcause the government's pledge is to
Si Jieep it so , and that pledge will not be
MK broken. However , the guaranty of our
Mw purpose to keep the pledge will be best
XK shown by advancing toward its ful-
K iillment.
H [ The evil of the present system is
BeS found tin ithe great cost to the govern-
B : ment of maintaining the parity of our
B different.forms of money , that is.keep-
HK * n& a11 of theni at par with gold. We
HHf surely-cannot be longer heedless of the
Hj burden this imposes upon the people.
BR even under fairly prosperous condi-
KS tions , while the past four years have
9 demonstrated that it is not only an ex-
| BS8 pensive charge to the government but
Bl * dangerous menace to the national
BBfi credit.
| 9B It is manifest that we must devise
BffiV come plan to protect the government
Bn against bond Issues for repeated re-
HBH demptions. We must either curtail the
BS opportunity for speculation , made easy
HkB& tne multiplied redemptions of our
HhMJ demand obligations or to increase the
HBH gold reserve for their redemption. Wo
H have $900,000,000 of currency which the
Bff government by solemn enactment has
Hj B undertaken to keep at par with gold.
BB Kobody is obliged to redeem in gold
H BB DUt the S ° vernment- The banks are
Bl not required to redeem in gold. The
B government is obliged to keep equal
BBfi witD goI < 1 al ] its outstandine currency
B find co5n obligations , while its re-
B ceipts are-not required to be paid in
PBBH eold. They are paid in every kind of
llflBBl money but gold , and the only means
BHBkI by which the government can with
BHB1 certainty get gold is by borrowing. It
BbbssHI can get it in no other way when it
BHBH most needs it. The government , with-
HPil out any fixed gold revenue , is pledg-
P § sd to maintain gold redemption , which |
LssssssBssssmBsBHn
L asP
* * * * * * * Bss *
asPB '
Is has steadily and faithfully done ,
and which * under the authority now
given it will continue to do.
The law -which requires the govern
ment after having redeemed its notes
to pay them out again as current
funds demands a constant replenish
ment of the gold reserve. This is es
pecially so in times of business panic
and when the revenues are insuffi
cient to meet the expenses of the gov
ernment. At such times the govern
ment has no other way to supply it3
deficit and maintain redemption but
through the increase of its bonded in
debtedness , .and during the adminis
tration of my predecessor $262,313,400
of 4i per cent bonds were issued and
sold and the proceeds used to pay the
expenses of the government in excess
of the revenues and sustain the gold
reserve. While it is true that the
greater part of the proceeds of these
bonds were used to supply deflceint
revenues , a considerable portion was
required to maintain the gold reserve.
With our revenues equal to our ex
penditures there would be no deficit-
requiring the issuance of bonds. But
if the gold reserve falls below $100-
006,000 how will it be replenished ex
cept by selling more bonds ? Is there
any other way practicable under ex
isting law ? The serious question ,
then is , shall we continue the policy
that has been pursued in the past
that is , when the gold reserve reaches
the point of danger , issue more bonds
and supply the needed gold , or shall
we provide other means to prevent
these recurring drains upon the gold
reserve ? If no further legislation is
had and the policy of Gelling bonds
is to be continued , then congress
should give the secretary of the treas
ury authority to sell bonds at long or
short periods , bearing a less rate of
interest than is now authorized by
law.
law.I
I earnestly recommend as soon as
the receipts of the government are
quite sufficient to pay all the expenoes
of the government , that when any of
the United States notes are presented
for redemption in gold , and are re
deemed in gold , such notes shall be
kept and set apart , and only paid out
in exchange for gold. This is an ob
vious duty. If the holder of the
United States note prefers the gold
and gets it from the government , he
should not receive back from the gov
ernment a United States note without
paying gold in return for it. The
reason for this is made all the more
apparent when the government issues
an interest bearing debt to provide
gold for the redemption of United
States notes a non interest bearing
debt. Surely it should not pay them
out again except on demand , .for gold.
If they are put out in any other way
they may return again , to be followed
by another bond issue to redeem a
non-interest bearing debt.
In my view it is of the utmost im
portance that the government should
be relieved from the business of pro
viding all the gold required fo * ex
changes and export. This responsibil
ity is alone borne by the government
without any of the usual and neces
sary banking powers to help itself.
