WyW"W, pr y
DECEMBEB, 1915
The Commoner
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dred and thirty-six officers and one hundred and
thirty-four thousand seven hundred and seven
enlisted men, or 141,843, all told, all services,
rank and file, by the addition of fifty-two com
panies of coast artillery, fifteen companies of
engineers, ten regiments of infantry, four regi
ments of field artillery, and four aero squadrons,
besides seven hundred and fifty officers required
for a great variety of extra service, especially
the all important duty of training the citizen
force of which J shall presently speak, seven hun
dred and ninety-two non-commissioned officers
for service in drill, recruiting and the like, and
the necessary quota of enlisted men for the
'Quartermaster corps, the Hospital corps, the
Ordnance department, and other similar auxil
iary services. These are the additions necessary
to render the army adequate for its present du
ties, duties which it has to perform not only up
on our own continental coasts and borders and
at our interior army posts, but also in the Phil
ippines, in the Hawaiian Islands, at the Isthmus,
and in Porto Rico.
PLANS TO SUPPLEMENT REGULAR ARMY
FORCE AND INCREASE SIZE
OF NAVY
By way of making the country ready to assert
some part of its real power promptly and upon
a larger scale, should occasion arise, the plan
also contemplates supplementing the army by a
force of four hundred thousand disciplined cit
izens, raised in increments of one hundred and
thirty-three thousand a year throughout a period
of three years. This it is proposed to do by a
process of enlistment under which the service
able men o the country would be asked to bind
themselves to serve with the colors for purposes
of training for short periods throughout three
years, and to come to the colors at call at any
time throughout an additional "furlough" period
of three years. This force of four hundred
thousand men would be provided with personal
accoutrements as fast as enlisted and their
equipment for the field made ready to be sup
plied at any time. They would be assembled
for training at stated Intervals at convenient
places in association, with suitable units of the
regular army. Their period of annual training
would not -necessarily exceed two months in the
year.
It would depend upon the patriotic feeling
of the younger men of the country whether they
responded to such a call to service or not. It
would depend' Upon the patriotic spirit of the
employers of the country whether they made it
possible for the younger men in their employ to
respond under favorable conditions or not. I,
for one, do not doubt the patriotic devotion
either of our young men or of those who give
them employment, those for whose benefit and
protection they would in fact enlist. I would
look forward to the success of such an experi
ment with entire confidence.
At least so much by way of preparation for
defense seems to me to be absolutely imperative
now. We can. not do less.
The programme which will be laid before you
by the Secretary of the Navy is similarly con
ceived. It' involves only a shortening 'of the
time within which plans long matured shall bo
carried out; but it does make definite and ex
plicit a programme which has heretofore been
only implicit, held in the minds of the Commit
tees on Naval Affairs and disclosed in the de
bates of the two Houses but nowhere formu
lated or formally adopted. It seems to me very
clear that it will be to the advantage of the
country for the Congress to adopt a comprehen
sive plan for putting the navy upon a final foot
ing of strength and efficiency and to press that
Plan to completion within the next five years.
We have always looked to the navy of the coun
try as our first and chief line of defense; we
have always seen it to be our manifest course
of prudence to be strong on the seas. Year by
year we have been creating a navy which now
ranks very high indeed among the navies of the
maritime nations. We should now definitely de
termine how we shall complete what we have
begun, and how soon.
