The Commoner.
WILLIAM J. BRYAN, EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR
R$
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VOL. 9, NO. 34
Lincoln, Nebraska, September 3, 1909
Whole Number 450
Election of Senators by the People
Tho following correspondence explains itself:
Lincoln, Neb., July 13, 1909. Hon. William
H. Taft, The White House, Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir: Now that the states are going to
vote on the ratification of tho amendmont speci
fically authorizing an income tax why not givo
them a chance to vote an amendment providing
for the election of United States senators by
popular vote? In your speech of acceptance
you said that you were personally inclined to
favor such a change in the constitution. Would
this not be an opportune time to present the
subject to congress? Two constitutional amend
ments one authorizing an income tax and the
other providing for tho popular election of sen
ators would make your administration memor
able and I pledge you whatever assistance I
can render in securing the ratification of these
amendments. With great respect, I am yours
truly, w. J. BRYAN.
The White House, Washington, July 22, 1909.
My Dear Sir: I hve your kind letter of July
13. I am not prepared to urge as an adminis
tration matter the submission of an amendment
changing the constitution with reference to the
election of United States senators by popular
vote. As I Bald in my "speech of acceptance," I
Hardly deem this a party question, and as there
Is a very wide difference of opinion in my own
party in respect to it, I think it ought to bo
presented to congress not as a party or as- an
administration queslidn, -but as a matter of in
dividual opinion, With great respect, I am,
Very sincerely yours,
jfc. .. .-i, , .. WILLIAM H.TAFT.
JBTon. William Jennlngrf Bryan,
The Commoner, Lincoln, Nebraska.
It is as we feared it would be. President Taft
'declines to recommend the submission of a con
stitutional amendment providing for "the elec
tion of United States senators by popular vote.
In the same speech in which he declared for an
Income tax he said he was personally inclined
to favor the popular election of senators. He
recommends an income tax, but declines to
recommend the senatorial proposition.
It seems that he does not regard his expres
sion of personal friendliness as committing him
to any effort to secure the amendment. As it is
not necessary for him to sign a' joint resolution
submitting such an amendment and as he now
declines to recommend it it would look like
his reference to it was a matter of surplusage.
It Is hardly fair to hold out such hopes during
the campaign and then disappoint them when
the election is over; we were afraid of it, as see
notification speech, August, 1908:
"With respect to the election of senators by
the people, personally, I am inclined to favor
It, but it is hardly a party question. A resolu-
CONTENTS
ELECTION OF SENATORS BY THE PEOPLE
"EVERYTHING ALL RIGHT"
; CAN NOT UNLOAD
EDUCATIONAL SERIES "CANNONISM"
AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
REPUBLICAN CORRECTS REPUBLICAN
THE MONETARY COMMISSION
NO TIME FOR SENTIMENT
WHY I PREFER ENGLAND BY AN AMER
ICAN MILLIONAIRE
THE BANK GUARANTEE IN CHICAGO
CURRENT TOPICS
'HOME DEPARTMENT
NEWS OF THE WEEK
tlon in iU favor has passed a republican houso
of representative soveral times and has boon
rojected In a republican senate by tho votes of
senators from both parties. It has beon ap
proved by the legislatures of many republican
states. In a number of states, both democratic
and republican, substantially such a system now
prevails."
ADVISABILITY OF THE POPULAR PLAN
The late Senator Stephen R. Mallory gave to
Georgetown University in the District of Co
lumbia a generous sum, the lntorest on which
was to be used as a prize for tho most merito
rious original essay on any question arising out
of or relating to the constitution of the United
States, or arising out of or relating to tho re
publican system of government. It was provid
ed that at least 600 copies of tho prize essay
should be published in pamphlet form within
three months after tho modal had been awarded.
Tho Mallory prize essay for 1909 was entitled
"The Advisability of Electing United States
Senators by Popular Ballot." This essay was
written -by Earl John Mohn of the' Georgetown
Law School, class of 1910. Mr. Mohn's resi
dence is 309 Rebecca street, East End, Pittsburg,
Pa. Tho essay is so interesting and instructive
that The Commoner reproduces it in full.
"VOX POPULI, VOX DEI"
PART I
The convention that met at Philadelphia In
1787 and framed our national constitution was
about equally divided between tho advocates of
a national and the advocates of a confederate
government. The great conflict between these
two factions was fonght over the question of
representation in our national legislature tho
congress of tho United States. Men whoso
names play a great part in the history of our
country were very active in this conclave. Tho
nationalists, as they were popularly called, were
under the leadership of such brilliant men as
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, James
Wilson and Gouverneur Morris, while tho con
federates were almost equally strong under tho
command of equally great men Patterson, Lan
sing and Luther Martin.