The banks do not feel the strain of
the gold redemption. The whole
strain rests upon the government and
the size of the gold reserve in the
treasury has come to be , with or with
out reason , the signal of danger or of
security. This ought to be stopped.
If we are to have an era of prosper
ity in the country , with sufficient re-
ceipts.for the expenses of the govern
ment , we may feel no great embar
rassment from our present currency ,
but the danger still exists and will
be ever present , menacing us as long
as the present ysstem continues. And
beside it is in times nf nrlpnnnto rev
enues and business tranquility that
the government should prepare for
the worst. We cannot avoid without
serious consequences the wise con
sideration and prompt solution of
this question.
The secretary of the treasury has
outlined a plan in great detail for the
purpose of removing the threatened
recurrence of a depleted gold reserve
and save us from future embarrass
ment on that account. To this plan
I invite your careful consideration.
I concur with the secretary of the
treasury in his recommendation that
national banks be allowed to issue
notes to the face value of the bonds
they have deposited for circulation ,
and that the tax on circulating notes
secured by deposit of such bonds be
reduced to one-half of 1 per cent per
annum. I also join him in reccom-
mending that authority be given for
the establishment of national banks
with a minimum capital of $25,000.
This will enable the smaller villa s
and agricultural regions of the coun
try to be supplied with currency to
meet their needs.
I recommend that the issue of
national bank notes be restricted to
the denomination of $10 and upward.
If the suggestions I have herein made
shall have the approval of congress
then I would reconmmend that na
tional banks be required to redeem
their notes in gold.
REVIEW OF SITUATION IN CUBA.
The most important problem with
which this government is now called
upon to deal pertaining to it3 foreign
relations concerns its duty towards
Spain and the Cuban insurrection.
Problems and conditions more or less
in common with those now existing
have confronted this government at
various times in the past. The story
of Cuba for many years has been one
of unrest , growing discontent , an ef
fort toward a larger enjoyment of lib
erty and self-control , of organized re
sistance 'to ' the mother country , or de
pression and distress and warfare , and
of ineffectual settlement , to be fol
lowed by renewed revolt. For no en
during period since the enfranchise
ment of the continental possessions
of Spain in the western continent has
the condition of Cuba or the policy
of Spain toward Cuba not caused con
cern to the United States.
The prospect from time to time
that the weakness of Spain's hold up
on the island and the-political vicis
situdes and embarassments of the
home government might lead to the
transfer of Cuba to a continental pow
er , called forth , between 1S23 and 1860.
various emphatic declarations of the
policy of the United States to permit
no disturbances of Cuba's connection
with Spain unless in the direction of
independence or acquisition by the
United States through purchase ; nor
has there been any condition to this
declared policy since upon the part of
the government.
k
' HJI . lilllll l l II
. .
_
The revolution which began in 1868
lasted for ten years , despite the stren
uous efforts of the successive peninsu
lar governments to suppress it. Then ,
as now , the government of the United
States testified its grave concern and
offered its aid to put an end to blood
shed in Cuba. The overtures made by
General Grant were refused and the
war dragged , entailing great loss of
life and treasure and increased injury
to American interests , besides throw
ing enhanced burdens of neutrality
upon this government. In 1878 peace
was brought about by the truce of
Zanjon , obtained by negotiations be
tween the Spanish commander Mar
tinez de Campos and the insurgent
leaders.
The present Insurrection broke out
in February , 1895. It is not my pur
pose at this time to recall its remark
able increase or to characterize its
tenacious resistance against the enor
mous forces massed against it by
Spain. The revolt and the efforts to
subdue it carried destruction to every
quarter of the island , developing wide
proportions and defying the efforts of
Spain for its suppression. The civ
ilized code of war has been disre
garded , no less so by the Spaniards
than by the Cubans.
The existing conditions cannot bul ,
fill this government and the American'
people with the gravest apprehension.
There is no desire on the part of our
people to profit by the misfortunes of
Spain. We have only the desire to
see the Cubans prosperous and con
tented , enjoying that measure of self-
control which is the inalienable right
of man , protected in their right to
reap the benefit of the exhaustless
treasures of their country.