The programme to be laid before you contem
plates the construction within five years of ten
battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers,
fifty destroyers, fifteen fleet submarines, eighty
five coast submarines, four gunboats, one hos
PifaTshlp, two ammunition ships, two fuel oil
ships, and one repair ship. It is proposed that oft
this number we shall the first year provide for
the construction of two battle ships, two battle
cruisers, three scout cruisors, fifteen destroyers,
five fleet submarines, twenty-five coast subma-
y
rlnes, two gunboats, and one hoBnltal shin tho
coast S hmnHt8' Ur flCOt BUbra"lncJ3, fifteen
sh?D- L?i f3' n0 BUnboat' an one fuel oil
cr 1L1 fin d yIar' two battleships, one battle
Snf Ii .8C0Ut crulsera. vo destroyers, two
fleet submarines, and fifteen coast submarines;
crnfi h ycartwo ttlcshlps, two battle
cruisers, two scout cruisers, ten destroyers, two
fleet submarines, fifteen coast submarines, one
ammunition ship, and one fuel oil ship; and the
fifth year, two battleships, ono battle cruiser,
two scout cruisers, ten destroyers, two fleet sub
marines, fifteen coast submarines, ono gunboat,
one ammunition ship, and one repair ship.
The Secretary of the Navy is asking also for
the Immediate addition to the personnel of tho
navy of seven thousand five hundred sailors,
twenty-five hundred apprentice seamen, and fif
teen hundred marines. This increase would bo
sufficient to care for the ships which aro to bo
completed within the fiscal year 1917 and also
for the number of men which must bo put in
training to man the ships which will be com
pleted early in 1918. It is also necessary that
the number of midshipmen at tho Naval academy
at Annapolis should ho increased by at least
three hundred in order that the force of officers
should be more rapidly added to; and authority
is asked to appoint, for engineering duties only,
approved graduates of engineering colleges, and
for service in the aviation corps a certain num
ber of men taken from civil life.
If this full programme should be carried out
we should have built or building in 1921, accord
ing to the estimates of survival and standards of
classification followed by tho General Board of
the Department, an effective navy consisting of
twenty-seven battleships, of tho first line, six
battle cruisers, twenty-five battleships of the
second lino, ten armored cruisers, thirteen scout
cruisers, five first class cruisers, three second
class cruisers, ten third class cruisers, one hun
dred and eight destroyers, eighteen fleet sub
marines, one hundred and fifty-seven coast sub
marines, six monitors, twenty gunboats, four
supply ships, fifteen fuel ships, four trans
ports, three tenders to torpedo vessels, eight
vessels of special types, and two ammunition
ships. This would be a navy fitted to our needs
and worthy of our traditions.
TIME TO DECLARE OUR INDEPENDENCE
BY MEANS OF ADEQUATE MERCHANT
MARINE
But armies and Instruments of war are only
part of what has to be considered if wo are to
consider the supreme matter of national self
sufficiency and security in all its aspects. There
are other great matters which will be thrust
upon our attention whether wo will or not.
There is, for example, a very pressing question
of trade and shipping involved in thi3 great
loblem of national adequacy. It is necessary
for many weighty reasons of national efficiency
and development that we .should have a great
merchant marine. The great merchant fleet we
once used to make us rich, that great body of
sturdy sailors who used to carry our flag Into
every sea, and who were the pride and often the
bulwark of the nation, we have almost driven
out of existence by inexcusable neglect and in
difference and by a hopelessly blind and provin
cial policy of so-called economic protection. It
is high time we repaired our mistake and re
sumed our commercial independence on tho seas.
For it is a question of independence. If other
nations go to war or seek to hamper each other's
commerce, our merchants, it seems, are at their
mercy, to do with as they please. We must use
their ships, and use them as they determine. We
have not ships enough of our own. We can not
handle our own commerce on the seas. Our in
dependence is provincial, and Is only on land
and within our own borders. We are not likely
to be permitted to use even the ships of other
nations in rivalry of their own trade, and aro
without means to extend our commerce even
where the doors are wide open and our goods
desired. Such a situation Is not to be endured.
It is of capital importance not only that the
United States should be its own carrier on the
seas and enjoy the economic independence wh ch
only an adequate merchant marine would give
it but also that the American hemisphere as a
whole should enjoy a like independence and self
rufflciency, if it is not to be drawn into the tan
B?e of European affairs. Without such inde
pendence the whole question of our po itical
Xy and self-determination is very seriously
clouded and complicated indeed.