A careful scrutiny of the conditions which
surrounded theso men when this incomparable
political compact was mado reveals tho conflict
ing claims and warring factions ever present
when popular action is invoked. A compromise
was inevitable. And we can not too heartily
thank God' that the apparent superhuman wis
dom of Roger Sherman and Benjamin Franklin
rescued the sinking craft (for failure of con-,
federation had made the destruction of the freed
nation imminent) and harmonizing incongruous
Impulses, steered it Into placid waters. The
sovereignty of the new states was necessarily
guarded with earnest vigor and keen watchful
ness by nearly all the participants in the con
vention. It was apparent from the outset that
some concessions must be made to strengthen
the weakened bonds of union, but that those
concessions should be yielded only after tho
most careful scrutiny Into their effect and when
tho absolute necessity therefor had been estab
lished, seems to have been the actuating prin
ciple of most of the delegates. And this was
not unnatural nor surprising.
"The people," said Sherman, "should have
as little to do as. may be about the government;
they want information and are constantly liable
to be misled," and again, "Popular election is
not likely to produce fit men." Mr. Gerry used
language nearly as strong while Mr. Randolph
Indiscriminately attributed the evils of the coun
try to the "turbulence and follies of democracy."
But the skilful management of cooler heads and
the personal influence of Madison of Virginia
who earnestly advocated the system of election
by the people and declared that he "thought
the great fabric to be raised would be more
stablo and durablo If It should rest on the solid
foundation of the pooplo itself than if it should
stand merely on tho pillars of tho legislature,"
averted what might easily havo become a serious
conflict and imperilled the chances of union.
But it was an early conclusion that In order to
induco tho consent of the states domlnatod by
such sontiments at least one of tho branches -of
tho legislature should accord in Its selection,
mornborshlp and power with tho two funda
mental requirements recognition of the sov
ereignty of tho stato and restraint of popular
action. Tho first is tho ono absolutely perma
nent featuro of the Instrument, for no imagin
able development of political ethics admits a
possibility of its voluntary cession. Tho mooted
question depends entirely upon tho necessity and
extent of application of tho second requirement.
No ono will deny tho unreliability of tho occa
sional waves of popular sentiment nor the de
sirability of some check upon the possible vacil
lation in governmental policy thoy might other
wise effect; but a freo country must dopond upon
tho will of its supporters. Tho consent of tho
governed implies tho exerciso of a conscious
intelligence, not tho moro aggregation of a ma
terial force.
"Tho senate," says Garrison, "was tho great
stumbling block almost tho crux In the con
stitutional settlement." Edmund Randolph's
plan provided for tho election of senators by
tho hoMso "out of a proper number of porsons
nominated by tho individual legislatures."
George Reld's plan substituted tho president for
tho house. Dickinson, following SpralgUt of
North Carolina, moved that tho loglslaturce -.
olect. Wilson of Pennsylvania, "than whom,"
says ex-Governor Higglns of Rhode Island,
"thoro was no greater mind In tho line of Juris
prudence," on tho othor hand advocated direct
popular eloctlon by districts arguing that a
choice by the legislatures would "introduce and
cherish local interests and local prejudices."
Wilson's plan failed, but somo of tho greatest
patriots and legal minds in tho convention were
in favor of its adoption even at that time and In
that form.
Wo can readily see that some of the rojected
schemes would havo had their own dangers and
abuses, but who can say whether tho result of
tho adoption of any ono of them would have
been more disastrous than that of Dickinson's
under which we havo worked for moro than a
century? Dickinson, as I havo mentioned above,
moved that the respective state legislatures elect
their representatives to tho upper houso of con
gress. His motion was carried and at that mo
ment Article I, Section III, of the Constitution
of tho United States took Its life.
"It is a maxim in law," says Edwin Maxey,
tho eminent writer on political science, "that -reason
is tho soul of law and when the reason
ceases tho law should cease. This maxim is
entirely logical although the logic of theory does
not conform to tho logic of fact." Applying this
bit of philosophy to tho case in hand we are
furnished with an explanation of tho continu
ance of the present method of electing United
States senators, but not necessarily with a justi
fication of it. When the framers of our consti
tution placed in that instrument the provision
that senators should be elected by the state legis
latures, thus making It tho supremo law of the
land, thoy had a reason for so doing and they
considered the reason a good one. They, or at
least tho great majority of them, believed that
it would not be safe to have the United States
senators elected by the people, any more than
it would be to have tho president so elected.
Their democracy had not developed to the point
whero they had sufficient confidence in the wis
dom and conservatism of tho people to entrust
them with the power of electing more than one
branch of congress.
Holding these views they had a reason for
favoring tho method which they adopted for
electing senators. But the advancement of
political science, tho astounding growth of our
country and the Intelligence of our people have
removed the reason, and this is proven by the
fact that all over this land the trend seems to
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