The offer made by my predecessor
in April , 1896 , tendering the friendly
offices of this government , failed. Any
mediation on our part was not ac
cepted. In brief the answer read :
"There is no effectual way to pacify
'Cuba unless it begins with the actual
submission of the rebels to the mother
country. " Then only could Spain act
In the promised direction , of her own
motion and after her own plans. The
cruel policy of concentration was in
itiated February 16 , 1896. The pro
ductive districts controlled by the
Spanish armies were depopulated and
the agricultural inhabitants were
herded in and about the garrison
towns , their land laid waste and their
dwellings destroyed. This policy the
late cabinet of Spain justified as a
necessary measure of war and as a
means of cutting off supplies from the
insurgents. It has utterly failed as a
war measure. It was not civilized
warfare. It was extermination.
Against this abuse of the rights of
war I have felt constrained on re
peated occasions to enter the firm and
earnest protest of this government.
There was much of public condemna
tion of the treatment of American cit
izens by alleged illegal arrests and
long imprisonment , awaiting trial or
pending protracted judicial procedure.
I felt it my first duty to make instant
demand for the release or speedy trial
of all American citizens under arrest.
Before the change of the Spanish cab
inet in October last twenty-two pris
oners , citizens of the United States ,
had been given their freedom.
For the relief of our own citizens
suffering because of the conflict , the
aid of congress was sought in a special
message and under the appropriations
of April 4 , 1897 , effective aid has been
given to American citizens in Cuba ,
and many of them at their own re
quest nave been returned to tbe united
States.
The instructions given to our new
minister to Spain before his departure
for his post directed him to impress
upon the government the sincere
wish of the United States to lend its
aid toward the ending of the war in
Cuba by reaching a peaceful and last
ing result , just and honorable alike to
Spain and the Cuban people. These
instructions recited the character and
duration of the contest , the widespread
losses it entails , the burdens and re
straints it imposes upon us , with con
stant disturbance of national interests
and the injury resulting from an in
definite continuance of this state of
things. It was stated that at this
juncture our government was con
strained to seriously inquire if the
time was not ripe when Spain of her
own volition , moved by her own in
terests and every sentiment of human
ity should put a stop to this destruct
ive war and make proposals of settle
ment honorable to herself and just to
her Cuban colony. It was urged that
as a neighborhing nation , with large
interests in Cuba , we could be requir
ed to wait only a resonable time for
the mother country to establish
its authority and restore peace and
order within the borders of the is
land ; that we could not contemplate an
indefinite period for the accomplish
ment of this result.
No solution was proposed to which
the slightest idea of humiliation tote
to Spain could attach , and , indeed ,
precise proposals were withheld to
avoid embarrassment to that govern
ment. All that was asked or expected
was that some safe way might be
speeany provided and permanent peace
restored. It so chanced that the con
sideration of this offer , addressed to
the same Spanish administration
which had directed the tenders of my
predecessor , and which for more than
two years had poured men and treas
ure into Cuba in the fruitless effort to
suppress the revolt , fell to others. Be
tween the departure of General Wood
ford , the new envoy , and his arrival
in Spain , the statesman who had
shaped the policy of his country fell
/by the hand of an assassin , and al
though the cabinet of the late pre
mier still held office and received from
" our envoy the'proposals he bore , that
cabinet gave place within a few days
thereafter to a new administration un
der the leadership of Sagasta.
The reply to our note was received
on the 23d day of October. It is in the
direction of a better understanding.
It appreciates the friendly purposes
of this government. It admits that
our country is deeply affected by the
war in Cuba and that its desires for
tipaoe are just It declares that the
present Spanish government is bound
by every consideration to a change in
policy that should satisfy the United
States and pacify Cuba within reason
able time. To this end Spain has de
cided to put into effect the political
reforms heretofore advocated by the
present premier , without nalting for
any consideration in the path which
In its judgment leads to peace. The
military operations , it Is said , will
'
wmfta&ir&l + 4 ' " - , , „ * V in ni "
" / dis
continue , but wil be humapo and con
ducted with all regard ( to private
rights , being accompanied/ / political
action leading to the Autonomy of
Cuba , while guarding Spanish sover-
ingty. This , it is clainded , will result
in investing Cuba wltti a distinct per
sonality ; the island ib be governed by
an executive and by a local council , or
chamber , reserving to Spain the con
trol of the forcigri relations , the army
and navy and the judicial administra
tion. To accomplish this the present
government proposes to modify ex
isting legislation by decree , leaving
the Spanish CoVtes , with the aid of
Cuban senators iind deputies , to solve
the economic problem and properly
distribute the existing debt.