Moreover, we can develop no true or effective
American policy without ships of our own not
ships of war, but ships of peace, carrying goods
and carrying much moro; creating frlondsM
and rendoring indlsponsablo services to all' inters
csts on thin nldo tho water. They must more
constantly back and forth between tho Amorlciw.
They aro tho only shuttles that can weave the
dellcato fabric of sympathy, comprehension, con
fidence, and mutual dopendonco In which we
wish to clotho our policy of America for Amer
icans. The task of building up an adequato mer
chant marine for Amorlca, private capital muit
ultimately undortnko and achieve, ns It has un
dertaken and nchlovcd every other like task
amongst us In tho past, with admlrablo enter
prise, Intelllgonco, and vigor; and It secmg to
mo a manifoat dlctato of wisdom that wc should
promptly romovo ovcry legal obstacle that mar
stand In tho way of this much to bo desired re
vival of our old Independence nnd should facil
itate In ovory possible way tho building, pur
chase, and American registration of ships. But
capital can not accomplish this great task of a
Budden. It must embark upon It by degrees, ae
tho opportunities of trade dovolop. Something
must be dono at once; dono to open routes and
develop opportunities whore they are as yot un
developed; dono to open tho artorles of trad
where tho currents have not yot learned to run,
especially between the two American contin
ents, where they are, singularly enough, yet to
bo created and quickened; and It Is evident that
only the government can undertake such begin
nings and assume tho Initial financial risks.
When tho risk has passed and prlvato capital
begins to find Its way in sufficient nbundanco in
to these now channels, the government may with
draw. But it can not omit to begin. It should
take tho first stops, and should take them at
once. Our goods must not be piled up at our
ports and stored upon side tracks In freight
cars which are dally needed on tho roads; must
not bo left without means of transport to any
foreign quarter. We must not await the per
mission of foreign ship-owners and foreign gov
ernments to send them where wo will.
With a view to meeting these pressing ne
cessities of our commerce and availing ourselve
at tho earliest possible moment of the present
unparalled opportunity of Unking tho two
Americas together In bonds of mutual interest
and service, an opportunity which may never
return again If-Vo rnlss it now, proposals will be
made to tho present congress for tho purchase
or construction of ships to bo owned and directed
by the government similar to those mado to the
last congress, but modified In some essontlal
particulars. I recommend these proposals to
you for your prompt acceptance with tho more
confidence because every month that has elapsed
since tho former proposals were made has made
the necessity for such action moro and more
manifestly imperative. That need was then
foreseen; it is now acutely felt and everywhere
realized by those for whom trade Is waiting but
who can find no conveyance for their goods. I
am not so much Interested In the particulars of
tho programme as I am In taking Immediate ad
vantage of the great opportunity which await
us If we will but act In this emergency. In thf
matter, as In all others, a spirit of common coun
sel should prevail, and out of it should come am
early solution of this pressing problem.
FULLER JUSTICE FOR THE PHILIPPINES
AND PORTO RTCO PRESSED FOR -PASSAGE
There Is another matter which seems to me to
be very intimately associated with tho question
of national safety and preparation for defense.
That is our policy towards the Philippines and
the people of Porto Rico. Our treatment of
them and their attitude towards us are mani
festly of the first consequence In the develop
ment of our duties in the world and In getting
a free hand to perform those dutfes. We must
be free from every unnecessary burden or embar
rassment; and there Is no better way to be clear
of embarrassment than to fulfill our promises and
promote the interests of those dependent on ns to
the utmost. Bills for the alteration and reform
of the government of the Philippines and for
rendering fuller political justice to the people of
Porto Rico were submitted to tho Sixty-third
congress. They will be submitted also to yoa.
I need not particularize their details. You are
most of you already familiar with them. But I
do recommend them to your early adoption with
the sincere conviction that there are few meas
ures you could adopt which would more service
ably clear the way for the great policies by
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