In the absence 4of a declaration of
the measures that the government
proposes to take in carrying out its
proffer of good offices , It suggests that
Spain be left free to conduct opera
tions and grant political reforms ,
while the United States for its part
shall enforce its neutral obligations
and cut off the assistance which it is
asserted the insurgents receive from
this country. The supposition of an
indefinite prolongation of the war Is
denied. It is asserted that the western
provinces are already well nisht : re
claimed ; that the planting of cane and
tobacco therein has been resumed
and that by force of arms and new
and amply reform very early and
completed pacification is hoped for.
The immediate amelioration of ex
isting conditions under the new ad
ministration of Cuban affairs is pre
dicted , and therewith all the disturb
ance and all occasion for any change
'of attitude on the part of the United
States. Discussion of questions of In
ternational duties and responsibilities
of the United States , as Spain under
stands them , is presented , with an ap
parent disposition to charge us with
failure in this regard. This charge is
without any basis in fact. It could not
have been made if Spain had been cog
nizant of the constant efforts this gov
ernment has made at the cost of mil
lions , and by the employment of the
administrative machinery at the com
mand of the nation to perform its full
duty according to the laws of nations.
That it has successfully presented the
departure of a single military expedi
tion or armed vessel from our shores
in violation of our laws would seem
to be a sufficienty answer. But of this
aspect of the Spanish note it is not
necessary to speak further now. Firm
in the conviction of a wholly perform
ed obligation , due response to thi3
charge has been made in diplomatic Is
sues. Throughout all these horrors and
dangers to our own peace this gov
ernment-has never in any way abro
gated its sovereign prerogative of re
serving to itself the determination of
its policy and course according to Its
own high sense of right and in con
sonance with the dearest interests and
convictions of our own people should
the prolongation of the strife so de
mand.
Of the untried measures there re
main only : "Recognition of the in
surgents as belligerents ; recognition
of the independence of Cuba ; neutral
intervention to end the war by im
posing a rational compromise between
the contestants , and intervention ; in
favor of one or the other parties. I
speak not of forcible annexation , for
that cannot be thought of. That by our
code of morality would be criminal
aggregssion. "
Recognition of the belligerency of
the Cuban insurgents has often been
canvassed as a possible , if not in
evitable step , both in regard to the
previous ten years' struggle and dur
ing the present war. I am not un
mindful that the two houses of con
gress in the spring of 1896 expressed
the opinion by concurrent resolution
that a condition of public war existed
requiring or justifying the recognition
of a state of belligerency in Cuba , and
during the extra session the senate
voted a joint resolution of like im
port , which , however , was not brought
to a vote in the house. In the pres
ence of these significant expressions
of sentiment of the legislative branch ,
it behooves the executive to soberly
consider the conditions under which
so important a measure must needs
rest for justification. It is to be seri
ously considered whether the Cuban
insurrection possesses beyond dispute
the attributes of sisterhood which
alone can demand the recognition of
belligerency in its favor. Possession ,
in short , of the essential qualifications
of sovereignity by the insurgents and
the conduct of the war by them ac
cording to the recognized code of war
are noless important factors toward the
determination of the problem or
belligerency than are the influences
and consequences of the struggle upon
the internal policy of the recogniz
ing state.
The wise utterances of President
Gnnt , in his memorable message of
December 7 , 1875 , are signally rele
vant to the present situation in Cuba ,
and It may be wholesome now to re
call them. At that time a ruinous con
flict had for seven years wasted the
neighboring island. During all those
years an utter disregard of the laws of
civilized warfare and the just de
mands of humanity , which called forth
expressions of condemnation from the
nations of Christendom , continued un
abated. Desolation and ruin pervaded
that productive region , enormously af
fecting the commerce of all commer
cial nations , but that of the United
States more than any other by reason
of proximity and larger trade and in
tercourse. At that junction General
Grant uttered these words , which now ,
' . < then , sum up the elements of the
problem :
"A recognition of the independence
of Cuba being , in my opinion , imprac
ticable , the question which next pre
sents itself is that of the recognition
of the belligerent rights of the parties
to the contest. In a former message
to congresss I had occasion to con
sider this question and reached the
conclusion that the conflict in Cua ! ,
dreadful and devastating as were its
incidents , did not rise to the fearful
dignity of war.
"It is possible that the acts of for
eign powers , and even the acts of
Spain itself of this very nature , might
be pointed to in defense of such rec
ognition. But now , as in its past his
tory , the United States should care
fully avoid the false lights which
might lead it into the mazes of doubt
ful law and of questionable propri
ety , and adhere rigidly and sternly to
the rule which has been its guide , of
doing only that which is right and
honest and of good report. The ques-
J" , ' . . . " "
miMS'jf. : i i . . . i .nil.i mi. ,
. . , . . .
' '
i..inn i i i ii ,
t |
i ii iii. nf WilMKWnMWdMllJVl'HH'fi'S ' | '
tlon of according or withholding
rights of bellegcrency must be judged
In every case in view of the partioulai
attending facts. Unless justified by
necessity it is always , and justly , re
garded as an unfriendly act ana a gra
tuitous demonstration of moral sup
port to the rebellion. It is necessary ,
and it is required , when the Interests
and rights of another government or
of Its people are so far affected by a
pending civil conflict as to require a
definition of its relations to the par
ties thereto. But this conflict must
be one which will be recognized in
the sense of international law as war.
"Belligerence , too , Is a fact. The
more existence of contending armed
bodies and their occasional conflicts
do not constitute war in the sense re
ferred to. Applying to the existing
condition of affairs In Cuba , the tests
recognized by publicists and writers
on international law , and which have
been observed by nations of dignity ,
honesty and power , when free from
sensitive , selfish and unworthy mo
tives , I fail to find in the insurrection
• the existence of such a substantial po
litical organization , real , palpable
and manifest to the world , having the.
forms and capable of the ordinary
functions of government toward Its
own people and to other statcn , with
courts for the administration of jus
tice , with a local habitation , possess
ing such organization of force , such
material , such occupation of territory
as to take the contest out of the cat
egory of a mere rebellious Insurrec
tion , or occasional skirmishes , and
place it on the terible footing of war ,
to which recognition of belligerency
would aim to elevate it.
"The contest , moreover , Is solely
on land ; the insurrection lias not pos
sessed itself of a single seaport
whence it may send forth its flag , nor
has it any means of communication
with foreign powers , except through
the military lines of its adversaries.
No apprehension of any of those sud
den and difficult complications which
a war xipon the ocean is apt to pre
cipitate upon the vessels both com
mercial and national , and upon the
consular officers of other powers ,
calls for the definition of their rela
tions to the parties to the contest.
Considered as a question of expediency
I regard the accordance of belliger
ent rights still to be as unwise as
I regard it to be , at present , indefen
sible , as a measure of right.
"Such recognition entails upon the
country , according the rights of war
which flow from It difficult and com
plicated duties , and requires the ex
action from the contending parties of
the strict observance of their rights
and obligations. It confers the right
of search upon the high seas by ves
sels of both parties ; it would subject
the carrying of arms and munitions of
war , which now may be transported
freely and without interruption In
vessels of the United States , to de
tention and to possible seizure ; It
would give rise to countless vexatious
questions , would release the parent
government from responsibility for
acts done by the insurgents , and
would invest Spain with the right to
exercise the supervision recognised by
our treaty of 1795 over our commerce
on the high seas , a very large part of
which , in its traffic between the At
lantic and Gulf states and between all
of them and the states on the Pacific ,
passes through the waters which
wash the shores of Cuba. The ex
ercise of this supervision could scarce
fail to lead , if not to abuses , certainly
to collisions perilous to the peaceful
relations of the two states. There i
can be little doubt as to what result
supervision would before long draw
this nation. It would be unworthy cf
the United States to inaugurate the
possibilities of such result , by meas
ures of questionable right or exp'j-li-
ency , or by any indirection. "
Turning to the practical aspects of
a recognition of belligerancy and re
viewing its inconveniences and posi
tive dangers , still further pertinent
considerations appear. In the code
of nations there is no such thing as
a naked recognition cf belligerency
unaccompanied by the resumption of
international neutrality. Such rec
ognition without more will confer
upon neither party to a domestic con
flict a status not heretofore actually
possessed nor affect the relation of
either party to other states. The act
of recognition usually takes the form
of a solemn proclamation of neutral
ity which recites the de facto condi
tion of belligerency as its motives.
It announces a domestic lavof neu
trality in the declariner state. It As
sumes the international obligations
of a neutral in the presence of a pub
lic state of war. It warns all citizens
and others within the jurisdiction of
the proclamation that they violate
those rigorous obligations at thejir
peril , and cannot expect to be shielded
from the consequences. The right of
visit and search on the seas , and seiz
ure of vessels and cargoes and contra
band of war and good prize under ad
miralty law must , under international
law , be admitted as a legitimate con
sequence of a proclamation of bellig
erency. While according the equal
belligerent rights defined by public
law to each party in our ports , dis
favors would be imposed on both ,
which , while nominally equal , would
weigh heavily on behalf of ? pai.i her
self. Possessing a navy and controll
ing the ports of Cuba , her rnaratime
rights could be assorted not only for
the military investment of the island ,
but up to the margin of our own ter
ritorial waters , and a condition of
things would exist for which the Cu
bans within their own domain could
not hope to create a parallel , while
its creation of aid or sympathy from
within our domains would be even
more impossible than now , with the
additional obligations of neutrality
we would perforce assume.
The enforcement of this enlarged
and onerous code of neutrality would
only be influential within our own
jurisdiction by land and sea and ap
plicable by our own instrumentalities.
It could impart to the United States
no jurisdiction between Spain and the
insurgents. It would give to tin
United States no right of intervention
to enforce the conduct of the strife
within tbe paramount authority of
Spain , according to the international
code of war.
I'or these reasons I regard th rec
ognition of the belligerency of the
Cubans as no's unwise , and therefore
inadmissablev. Should that step
hereafter be deemed wise as a meas
ure of right and duty the ° ecutive .
will take it.
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! i I I i i i ii i i ii IT ! T
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_
Intervention upon humanitarians } M M
grounds has been frequently euggest- JAt _ H
ed and has not failed to receive ay J l H
most anxious and earnest consluorp.- jy H
tion. But should such a step bo now- _ / > " ' . _ _
taken , when It is apparent that a Ajijr H
hopeful change has supervened in the H
policy of Spain toward Cuba ? A now V H
government has taken office in tho- i ( J m
mother country. It Is pledged in ad- B | m
vance to the declaration that all the- - wH \
effort In the world cannot suffice to * iM * * H
maintain peace in Cuba by the "bayonet ; % H
that vague promises of reform after- ' / M M
subjugation afford no solution of the- , M
Insular problem ; that with a substi- ( j j H
tution of commanders must como a. ' , M
change of the past system of warfare * H
for ono in harmony with a new policy , f * H
which shall no longer aim to drive M
the Cubans to the "horrible alternative - M
tivo of taking to the thicket or sue- M
cumbing in misery ; " that reforms- H
must be instituted in accordance with * H
the needs and circumstances of time , j H
and that these reforms , while design- H
cd to give full autonomy to the colony H
and to create a virtual entity and self- f H
controlled administration , shall yet ' Lssfl
conserve and affirm the sovereignty of H
Spain by a just distribution of power ? H
and burdens upon a basis of mutual' 1
interest untainted by methods of selfish - 1
fish expediency. |
The first act3 of the new government - ) H
ment lie in these honorable paths. The * > H
policy of cruel rapine and extermination - ' k
tion that so long shocked the unlver- H
sal sentiment of humanity has been. , ' < LsH
reversed. Under the new military H
commander a broad clemency Is prof- B
fcrcd. Measures have already becrr B
set afoot to relieve the horrors or y flBVJ
starvation. The power of the Spanish
armies , it is asserted , is to be used' * , * K AJBV
not to spread ruin and desolation but 'ftVBB
to protect the resumption of peaceful * . jJBVJ
agricultural pursuits and productiveAVBv
industries. That past methods nro * AJBV
futile to force a peace by subjugation SBSJ
is freely admitted , and that ruin- < , &
without conciliation must inevitably flHBV
fail to win for Spain the fidelity of a- j lftV
contented dependency. H
Decrees in application of the fore- VABJ
shadowed reforms have already been' SVBb
promulgated. The full text of theseABBS
decrees has not been received , but as flBBB
furnished in a telegraphic summary B
from our minster arc : All civil anO flBBB
clectroal rights of peninsular SpanBBBH
iards are. in virtue of existing constBBflfl !
tutions authority , forthwith extended ! ABBflJ
to colonial Spaniards upon rati flea- BBBBJ
tion by the Cortes. It creates a Cuban BBBH
parliament , which , with the insularr BBflB
executive , can consider and vote uponflBBB
all subjects affecting local order ant ? BBflB
interests , possessing unlimited powers flBflJ
save as to matters of state , war andBBflJ
navy , as to which the governor general BBflJ
acts by his own authority as the del- BBa
egate of the central government. This H
parliament receives the oath of the HBB
governorgeneralto preserve faithfully jflBfl
the liberties and privileges of the col- jIBA
ony , and to it the colonial secretaries- B
are responsible. It has the rjht to j fl
propose to the central government . BBB
through the governor general , modi- BBB
fications of national charter and' flB
to invite new projects of law or ex- fl
ecutive measures in the interest of the- BB
colony. Bfl
Besides its local powers it is competent - { H
petent , fiht , to regulate electoral reg- BflJ
istration and procedure and prescribe- AflJ
the qualifications of electors and thoAflfl
manner of exercising suffrage ; scond „ B
to organize courts of justice with na * raMflflfl
five judges from members of the IofwflflB
cal bar ; third , to frame the insular- / V # flBB
budget both as to expenditures and' B
revenues to meet the Cuban share of flflj
the national budget , whicii later wiir BBB
be voted by the national Cortes , with- B
the assistance of Cuban senators and' BBl
deputies ; fourth , to institute or take- BBa
part in the negotiations of the na- BB
tional Government for commercials BB
treaties which may affect Cuban in- BB |
terests ; fifth , to accept or reject com- BB
merc-ial treaties which the national * M
government may have concludccT ' BSJ
without the participation of the Cuban * jBfla
government ; sixth , to frame the colBflB
onial tariff , acting in accordance with' H
the penisular government in schedul- | BBl
ing articles of mutual commerce be B
tween the mother country and the col- B
onies. Before introducing or votingr BBB
upon a bill , the Cuban government , or- B
the Chambers , will lay the project beflflfl
fore the central government and hear"Yflfl
its opinion thereon , all the correspondence - B
pondence in such regard bfing made- B
public. Finally , all conflicts of jurisBfll
diction arising between the different ( jflfll
municipal , provincial and insular assemblies - B
semblies , or between the latter and the- BBb
insular executive power , and which ?
from their nature may not be referable- fl
to the central government for decision , . BflB
shall be submitted to the courts. Bflfl
That the government of Sagasta has- fl
entered upon a course from which re | |
cession with honor is impossible can. B
hardly be questioned ; that in the few B
weeks it has existed it has made earnest - |
est of the sincerity cf its professions- H
is undeniable. I shall not inpugn its- H
sincerity , nor should impatience be- |
suffered to embarras it in the task it , flflB
hps undertaken. It is honestly due to ( ' % ' H
Spain and to our friendly relations with X |
Spain that it should be given a rea |
sonable chance to realize its expecta- fl
tions and to prove the asserted efficacy B
of the new order of things to which- fl B
it stands irrevocably committed. It B B
has recalled the commander whose- B
brutal orders inflamed the American B B
mind and shocked the civilized world. ' j B B
It has modified the horrible order to BWBB
concentration and has undertaken to BVBB
care for the helpless and permit those- B
who desire to resume the cultivation- B
of their fields to do so and assure- B
them of the protection of the Spanish B
government in the lawful occupations. . - B
It has just released the Competitor ' ' B
prisoners , heretofore sentenced to B
death , and who have been the subject |
of repeated diplomatic correspondence |
during this and preceding administra- |
BBBb
Not a single American citizen is ' H
now under arrest or in confinement BBflB
in Cuba of whom this government has . JbWBWI
any knowledge. The near future wiir flVflVB
demonstrate whether the indispensflVBVfl
able condition of a righteous p ° ace IflV H
just alike to the Cubans and to Spain " BflS
ps well as equitable to all our interests flVH
so intimately involved in the welfare flVfl
of Cuba , is likely to be attained If v J B
not. the exigency of further and other- JBVBB
action by the United States will reflVflVI
main to be taken. When that timeflVfl
comes that action will be determlnrvr V flfl
in the line of the indisputable flH
rieht
and duty. It will be faced without 4b H
misgiving and hesitancy in the Uvhl BVBB
of the obligation this government SS JbIH
to itself , to the people * who have ZS H
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